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ABSTRACT
Legitimacy in American Politics
Robert R. Higgins
,
B.A., University of Maine at Orono
M.A., University of Massachusetts,
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor William E. Connolly
A crisis of confidence and effectiveness has con-
fronted the American welfare state for more than a decade.
This dissertation contributes to assessments of the crisis
by exploring how the very mission of the welfare state has
helped disrupt and politicize traditional cultural
sources of political legitimacy. I initially develop this
position by counterposing liberal, Marxist, and hermeneu-
tic theories of legitimacy. I focus on the debts of these
theories to sharply divergent concepts of social structure
and culture, and analyze the social and epistemological
commitments which shape these concepts. The major authors
considered include liberal S. M. Lipset
,
Marxist James
O'Connor, and Jurgen Habermas, who incorporates a hermen-
eutic element into his critical theory.
I argue that none of these theories adequately cap-
tures the particularly American form of the historical
erosion of tradition, and develop this argument by examin-
ing one aspect of this erosion, the relationship between
IV
legitimacy and racial segregation. Widespread public
acceptance of the welfare state depended in large part
upon its image of providing security at work and in the
family. Yet major theories of welfare state crisis do
not pursue the ways in which the welfare state’s halting
embrace of integration symbolically threatened these
commitments to work and to family. I explore the histori-
cal connections of segregation to the motivations which
have traditionally sustained intense modern work patterns
and the patriarchal family, the special debt of these
connections to the sexual aspects of racial ideology, and
their wider implications for the emergence of conservative
challenges to welfare liberalism.
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CHAPTER I
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND LEGITIMACY
Introduction
This opening chapter will set out the development
of scientific liberalism in the political science profes-
sion, and efforts within this mainstream to treat the
legitimacy of political and social institutions. The major
task of this review will be to clarify the social and
epistemological commitments which have shaped the main-
stream and limited its treatment of legitimacy. I will do
this by focusing on, and suggesting connections between,
the mainstream's scientific approach to explanation and
its professional-managerial status within the social divi-
sion of labor. In this appraisal, I will draw on two
different perspectives: Marxist theory, and a cultural
hermeneutic approach to social explanation. This appraisal
thus anticipates a fuller examination of these perspec-
tives' contributions to legitimacy theory later in the
dissertation
.
I shall argue, in sum, that interwoven epistemologi-
cal and social commitments have limited the mainstream's
appreciation of the interwoven and mutually constraining
1
2nature of state, economy, and culture. I shall also argue
that these commitments have limited the mainstream's grasp
of social beliefs and of the vital expressive dimension of
social activity. These deficiencies are exhibited not only
directly in studies of legitimacy, but also in the entire
corpus of scientific liberal study from 1950 to 1970, a
body of work which functioned in part to legitimate the New
Deal state in that period. The effect of these deficiencies
has been to preclude the mainstream's anticipation of the
legitimation problems to confront the state after the mid-
1960' s, as well as its understanding of these problems once
they arose.
I. Overview of Political Science
Prior to the hegemony of behavioral political science,
the notion of the state was a major organizing principle
of political inquiry. In political philosophy, the theory
of the state organized thought on the "right order" of
social life and the politics necessary to achieve it. The
ends proper to a social order, the interests of a life in
common, political ethics, how we might know the good, and
theories of obligation: the state (or political community),
however conceived, touched on all of these themes in classi-
cal political philosophy, quite openly and consciously in
the best of it.
3Apart from Marx's critique of philosophy, since at
least the early 1900's political philosophy has come under
recurrent intellectual attack within the university. An
increasingly dominant force within the study of politics
since then, the adherents in each wave of what David Truman
has called "the new realism" have swamped the tradition of
political philosophy. The result is that virtually all of
the institutional positions and support available today for
political study are dominated by representatives of a tra-
dition of thought barely half a century old. How is this
change to be understood?
I will basically argue that it derives from profound
developments in the social division of labor fostering the
growth of professional occupations. These developments
brought together people in and out of the university on the
basis of mutual, though not identical, political and social
concerns. In post-1900 America, professional occupations
typically combine scientific or expert knowledge with a
direct or indirect function of social management. Political
science, dominated by scientific liberals, embodies these
qualities in ways I shall clarify below.
Pre-scientism and early realism . Alongside the classical
tradition of political philosophy grew up, in the late 19th
century, an approach to political study which incorporated
many of the concerns of the classical approach--classical
4philosophy was its acknowledged ancestor. The beginning of
this "formal-legal" approach to political study is associated
in histories of the discipline with the immigration of
German intellectuals to this country and reflects the close
ties political science has always had to legal education
.
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Studies in this tradition have usually been quite open
in avowing opinion on the right order of political life,
though not as concerned with justifying their claims as
classical philosophy. Rather, the emphasis in these studies
could be said to rest more on Aristotle's formal cause of
the polity: a description of the state under scrutiny, a
classification of states from the point of view of certain
notions of the good state, most often the liberal-democratic
one. Woodrow Wilson, whose Congressional Government is often
cited as an early "realist" work, is actually a transitional
figure to the early realism. His text, The State
,
is a
good example of the formal-legal approach— a classification
of governments, the organic metaphor for society, the state
as government and government as legal force organized for
, 2
common ends.
A better representative of this approach is the work
of Ernest Barker, an English political theorist. His essay,
"The State," represents both the contributions and limita-
tions of the formalist tradition which early "realists"
revolted against. For Barker the state is "essentially
3law." It is "in its primary and abstract sense, the
5status or position, common to us all, of being the members
of a legal association ." 4 The state is one face of the
Nation, which "acts in a social or voluntary way, as a
social order or Society," and "acts in a legal or compulsory
way, as a legal order or State ." 5 Law exists to promote
the general good to ensure "to the greatest possible number
of persons" that they have the "external conditions required
by every citizen for the development of his capacities ." 6
These conditions are, in sum, rights which the individual
has against society— a legal "persona" or "mask ." 7 Rights
as liberty carve out a realm of personal expression and
development the principle of voluntarism; a realm of eco-
nomic freedom— "whether with hand or brain" and a realm of
political liberty—the "positive legal right of constitut-
ing and controlling government ." 8
One recognizes in Barker the abstract state of Marx's
early critiques—the illusory community where individual
freedom is defined in opposition to society, where commu-
nality is imposed as an external condition, in which indi-
viduals must actually put on masks to have interests in
common, where a people's unity is in the abstraction of law
imposed ultimately by the sanction of force. One also
recognizes the ground for the criticism both Marx and the
scientific liberals could make against Barker: as correct
as the legal description might be, it lacks the animation
and substance of actual human interests, of "sensuous
6human activity"~it is ’’unreal" in that sense, a legal
formalism, not the stuff of "actual politics."
One manifestation of early "realism" was Arthur
Bentley ' S ghg Process of Government
, the early pluralist
work which was self-consciously realist, scientific, and
highly critical of the traditional approach to political
study. Bentley's work was a harbinger of a new political
science which based itself on the logical-positivist
attack within philosophy on "metaphysics." As understood
by R. Schmidt, a contemporary of Bentley’s, "the new politi-
cal science frees itself from the speculative viewpoint,
leaves the metaphysical question of the State to one side,
and confines itself to the world of experience
.
On Bentley's account, the formal^-legal approach too
often resulted in a "formal study of the most external
characteristics of governing institutions," all the more
unpalatable because "when it is necessary to touch up this
barren formalism with a glow of humanity, an injection of
metaphysics is used." "The state as discussed in politi-
cal science is usually the 'idea of the state,’ and that
is not good raw material for an investigation." Bentley
thus attacks the focus on the state—which on his reading
means only government institutions— as unduly restricting
the definition of politics and thus the "raw material" to
be investigated.
7On his account, the state-as-government is a group,
an association different only in degree from other groups.
Because politics, for Bentley, is essentially a matter of
the balance of power among interests, if pushed Bentley
would simply define the state as the "sum of the activities
comprised within government," government understood as the
p rocess of mutual group adjustment in or out of actual
legal institutions
.
13
Because Bentley saw the legalists
paying too little attention to politics and because he saw
them as limiting politics to the state-as-government,
Bentley "expanded” the definition of politics and government
to power relations among interests. "Expanded" is used
advisedly
,
because essential to that expansion is the
contraction or disappearance of overt normative concerns.
Another part of this early realist trend important
for the discipline's self-definition was the practical-
reformist impulse behind the founding of the APSA and the
National Municipal League—an impulse which also had roots
in the more traditional approach to political study. Its
prominent concerns were to bring political study down from
the level of formal abstraction to the level of "practical
knowledge" and thereby to make political study more rele-
vant to public officials
.
11
This point brings us to an
examination of the scientific liberals' social context.
8The professional-managerial background
. If we are to
clarify the shift to "realism” and scientism, we must
address the social context of this transformation. Changes
in class and economy are a crucial part of this context.
And, to make them clear, an historical argument about
literalism and science is in order.
Liberal thought originally emerged in a context of
social revolution, a revolution propelled in part by
changes in social class relations which allowed and fostered
new productive techniques. In appraising the development
of these technologies, men like Francis Bacon became
philosophers of the new science they found in craftsmen's
empirical, experimental tinkering. The empirical, mathe-
matical, and mechanical sensibilities of these new men of
science influenced liberal thought in profound ways. They
helped infuse the intellectual climate with a standard to
be applied in knowing not only nature, but also society,
and a standard by which we could not only know society
,
but
a lso improve it through the material progress it would
inform. That is, they helped shape a major claim of
liberal thought, that science might ameliorate or solve
age-old social problems, especially those rooted in material
. . 15
scarcity
.
This claim of liberal ideology emerged in somewhat
altered form, and with renewed force, by the end of the
919th century. As it had been originally, it was shaped in
complex ways by the development of social class relations
and technology. in a series of struggles over roughly a
forty-year period (1880-1920), capital broke the craft
organization of production remaining inside many industries.
By seizing control over production itself, capital "freed"
the mental aspect of production, and science itself, as
forces in both the abstraction and degradation of labor and
in the expansion of production. This degradation and
abstraction of labor exacerbated the social problems of
poverty and unemployment endemic to capitalism, at the same
time that it helped to undermine the craft organization of
many working class communities.
In the context of this turmoil, occupations evolved
or emerged in the social division of labor concerned pri-
marily with planning and social control in production
(i.e., engineers), and social control and reform outside
production (i.e., social workers, cultural workers, posi-
tions related to advertising, lawyers). These occupations
developed largely under the pressure of capital's need to
intervene directly and continuously in the work process,
and increasingly in the everyday life of the working class
—
raising the rate of exploitation, fostering attitudes
amenable to capitalist work requirements, socializing
immigrant labor, dealing with social disorder. The dominant
self-images of this emerging class, and the activities they
10
informed, were both accepting and critical of capitalism-
in part because of pressure from the left, and in part
because of genuine revulsion from what appeared as the
"excesses" of capitalism. These self-images included the
task of bringing order and rationality to social life,
reforming capitalism and mediating the disputes between
capital and labor, and the application of scientific/
technical expertise to the surrounding world. These self-
images express the mediate position of these occupations in
the class structure, and are in effect modern statements of
the liberal vision I summarized above. This vision is of a
society improved and run by men of science and knowledge,
overcoming material scarcity and its attendant social con-
flicts. Any account of the new science of politics
gestating in this period, or of its subsequent development
and content, would be radically incomplete without an
account of these visions, and without an account of the
relation of these scientific aspirations to the social
division of labor and the problems it spawned.
The rise of scientism
. After Bentley the renewed impetus
for a science of politics came during the 1920 's through a
1 7series of books, graduate programs, and conferences.
Books by Charles Merriam and G. E. Catlin on the scientific
study of politics, and by Stuart Rice on quantitative
methods in political study were key works in setting out
11
the intellectual grounding and framework of the new profes-
sion. Merriam
' s graduate seminars trained many of the
later important behavioral scientists, including V. o. Key
and Gabriel Almond. Merriam was also a co-founder of the
Social Science Research Council, an interdisciplinary
association of behaviorists seeking to promote and refine
training and research in their fields. 18
The implication of this surge for the study of the
state was a sharper restatement of the Bentley critique.
An example of this critique is a 1934 book, The State as a
Concept of Po litical Science
, whose author writes of "strong
reasons for entertaining serious doubts as to the poten-
tialities of a science which 'begins and ends with the
state.'" On the author's view, apart from the problems
internal to the idea of the state (i.e., its "metaphysical"
nature), the number of contemporary states was entirely too
limited. Even drawing on historical states as additional
data, "from such meager materials brilliant results can
scarcely be expected." He quotes G. E. Catlin approvingly
on this score: "Politics, if it is to be a science, must
be based on the study of some act which is repeated count-
less times a day, not on the study of sixty states," 21
Political science has perhaps been best a prediction when
presaging its own future practices. Here, bound up with
the scientific approach and typical of later practice,
method determines the substance of study. The utility of
12
an "expanded" definition of politics is not simply lts
greater "reality," but just as importantly its serendipi-
tous creation of unlimited raw data.
Yet despite the attack on "speculative” and formal-
legal study, realists prior to WW II were not in control
of the discipline. Political studies was still "a disci-
pline without a clear intellectual identity," and still
lacked that "central, organizing set of concepts or body of
theory which the realists saw as necessary to their
22
science. The post-war "behavioral revolution" provided
the basis for this dominant paradigm, and the "revolution"
required itself the confluence of several factors. In addi-
tion to the underlying need for a professional identity and
the dovetailing of scientism with that need, it required a
refinement of technique, a definition of the movement's
overall concerns, and an array of financial and institu-
tional support to push the third and triumphant wave of
realists to dominance in political science.
The refinement of techniques took place in part
through early marketing and advertising studies, which may
help account for subsequent financial backing of private
foundations. In fact, Lazarsfeld's pioneer voting study,
The People's Choice
,
was done "piggyback" on a marketing
survey he was doing at the time. Techniques were also
given great impetus by WW II, as evidenced by Samuel
Stouffer's vast work on draftees for the U.S. Army, later
13
published as The American_Soldier
.
24
Also important in
this regard was the 1930' s group of German immigrants to
U.S. universities who helped develop survey techniques and
added to the weight of science advocates at schools like
Columbia and the New School.
A sense of the political concerns of post-WW II
political science may be gained from Gabriel Almond's argu-
ment that empirical studies and the political events of the
first half of the twentieth century had helped undermine
classical and legal theory's analyses of modern politics
and democracies, as well as a common Enlightenment heritage
of faith in education as a civilizing force. 25 The collapse
of Weimar, the Great Depression, fascism, World War II, and
the developing cold war all contributed to a general concern
for the stability of Western polities. A quick glance at
the prefaces, dedications, and hypotheses of post-war
behavioral studies is sufficient to confirm this observation
It was not until the late 1940’ s, when corporate
foundations funded the behavioral science movement, that
political scientists could successfully dominate the study
of politics. These foundations were open to the profes-
sional claims of behavioralists in large part because of
the success of applied science's social control and produc-
tive roles in the work process. The foundations had, for
instance, already created and funded new universities such
as Rensselaer, and funded existing universities, to supply
14
the required basic research and engineering manpower; they
had also funded the development of industrial sociology
and various other managerially-oriented sciences. The fund-
ing of behavioral political studies in the late 1940
' s was
a logical extension of these management concerns to broader
social and political issues, especially in the context of
Depression-era disorder and the attractions of left-wing
movements
.
Ford generously financed many Social Science Research
Council operations, and through its own agencies and the
SSRC it was responsible for funding: various APSA commit-
tees on research into political behavior; research, books,
and articles which became models for the field and propelled
their authors to academic prominence; research institutes
at Stanford, Michigan, Princeton, North Carolina, and
Columbia; training seminars in scientific techniques; inven-
tories of political knowledge, etc. In short, foundation
money was the material cause which set in motion and sus-
tained the behavioral revolution; it was fundamental in
establishing the institutional and research network which
girds and sets the intellectual tone for the discipline.
27In Robert Dahl's words:
If the foundations had been hostile to the behav-
ioral approach, there can be no doubt it would
have had very rough sledding indeed.
What were the immediate concerns which Ford and other
foundations brought to their funding programs? The
15
immediate post-war era threatened a return to the economic
problems and social turmoil of the 1930' s: maintenance of
wartime levels of investment and production was not an
assured thing, waves of strikes spoke of working class
militancy, racial uprisings and conflict over civil rights
loomed on the horizon, left-wing parties still had signifi-
cant organizational strength in the U.S. and were making
impressive showings in Europe, and turnout for elections
(elections being a central element in the legitimation
process) was at an all-time low. In the face of these
circumstances, the Ford Foundation sought explanations,
reliable indicators of social problems and unrest, and a
revamping of legitimating ideology for the political
process. With this context in mind, here are some represen-
tative sentiments from a Ford Foundation report on the need
for behavioral political studies. These statements indicate,
to a considerable degree, the mutual concerns of corporate
planners and professional experts: 28
the committee's attention was also directed to
the widespread apathy, misunderstanding, and
ignorance concerning political issues, person-
alities, and public needs. This poses a great
danger to self-government. It is evidenced not
only in the failure of many citizens to exercise
their rights as voters with interest and intelli-
gence, but also their neglect of many opportunities
for participation in public affairs.
In a most realistic and practical manner, inter-
group hostilities weaken our democratic strength
by dissipating important resources of energy in
internal conflicts, and by swelling the ranks of
malcontents who constitute the seed bed for
undemocratic ideologies.
16
At the same time, the committee was impressed withthe struggie of thoughtful and informed persons tond a meaningful, contemporary and useable defini-t!on of democracy. Without such a definition
millions of Americans remain confused in their
analysis of crucial problems.
What the new profession of political science produced,
within the pressures of corporate funding, was a body of
political knowledge bearing the imprint of both corporate
concerns an d the technocratic/managerial ideology so con-
stitutive of the PMC life-world. These imprints bear in
turn, though in a manner epistemologically unconscious of
itself, corporate and PMC concerns with the
ability of subordinate populations to disrupt the social
agenda of elite groups. Peter Bachrach has aptly described
these concerns as a "revolt from the masses." The revised
theory of democracy produced by this revolt held, for
instance, that elites were the guardians of democratic
values, that apathy is functional for democracy, and so
29
on
.
As I shall argue in the next two sections, in order
to reach such conclusions, the new science of politics had
first to do away with inherently normative and politically
suggestive terms such as class and state, and then to
reduce absolutely necessary concepts like power and interest
to highly behavioral/operational definitions. These defini-
tions created, in the revised theory of democracy, a
startling likeness to the social relations in production
17
resulting from capital's seizure of the work process. The
great mass of people could only engage in the operational
equivalent of democracy—pulling the voting lever—while
elites themselves possessed the values, ideas, and techni-
cal expertise to manage the democratic state.
By assuming this behavioral stance, political science
could ratify a system which discarded older aspirations for
participation in decision making, or for an active citizenry
as unsuited to industrial society—much as their engineering
counterparts like F. W. Taylor did with social relationships
30m Production. Yet, this was no conspiracy on the part
of political scientists. Rather, it was the result of
internally-woven class and epistemological pressures to
abstract the social world into routine and creative labor,
and as mental labor, to regard the body politic objectively,
much as an engineer regards a machine—or a worker.
II. Political Science and Legitimacy
The self-image of the realists who came to dominance
after WW II was largely one of builders of a science of
politics, modeled on their understanding of the physical
31sciences: covering law explanation. The general goal
which united those in the forefront of the movement was a
discipline dedicated to the search for "systematic,
ordered, predictive propositions" and to a "long struggle
32to put 'is' in place of 'ought to be.'" Developing an
18
elite-pluralist paradigm within these epistemological con-
cerns, the mainstream of the discipline arrived at a virtual
equation between political stability and legitimate
authority. This equation derived from a general concern,
nurtured by the behavioral revolution, for the stability of
political hierarchy and the management of social conflict
and disorganization. For the purpose of later comparison
with Marxist and hermeneutic theory, it will be useful to
explore this concern for stability from two perspectives:
the scientific liberals' treatment of social structure and
of cultural beliefs.
Regarding social structure, the mainstream developed
a picture of "modern industrial society" with two major
facets. One is a usually implicit political economy accept-
ing of capitalist economics, largely committed until
recently to the project of New Deal economic and social
management. The other has been a functionalist account of
the stratification required in "modern industrial society."
Both facets involve an account of relations of influence
and constraint among state, economy, and social stratifica-
tion. Regarding cultural beliefs, the mainstream has
relied on a social psychology built around the externality
of beliefs to activity and the top-down transmission of
beliefs from elites to subordinate populations. This
externalist treatment can be seen particularly in scientific
liberal studies of value consensus and in voting studies.
19
My account of these features is abstracted from a
number of nominally different works sharing the elite-
pluralist perspective. No one work fits this synopsis
completely, though Lipset
' s The First New Nation and
Almond and Verba's The Civic Culture come quite close
.
33
In my synopsis, I have not confined myself to works which
directly analyze legitimacy. The reason is that, shaped
by the interplay of forces internal and external to the
discipline, such research shared with the rest of the elite
Pluralist corgus the articulation of legitimating ideology
for "modern industrial society," and also shared the task
of producing indicators of (instability for social manage-
ment. Treatments of social structure and ideology by the
mainstream thus bear the imprint of the PMC in its relation
to corporate and subordinate interests, as discussed in
Section I.
Social structure. The search for science in the discipline
entailed a certain commitment to what could be known and
how it might be known. With its roots in "logical empiri-
cism, the mainstream firmly grounded its search for the
real in the traditional liberal tenet of the self-contained
individual. This "methodological individualism " 34 has
sharply defined and constricted the nature of inquiry.
Research also took place within an unexamined, a usually
tacit commitment to Keynesian economics and the idea of a
20
welfare state. Given the acceptance of this framework,
political science documented the activities of the New
Deal State: electoral politics, "fine-tuning” the economy,
regulating its excesses, and organizing an array of social
programs to cope with the problems generated by capitalist
development. These methodological and social commitments,
I would argue, weakened the mainstream's perception of
structural relations between the state and its social-
economic context. Moreover, the behavioral revolution
entrenched itself so successfully that its methodological
commitments formed the unexamined ground of political
debate (especially through the mid-1960's) in the discipline.
The major debate during the 1950's and 1960 's which
subsumed the relation of the state to its social—economic
context was the debate between pluralist and elite interpre-
tations of American society. The pluralist version of
society pictured an overlapping, shifting melange of groups
in which inequalities of wealth, power, and status were not
cumulative or systematic. A market version of social
theory, it pictured no coherent power structure, nor
consistent sources of structural pressure upon state
policy, but rather the dispersion of power among competing
groups. Thus in the political market, pluralists presented
the state as a neutral and vulnerable arbiter which set
the rules of competition and which reflected as closely as
possible the balance of forces current at any moment in
21
the interest group system. Even the interests of unorgan-
ized people-
-ghetto blacks or migrant workers—were repre-
sented by responsible elected leaders. With fragmented
elites competing for the support of diverse publics, a
representative and responsible rule of circulating elites
democracy
—was assured.
Using a monopoly theory of power, elite theorists
denied this pleasing picture, one which was deeply influ-
enced by corporate funding of behavioral political studies.
Instead, critics pictured a crystallized, interlocking,
coherent elite, occupying positions of command in the major
institutions of society, representing their own interests
consistently against the interests of a largely unorganized,
subordinate public. From this perspective, the elite
competition so central to the pluralist version of democ-
racy existed only at what C. Wright Mills termed the
"middle levels of power." And, the elite monopoly of
political power, critics agreed, was representative and
responsible to the masses only by chance. Thus the state,
from this perspective, was an instrument in the hands of a
ruling elite which physically occupied key positions and
offices
.
There was some "give" by pluralists in the course of
this debate, but the debate itself reveals as much in the
way of shared assumptions among pluralists and elite
critics as it does in divergent opinions about American
22
democracy. Basic among these shared grounds, I would argue,
were the epistemological assumptions of methodological
individualism. Decisions, nondecisions, recruitment of
personnel into the state and political parties, campaign
contributions—all these individual nodules of reality,
things in themselves, were piled up by most elite critics
and searched for patterns
.
35
Yet, shared standards of
evidence and a non-relational view of reality made it
possible for pluralists to undermine, in a logical way,
some of the devastating and incriminating patterns of
access to the state documented by elite theorists.
Elite theory challenged the pluralist assertion that
competing elites assured responsible, representative govern-
ment. Their challenge was based on the thoroughly docu-
mented, continuous, insular control of key institutions by
36coherent, interlocking elite. However,
In raising this challenge, elite theorists haveignored the basic assumption of pluralism: that
control of government implies control of policy.
Having demonstrated elite control of government,
they have then been saddled with the impossible'
task of demonstrating that every social policy
serves the elite. And this has been the main
point on which the pluralists have hung their
counter-critique
.
The pluralist counter-critique, of course, was then enabled
by assumptions it tacitly shared with elite theory to
caricature elite theory as conspiratorial and to correctly
criticize it as an overblown picture of the actual exercise
of power.
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What would an alternative view of society have to say
about this debate? Both Marxist and hermeneutic analysis
would point out that class, as social stratification, is
not simply a collection of individual inequalities, but is
fundamentally a relation which is itself internally connected
to other institutions and relations of society. A Marxist
would go on to say. that because class is an unequal, contra-
dictory relation, class has built into it tension, conflict,
and struggle, even when accommodated to by subordinate mem-
bers of the relation. As such, it is an historical
phenomenon whose history is this struggle. As a relation,
class does not exist outside this history.
Anticipating the discussions of chapter two, this
view would enable us to articulate a theory of state power
which accommodates elite theorists- documentation of insti-
tutional command, pluralist critiques that elite theorists
overestimate instrumental elite power, and the dynamic
quality of social antagonisms bound up with class-oriented
policy-making. Mintz et. al. capture especially well the
limits on elite power set by subordinate populations : 37
Ruling class theory assumes an elite which is
unified by common economic interests and reinforced
by conflict with other classes. As in elitism,
their power is by virtue of their positions, but
the role of the masses is quite different. Rather
than an impotent public unable to influence policy,
the subordinate classes voice their interests
through their power to disrupt the major institu-
tions of society by means of strikes, sit-ins, or
riots
.
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Instead of an elite which is absolutely victorious on every
issue in which it has a stake, we have instead a class
which through its control of major social institutes domi-
nates-within the constraints imposed by its opposites-
state policy decisions. Yet this picture of instrumental
control tempered by class structure remains itself i„ need
of tempering through an appraisal of other structural con-
straints upon the state and of the simple, two-class model.
I will address these issues as I examine Marxist James
0 Connor's work in chapter two.
The elite-pluralist debate, in due time, succumbed
in the dead end into which it had turned, leaving scientific
elite-pluralism largely intact. But we require a further
review of the mainstream's account of social structure in
order to clarify its limitations, to note the influence
upon it of PMC concerns, and to sharpen the comparison
with O'Connor's alternative.
According to elite-pluralist theory, inequality exists
in the U.S. but is not crystallized into coherent and
OO
politically contending classes. ° Instead, politics takes
place through a melange of shifting interest group coali-
tions which express inequality yet cut across and mute
permanent class divisions. This theory is compatible with,
and draws upon, behavioral sociological research which
describes inequality as a pyramid of occupations and
incomes, within which widespread social mobility helps
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blur the class divisions that might otherwise support
"extremist" politics.
Between 1950 and the late 1960's, the mainstream also
tacitly relied on what seemed to be the indefinitely expand-
ing horizons of a fine-tuned economy as a damper on "extrem
ism" from the lower orders of this hierarchy-an expanding
pie even for those
-with smaller slices. In fact the state,
it was generally assumed, could and should rely on economic
growth to provide revenue for redistributive programs aimed
at problem areas of the social hierarchy. (The acute
problem of racial inequality which remained, it was argued,
was not especially representative or revealing about
oninequality in general. And sexual inequality was not in
itself a matter of scrutiny.) 40
It is somewhat difficult, on the whole, to present a
coherent picture ol mainstream views of inequality because
these views themselves were, are, often contradictory.
They are contradictory on the whole in that they attempt to
reconcile capitalism and democracy, as C. B. MacPherson has
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argued. And, they are contradictory because they express
the contradictory position of the PMC in the class struc-
ture. Thus on the one hand, according to the dominant
view, modern industrial society requires inequality. On
the other, excesses of inequality are unfair, or at least
justifiably objects of the political process. This tension
resolved itself in part through the mainstream's commitment
26
to New Deal, and Initially Great Society, social programs,
and through ideological overstatements of social mobility.
S. M. Lipset, characteristically, articulates these ten-
sions
:
42
My own politics derive from the belief that whiledifferences m the distribution of statue; -j n „
and power (stratification) are inLrenffn the ’
is unlaid
any C
°TfX social system, such inequalityf r.
. . And since I feel that inequality
'
though inevitable, is immoral
.
I support a?l measureswhich would bring the utopian "equality of status andopportunity" closer to realization. (his emphasis)
In fact, Lipset finds inequality to be highly func-
tional for democracy if expressed through the interest group
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How? Because the interest group system allows a
moderate amount of social conflict to surface. Seeking sup-
port from conflicting groups, political elites compete for
office (the central trait of democracy, according to scien-
tific liberals), helping process the demands of the inter-
est group system (mediated inequality) into state policy.
In this rou t in izat ion of conflict" through groups,
parties, and the state, legitimacy is a result of two basic
factors. Directly, adherence by citizens to a value con-
sensus on political "rules of the game"—minority rights,
majority rule, etc. — legitimates the exercise of public
power. Indirectly but equally important, legitimacy also
depends on the ability of political elites to process inter-
est group demands into effective policy.
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Lipset basic formulation is echoed throughout the
mainstream, most obviously in the "systems" approach to
politics which mainstream research and texts have heavily
re led upon. This schema represents inputs into the
political system as both interest group demands and diffuse
public support for political leaders. Diffuse public sup-
port derives from the democratic value system and a "feed-
back loop of public opinion about government output, i.e.
effectiveness.” This basic formulation is plausible, to
a certain point. But it had crucial weaknesses in its
treatment of values, which I shall deal with in the next
sub-section, and on the question of limits to effectiveness.
Though systems theory explicitly addressed the "links”
between the political system and its social-economic envi-
ronment, it had little sense of possible kinks in these
connections, little sense of limits to effectiveness.
Instead, formulated from a managerial perspective, and on
the assumption of continuous economic growth, it could not
even frame the question of a limited managerial capability.
The growth of political disaffection in the mid to
late 1960's, though, increasingly focused attention from
left and right on the limits to state effectiveness. The
left, influenced in part by the Marxist tradition, has
increasingly focused on the constraints imposed by capital-
ist economic and social relations. The right, more self-
conscious about these relations but still accepting of
28
them, increasingly focused on forms of
pation
,
within which it included the i
as constraints to state effectiveness.
democratic partici-
nterest group system,
In ?he End of Liberalism and its revised second edi-
tion, Theodore Lowi attempts to come to terms with the
crisis of the welfare state from this neo-conservative point
of view. Explicitly accepting the capitalist economy,
Lowi seeks a political order which can deal effectively
with the deplorable social consequences of the accumulation
process. This effectiveness, he believes, is not possible
within (what he agrees with the mainstream is) a pluralist
policy-making process.
Lowi accepts the welfare state principle in the sense
that he does not think the economic market alone can create
"human happiness." The market is an engine only for the
creation of wealth, and so the state must be in the business
of applying administrative rationality to the problems
caused by the social irrationalities (or non-rationalities)
of the market. The goal is not simply stability, but a
stability based on the pursuit of a recognizable public
interest. Taking the pluralist cosmology at face value,
Lowi argues that the interest group political market
—
integrated since FDR into the policy process--does not
automatically, or often, produce policies in the public
interest. Rather, it has produced an amorphous body of
administrative decisions which are the antithesis of
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coherent, implementable policy. With government thus
unable to cope, social problems grow worse while public
cynicism about authority and the purpose of the welfare
state grows.
Like the mainstream, Lowi sees legitimacy as a com-
bination of values—democratic norms of representation
which have been used to sanction interest group influence
on public power— and of effectiveness. The welfare state,
he believes, has tipped too far in the direction of democ-
racy. He sees interest group participation in bureaucratic
policy-making as an expansion of democratic forms at the
expense of democratic purposes—effect ive public policy in
the public interest. His solution is to trade this inter-
est group democracy for: 1) a reliance on elections alone
as a democratic legitimating mechanism, and 2) a restruc-
tured policy process in which elected representatives
instead of bureaucrats will make law. That is, the solu-
tion is to trade off ’'democracy" for effectiveness.
Lowi ’ s work, I think, is in part an evolved statement
of the PMC concerns with planning, reform, and social
management which I explored earlier. It is important to
note that Lowi is critical of both subordinate and cor-
porate interest group activities that inhibit rational
policy planning. And, he embraces capitalism while at the
same time articulating the need for reforming and managing
its excesses. Moreover, as one would expect, when faced
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with a choice between democracy and effectiveness, or
democracy and planning, he emphasizes effectiveness and
planning— in fact assumes that democracy on the one hand,
and effectiveness and planning on the other, are mutually
limiting in just the way he describes. Thus, like the
mainstream, he effectively articulates a major contradic-
tion of the capitalist state: the need to maintain its
legitimacy through democratic forms while insulating policy
makers from the demands of subordinate populations (and
undisciplined corporate interests). His focus on democracy
as the source of state ineffectiveness has been increasingly
echoed in the Crisis of Democracy and other neo-conservative
works
.
Blaming interest group democracy is an insufficient
explanation for the state's legitimation dilemma, for it
regards the restoration of effectiveness as simply a matter
of will within prevailing economic relations. Now, sub-
ordinate populations and particularistic corporate inter-
ests are in fact constraints on social planning. The
claims of these interests themselves, though, represent
structural pressures on the state that are inherent in the
capitalist accumulation process, including the increasingly
interwoven and interdependent (social) nature of the
economy. Neither the older mainstream nor its newer con-
servative critics grasp these and other pressures, their
sources, or how they might make legitimation problems an
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integral feature of the contemporary American state. In
chapter two I shall argue that James O’Connor's The Fiscal
Crisis of the State offers a superior account of these
pressures and their relation to legitimation
.
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Beliefs and values: the soci al psychology of legitimacy
In separating the scientific liberal’s treatment, and func
tion, of legitimation into social structure and beliefs, I
am actually following an analytical separation much more
congenial to their epistemology than to mine. I will sug-
gest in this section, and in more detail in chapter three,
why this separation is not tenable as a starting point for
inquiry. My appraisal of mainstream treatments of beliefs
is thus a window onto, and partly a repetition of, social-
structural issues.
Behavioral political science separates belief from
action and studies them as two distinct, but causally-
related realms: attitudes which are external to behavior,
but linked in a causal chain of behavior--at t itude--
behavior—etc. Behavior is identifiable through analyti-
cally constructed definitions which isolate and describe
the physical operations involved in behavior. Operational
definitions comprise the verifiable hypotheses that relate
types of behavior and attitudes and behavior. Tested
against an existent real world of behavior, these hypothe-
ses will eventually yield predictive laws of behavior.
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Within this scientific framework, embodying an immanent
relation between predicting and managing behavior, we can
discern the mainstream’s treatment and function of legiti-
mation in two basic areas: studies of the value consensus
and of electoral opinion and behavior.
A long series of monographs, articles, and books at
the beginning of the behavioral revolution documented the
"unreality" of the classical democratic theory's view of
the citizen. According to these studies, classical demo-
cratic theory erred in expecting, assuming, uniformly high
levels of citizen interest and participation in politics,
and beliefs in democratic values. Instead, the behavioral-
ists found dangerous levels of undemocratic beliefs among
lower social-economic strata. Luckily, even though such
people were represented by responsible elites, they were
by and large apathetic about the political process and so
were unlikely to provide support for undemocratic (fascist,
communist) movements. These studies quickly ascertained
that classical theory's democratic consensus existed if at
all at an abstract level, consisting of beliefs in majority
rule, minority rights, free elections, and the like. When
pressed in hypothetical but concrete situations, though,
many people abandoned these beliefs. Luckily, as it turned
out, political elites adhered much more consistently to
democratic values, acting as a reservoir for renewal of
these values and forming a vast potential group (in David
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Truman's phrase) which would mobilize around any threats to
rules of the game.^^
Further work in the "political culture" tradition re-
fined the notion of consensus developed by early behavioral-
ists. Almond and Verba’ s The Civic Culture is outstanding
m this genre not only for its conclusions but also for its
role as model for future studies. As a cross-cultural
study, it compared the fit between political belief and
political stability in five "western democracies." Its
goal was not only a deeper understanding of these societies,
but a model "for the transfer of the political culture of
Western democratic states to the emerging nations.
In its ideal form, the civic culture (as this model
was entitled) is a mix of neo-Weberian authority models
embodied in three particular sub-cultures. The participant
sub-culture corresponds to Weber's rational-legal, the
subject sub-culture to his charismatic, and the parochial
to his traditional model of authority. The participant
sub-culture is an approximation of an acted-upon democratic
consensus. Almond and Verba find that an appropriate mix
of these sub-cultures provides a balance of citizen input,
generalized support for political leaders, and acquiescence.
In other words, it provides a sufficient amount of legiti-
macy while leaving political elites sufficient room to
maneuver without constant pressure from citizens. In this
formulation, the civic culture also expresses quite well
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the contradiction of the capitalist state: the need to
maintain its legitimacy through democratic forms while
insulating itself from actual democratic pressures from
subordinate populations.
The social psychological approach sought to establish
verifiable relationships between attitudes to authority
and political stability, with an eye to predicting political
behavior. A great deal of effort in this direction went
into the study of electoral behavior. This effort expressed
aspirations among corporate and managerial classes to re-
strict popular influence on the state to the periodic elec-
tion of elites, and the indirect access of the interest
group system. This effort was itself part of a broader
one, in the immediate post-war era, to purge social institu-
tions (especially trade unions) of left and popular influ-
ence. Thus the Ford Foundation, a key force in the
behavioral revolution, placed high priority on the develop-
ment and dissemination of a notion of democracy limited to
periodic election of elites, and on survey techniques as
potential indices of popular discontent and building social
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movements. Armed with such predictive power as the
scientific liberals claimed to offer, corporate planners
hoped to be in an advantageous position to manage or
manipulate public opinion and social movements.
The scientific liberals, though, proved largely
unable to anticipate the legitimation problems of the
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I960 s. Why? First, I have argued that an insufficient
and tacit analysis of social structure hindered their
clarification of structural limits to state effectiveness.
and thus of basic causes of lessened "diffuse support" for
the state. With structural relations downplayed, scien-
tific liberals also largely missed important sources of
pressure from economy and state on belief systems them-
selves, pressures I shall further detail in chapter three.
Thus when legitimation problems arose, they appeared to
scientific liberals as "simply" a crisis of belief described
in various ways: the result of a confluence of relatively
unconnected problems confronting the state (the bulk of
electoral opinion analyses), and/or the result of democratic
ideology hindering state effectiveness (Lowi), and/or a
profound disregard for basic social values including but
extending beyond democratic rules of the game (the "demo-
cratic distemper" and "uncivilized youth" of other neo-
conservative analyses).
Second, the direct treatment of the value consensus
in studies like Almond and Verba' s, and its indirect assump-
tion in public opinion studies, suffered important weak-
nesses. These can be summarized as: by treating beliefs
as external to activity, scientific liberals could then
picture the consensus as a pyramid of belief transmitted
downward from elites to masses. Let me unpack this
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summary
.
36
Survey analysis as a scientific tool demands the
uniform posing of large numbers of set questions to large
numbers of respondents. It is a highly limited tool of
analysis, for when these questions are posed, people tend
to respond (and this is the correct word) within the frame-
work of dominant beliefs (hegemonic ideology) diffused in
the culture. This methodology is therefore insensitive, in
a way that indepth, trust-based, dialogue interviews are
not, to respondents' self interpretations of their situa-
tions; it does not call them up. This methodology is there-
fore also insensitive to the deep sources of differentiation
(by class, gender, race, etc.) among these self interpreta-
tions in the life worlds of those being interviewed. Its
individualist orientation also obscures the truly social
and intersubject ive nature of these beliefs, the fabric of
culture they form. These interpretations, of course,
inevitably percolate into survey responses, but only their
surface is usually recorded. In missing these self
interpretations, scientific survey analysis slights the
crucial expressive dimension and depth of everyday experi-
ence, a dimension comprising purposes and aspirations that
are partly constitutive (not causal) of social activity as
such. Precisely because norms do allow of reasoned dis-
course, or dialogue, the survey method of recording them
as brute data does not suffice for their analysis or
clarification. Finally, "pyramid" consensus studies
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Pictured the values of modern industrial society, as a
whole, as essentially non-contradictory or not in tension:
accumulation and affluence, achievement, social mobility,
individual privacy, stable and private family iife
, and
so on. One might conclude, with Harry Braverman, that such
surveys tend to measure the social consciousness, not of
the respondents, but of the social scientist.
Survey analyses compare unfavorably to the sensitive
work of Sennett and Cobb in The Hidden Injuries of Cl agc
a study of the emotional and social burdens for working
class persons of an ethos emphasizing individual responsi-
bility and social mobility through education. Interpreting
and acting within the social world partly through the lens
of dominant values, these persons must nevertheless con-
sistently maintain an important substratum of working class
interpretation at odds with dominant values. Thus, for
example, it somehow both is and is not a manual worker's
fault (m his mind) that he never gained the education
which seems so necessary for economic security and social
esteem. Self-esteem, in fact, is always precarious in
this setting, a consistent victim of this bind. Denied
security and esteem by an incompletely-acknowledged class
system, working class parents may succeed in propelling one
or more children a short distance up the social ladder,
only to reap painful rejections, separations, and strains
between family, child, and community.
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Illustrations from congenial analyses could be multi-
plied; and what Sennett and Cobb make clear for aspects of
working class culture, others have done for women and non-
whites of various classes. One of the crucial points about
comparing Sennett and Cobb's work to that of the mainstream,
though, is to bring out the tacit elite identification which
shapes mainstream research, desensitizing it to the life-
worlds of subordinate populations. The scientific survey
stance is desensitized in part because it is rigidly mana-
gerial, allowing no interchange between respondent and
analyst to shape the questioning and the categories of
interpretation. Its point is in fact to avoid this mutual
influence in favor of an attempt to predict behavior under
certain conditions. The irony of course is that this mana
gerial stance would itself have to be transcended in order
for an accurate appraisal of beliefs and activity to take
place
.
Conclusion
On its own terms, the scientific liberal mainstream
failed as a predictive science to anticipate, and then to
fully grasp, the legitimation problems of the state after
the mid 1960's. Why?
Self-identified as elites, having painted a picture
of the just and stable society, and epistemologically
unequipped to deal with either the logic of moral issues
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or the interconnected structures of the political economy
the mainstream was ill-positioned to anticipate and concep-
tualize the growing problems of the welfare state. it
suffered, as John Schaar put it from a perspective somewhat
different from mine, from the blindness of the eye perceiv-
ing itself. Treating legitimacy as a matter of mere belief
about authority, this mainstream could record but not
clearly conceptualize the expressive depth of a crisis in
socially constituted standards of right. And by embraclng
welfare state capitalism as tacit background, this main-
stream could not be fully aware of developing structural
pressures either on the state, or on the cultural beliefs
which help ground political authority.
In the next two chapters I shall examine approaches
to legitimacy which improve, respectively, on the social-
structural and ideational weaknesses of scientific liberal-
ism. Chapter two appraises Marxist James O'Connor's theory
of structural pressures from the economy upon state effec-
tiveness, and thus upon legitimacy. Chapter three appraises
a hermeneutic approach to culture, and the connections such
an approach helps us make between social meaning, social
identity, and social authority. In each of these chapters,
the social role of the PMC figures importantly in my
appraisal. Also key among the concepts I bring to legiti-
mation theory, in chapter three, are explicit treatments of
gender, patriarchy, and nationalism. In chapters four and
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I then apply the general framework established through
the first three chapters to an analysis of race and legiti-
mation, focusing on the sexual aspect of race. I explore
the intimate connections of sexual/racial social identity
to the motivations which help sustain capitalist work life
and patriarchy, to the meaning of racial segregation, and
thus to a range of purposes and social "right" which state
legitimacy has traditionally rested upon.
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CHAPTER II
MARXISM AND LEGITIMACY: JAMES O'CONNOR’S
FISCAL CRISIS THEORY
truth ^
ng °bsessed by Property. The15 the other way around. It is the societvand the culture which is so obsessed. Yet to an
Y
nature'of ^h
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what it
f t gS and so is not recognized for
John Berger 1
Until the late 19th century, the relation of private
property to the state was one of the central questions of
social theory, directly addressed and dealt with. Hobbes,
Locke, Rousseau, and Hegel all found the question of prop-
erty central to their discussions of the state. This
relation was a central question for social theory because
liberal society, and emerging capitalism itself, put the
matter on the agenda—made it clear that questions of par-
ticipation in the state and of social identity could not
be fully addressed without addressing class relations.
Marx was in a way a culmination of these inherited treat-
ments. However, he helped render the forthright treatment
of class quite untouchable for liberal thought; liberal
theory and social science since that time form, to a con-
siderable degree, an unacknowledged debate with his work.
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The disappearance of the question of property from
the agenda of liberal social studies also required the
abstraction of social studies into different disciplines,
in which the unity of a perspective offered by a notion
such as class is fractured and redistributed, in market
fashion and with market content, to various fields. Its
disappearance from modern social science does not mean,
however, that modern society has made property superfluous,
but rather that by its very nature (as PMC activity, in
part) modern social science cannot clearly focus on the
matter
.
The conclusion of modern social science, that a
diverse, technocratic elite has assumed control of the
reins of major institutions and thereby obviated the his-
torical antagonisms between propertied and unpropert ied
,
is in fact an age-old liberal vision. The appearance of
this conclusion in the realm of academic and political dis-
course is a sign that the liberal vision has come full
circle and is in danger of exhausting its meaning. It has,
in effect, played its trump card. Liberal society has not
yet, however, exhausted its power, for its power is in part
rooted in the antagonisms of class which have been dis-
placed through social life. One of the arenas of this
displacement has clearly been the state, and this chapter
will focus on a theory which seeks to explain this dis-
placement and its effect upon legitimacy.
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James O'Connor's account of state fiscal crisis moves
significantly beyond liberal legitimation theories by
clarifying the extent to which the state is structurally
captive of capital's accumulation needs
.
2
Properly amended,
his analysis pushes us to realize the constraints on "new"
market-incentive policies, and on institutional change con-
fined to the state, in resolving the state's legitimacy
problems
.
O’Connor argues that the increasingly interwoven and
interdependent nature of our capitalist economy has re-
quired the state to finance an array of capital's collective
productive and social control needs. That is, to a con-
siderable degree, the parameters of state spending are not
simply a matter of political choice, but rather of necessity
--a necessity beyond the conventional appreciation of the
level and categories of spending mandated by public law.
No constitutional amendment or "sunset" clause in any legis-
lation could appreciably offset this trend.
But as O'Connor points out, in responding to these
pressures to aid private accumulation the state must pre-
sent its actions as those of an independent
,
public insti-
tution operating for the general welfare. This it can
generally do as long as the economy performs well. However,
in expanding, the economy requires increasing state spending
(reflecting growing interdependence) to support collective
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productive needs and to control the surplus populations
shed by capitalist development. And, the increase in this
spending has been exacerbated by an entrenched network of
particularistic corporate interests and by the decentral-
ized, overlapping, and uncoordinated branches and levels of
the U.S. state. One major result, as predicted by
O'Connor, has been the politicization of the budget around
tax revolts and around elite attacks on the state's "social
wage." O'Connor sees the unplanned nature of this accumu-
lating spending as a major cause of the stagflation which
Plagues the economy, a situation threatening the state's
legitimacy in two ways: by undermining its claim to eco-
nomic management, and by contributing to a general fiscal
politicization which menaces the state's appearance as an
independent, public institution.
I think that O'Connor makes a basic contribution to
legitimation theory, one that moves us beyond the scien-
tific liberals' conception of state power and effectiveness.
Scientific liberal theory pictures the state as a neutral
arbiter not "captured” by any particular set of interests,
whose effectiveness through social programs is essentially
a matter of will. But O'Connor persuasively argues that
the state is not, cannot be, neutral, that it is in fact
structurally captive of the needs of an economy dominated
by a particular form of property, monopoly capital. It is,
overall, the growing socialization of the economy which
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renders the state, as tfi. social institution, the likelyPlace to locate various collective needs of capital and
labor. m this sense, contrary to Lowi
,
the problems caused
by interest groups are not onl* a failure of an ideology
of participation; contemporary interest groups themselves
are an expression (but not only this) of the structural
process of socialization. With this basic insight, O’Connor
helps us formulate how a state captive of this structural
dynamic may, in the very process of responding to the
uncoordinated demands generated by the dynamic, actually
help undermine its own long-term effectiveness, the long-
term performance of the economy, and thus legitimacy itself.
Yet amendments to O’Connor’s account are crucial. He
actually understates, in my opinion, the constraints on
the state as an economic manager. This shortcoming is
related to his perhaps unwitting embrace of what I call
the liberal problematic of public power, a problematic
which both expresses and shapes his inadequate account of
the class structure. By assuming and even embroidering
this perspective, he glosses over the crucial question of
whether a crisis of the state, even as he explains it,
will necessarily be a crisis of capitalist relations.
Finally, he underestimates other cultural constraints on
the state through an external view of ideology similar to
that which handicaps behavioral theories in explaining
crises of belief. He thus suffers nearly the mirror image
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of their problem: unable to grasp the
have of structural change, behavioral
predict the legitimation crisis, while
problems explaining the persistence of
experience people
theories failed to
0 Connor encounters
the social order in
the face of the crisis.
L Summary of O'Connor's Position
O'Connor sees his theory as "rooted in the basic eco-
nomic and political facts of late capitalist society ." 3
He describes late capitalism as a three-sector economy,
divided into monopoly, competitive, and state areas. Each
sector organizes the production of specific types of goods
or services, and each displays characteristic capital to
labor ratios, productivity rates, labor force compositions,
and methods of wage-price determination. In the last analy-
sis, the interrelationships between these three sectors
depends on their relative economic strengths.
Within the private economy, monopoly capital is the
superior productive force. It is "the engine of capitalist
accumulation and growth ." 4 This dynamism springs from
monopoly s capacity for technological innovation
,
from its
akility to plan, from the position it is in with respect
to administering market prices, and from its developing
symbiosis with the state. The capacity for technological
innovation, as well as other important consequences, is
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given free expression by a class compromise between monopol y
management and labor unions: 5
have agreed that^orkers
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c°st Of living, evenP t l ng-run technological unemployment
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The heart of O’Connor's theory concerns a developing
relationship between monopoly capital and the state. While
it is possible to describe this in terms of structural
imperatives, O’Connor in fact emphasizes the role of the
state as an arena of transferred private power relation-
ships
:
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ditUreS and programs and thectget as le are explicable only in terms nfpower relationships within the private economy.
In O'Connor's view the state reflects the distribution of
private power, and since the private sector is dominated
by monopoly capital and monopoly labor as interests, their
interests are widely realized in the state. The result is
this: "the growth of the monopoly and state sectors is a
single process .
"
7
In the theory of monopoly capitalism, the stability
of the class structure is threatened by the very success
of capitalism itself. 8 Monopoly's tremendous productive
capacity is the problem. Uncoordinated production for
exchange results in a general tendency to overproduction
on the one hand, and to underconsumption on the other.
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Having solved in its own way the historical problen, o,
producing enough tor society, the monopoly donated system
1S fa°ed Wlth thS Pr°blem of sel li"S and distributing what
it produces. Despite their monopoly powers, monopoly
industries do not systematically control exchange and cannot
insure that what they produce will be bought. Without
assured markets, production is cut back and productive
capacity is underutilized. Underutilized capacity means
that fewer workers than possible will work, aggravating the
already existing tendency to technological unemployment.
The result is a potential spiral of falling aggregate demand
or consumption within the economy, and an ever present
tendency to stagnation.
The solution in Keynesian economics to the problem of
aggregate demand is an ensured market or consumer and an
overall coordinator of savings and investment. What private
consumers will not buy, spend or invest in, the state
through its taxing power assures will be spent and bought
and invested in. Public expenditures through the state,
the tax structure, and the monetary supply all play a major
role in maintaining economic stability and growth.
O'Connor agrees that the state in late capitalism
has tried to play this role, but holds that the manner in
which it has done so has ultimately been self-defeating.
Thus while it is true that "whether the growth of produc-
tive capacity runs ahead or behind the growth of demand
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thus depends on the composition of the state budget," the
fact is that the growth of the state's role is "a contra-
dictory process which creates tendencies toward economic,
social, and political crises ." 9
O'Connor approaches the state budget with categories
which define state activity within the economy. Prom the
Marxist point of view, the production process of capitalism
creates a certain amount of wealth (value) above and beyond
that required to maintain (reproduce) conditions for the
existing level of output. This surplus can either be con-
sumed on luxuries, saved, or plowed back into expanded pro-
duction through the purchase of additional machines, labor,
and raw material (corresponding roughly to constant and
variable capital, and raw material).
The state, however, taxes this surplus, and then
reallocates or distributes through its budget the portion
of the surplus it has appropriated. O’Connor proposes
through his budget categories to show how this state spend
mg is shaped by, and contributes to, the maintenance and
expansion of capitalist production.
The basic categories which he develops are those of
social capital and social expenses
.
10
The first category
includes public investments in physical and human capital
which indirectly lower the unit costs of production for
private business and make expanded production possible.
It also includes expenditures which represent a collective
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wage and thus appear in hls as fowling or contalning
the wages and benefits which private firms make
. Soclal
expenses as a budget category represent additional neces-
sary, but basically unproductive, costs which are external
to the calculations of private firms. We shall treat this
category first.
O'Connor argues that from the point of view of capi-
tal, social expenses are those which do not directly or
indirectly contribute to profitability but which are still
required to maintain existing and future patterns of accu-
mulation. These are most obviously expenses of social con-
and little else. Welfare and warfare expenditures,
broadly considered, are social expenses of production.
And, each is related to both the stagnation and expansion-
ary tendencies of monopoly capital. How is this so?
Warfare expenditures help mop up unemployment among
the underclass while protecting the foreign interests
which monopoly capital creates in its drive for cheap
labor and expanded markets. Military expenditures repre-
sent wages and goods bought, and thus contribute to aggre-
gate demand. They represent a portion of the private
surplus taxed by the government which is spent on necessary
things, but which might not otherwise be bought; the result
is to help demand keep up with productive capacity.
Welfare expenditures share this double function, help-
ing to maintain aggregate demand while stabilizing its
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recipients above the threshold of disruptive political
activity. A cost of domestic stability and an offsetter
of stagnation
,
the welfare budget buys the peace which is
a precondition for overseas expansion; they allow efforts
to be focused abroad and in defense of empire rather than
on domestic unrest
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Seeing warfare/welfare expenditures as internally
related, O'Connor offers a counter explanation for the guns
and butter politics which Lyndon Johnson practiced in the
mid-1960
' s
. Racial and civil rights unrest had to be dealt
with in order to allow the intervention in Indochina to
proceed. And the intervention in Indochina not only was a
direct defense of empire, but also performed admirably in
heating up the economy to the point where unemployment fell
to record lows. The effort by LBJ to justify his policies
with rhetoric about "freedom” here and abroad may have been
a genuinely felt interpretation on his part, but it is
insufficient to explain the role and effect of such policies
within a capitalist social structure and economy.
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Welfare and warfare expenditures are therefore neces-
sary expenses of the capitalist system, They maintain a
relative surplus population through income supplements and
Military employment, and an absolute surplus population
through relief payments. The relative and absolute surplus
populations consist mainly of competitive sector workers
and their dependents who are, respectively, permanently
underemployed and unemployed. Where do these populations
derive from?
They derive from a combination of class, sexual, and
racial patterns of labor allocation. Because of its tech-
nological competence and high rate of productivity,
monopoly capital employs only one-third of the labor force
even while it far and away outstrips the market sector in
the wealth it produces. Slowly increasing or even stagnat
ing employment levels in the monopoly sector mean that two.
thirds of the labor force "must be absorbed in part or in
whole by the state and competitive sectors ." 12
This displacement falls most heavily upon third-world,
and female, job seekers, and is associated with skill/
education "deficiencies." A large reserve army of the
unemployed affects only competitive sector wages, because
this is the only sector of the economy where wages are
fixed according to market criteria of supply and demand.
The result is an ever-present downward pressure on wages
there, and a concentration of the less-skilled, those born
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into lower socio-economic families, and third-world and
female workers among whom the problems of unemployment
and underemployment are endemic. This population
expands, accord^
<^C°nnor. Moreover, its poverty increases as state and
monopoly-fed inflation increases both the costs of living
and the standard or . necessities of living
.
13
State employment therefore also expands as the state
services this population: "These workers depend more and
more upon the state to meet their needs and supplement
their incomes ." 14 I„ short, stagnation-through-expansion
directly increases state outlays on its own labor force and
on assistance, by multiplying the persons with reasons for
state subsidies.
According to O’Connor, the state exists not only as
an expense of production. It also promotes expanded pro-
duction (which in turn increases the need for social
expense outlays) by investing in the infrastructure required
by monopoly capital, and by underwriting a portion of the
wage bill. These are, respectively, social capital invest-
ment and the social consumption of capital. They are made
necessary by the increasingly social character of capital-
ist production. The expansion of the economy creates and
feeds off the increasingly interdependent and intercon-
nected nature of social life. How?
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our society, fewer and fewer goods and services
are produced and consumed by the same individual
,
or pro-
duced and consumed within a tiny local co^unity. More
and more of the utilities of life are produced, not for
immediate use and consumption by those who produce them,
but for exchange within geographically-expanded markets.
As this happens, and for it to happen, more and more invest-
ment costs in capital and labor take on the character of
collective goods: goods which any one productive unit may
use, but which it would be irrational for any one unit to
assume the costs of alone : 15
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Social capital investment includes spending on highway con
struction and other transportation facilities, urban re-
newal projects, and similar physical construction; it
includes as well : 16
teaching administrative, and other services at
Lh R GJeiS ° f the education system and scientificand R & D services both inside and outside of theeducation establishment.
In physical investment, the highway trust fund stands
out as the best example. Paid for by taxes, this socialized
infrastructure investment indirectly lowers costs of pro-
duction by decreasing the costs (and time) of circulating
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goods, by increasing the radius of territory (land and
labor supply) which capital may avail itself of i„ expanded
Production, and by providing incentives for automobile
consumption
.
Investment in what O'Connor calls human capital is
especially important in the area nf toot, io technological research
and development. In this respect for rvrv,
,
t 0 Connor, monopoly
capital and the state constitute an important unity: 17
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Social consumption expenditure is the socialization
of monopoly capital's wage bill, representing"^
goods and services consumed collectively by theworking class and social insurance against eco-nomic insecurity. 1
Late capitalism requires social consumption investment
because it has invaded, destroyed, and rendered impractical
most of the non-commodified, independent provision of food,
housing, waste disposal, culture and recreation, and old-
age care formerly to be found in the interior of rural and
working class life. These were only possible within a
network of community and family ties which the development
of the commodity form has sundered and atomized into
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individualized consumer units. Although suoh serylces
have existed in rudimentary form for a long time, according
to 0
’ Connor they were expanded especially after the second
world war largely as a result of the suburbanization
process and through a political combination of monopoly
capital and monopoly labor. For instance, i„ this latter
case, increases in OASI coverage were due in large part to
this process: 20
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Many of the laws which require social consumption expendi-
ture at the federal level are written to favor better-
placed monopoly sector labor. However, the provision of
social consumption in general is a haphazard process at
best, because of the unplanned and uncoordinated nature by
which it is undertaken, A proliferation of overlapping
political jurisdictions, many with their own fiscal base,
piles up expenditures and taxes incrementally.
The upshot of the growing socialization of invest-
ments and expenses is not only that "the growth of the
state is both a cause and effect of the expansion of
pi
monopoly capital," but more fundamentally that the
unplanned nature of the growth, and the continuing private
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appropriation of most of the surplus, result in a built _ in
gap between revenues and expenditures. There is a "ten-
dency for state expenditures to increase more rapidly than
the means of financing them." 22 i n short, 23
expense^is^^ighly^rrationai* 8^ “d S°Cial
fiscai
*16
accumulation"^ Profitable private"
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The structural gap between revenues and expenditures
emerges as a crisis when the economy slows down. And
according to O'Connor, one major source of the contraction
of the economy could be exactly the same expenditures which
P ovide an indirect basis for monopoly growth. Why?
In his terms, it would be because the growth of the
state budget at all levels has been so unplanned that the
proper proportion between demand and productive outlays
could not be maintained. The state would thus be implicated
in the series of post-war recessions. And, one of these—
post 1970 stagflation" has been the immediate cause of
the re-interpretation of the fiscal gap into the fiscal
crisis
.
Here, then, is a summary of the fiscal crisis from
the point of view of O'Connor’s theory:
1* Tlie growing social nature of production and
the ultimate fiscal dependence of the state
upon private interests ground the interpene-
tration of the state and monopoly sector
interests
.
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^constitution seems to O'Connor the only hope.But efforts toward the creation of a "social-industrial complex" will run into roadblocks
ot key interests, probably worsening the politi-
cal crisis and further exposing the monopoly
capital-state relationship. State employees
who service surplus populations are potential
radical actors in this situation, who nonetheless
ack a coherent interpretive framework in which
to place their activity.
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The fiscal crisis, then, involves a series of
possible outcomes politically, A tax revolt, first of all
against rising state expenditures could be aimed either at
’
programs serving the surplus populations, or, given in-
creasingly transparent power relations, at monopoly capital
State workers, accustomed to measuring their activity and
worth against human need and not efficiency ratios, might
come to a clearer understanding of their role in the sys-
tem and become a radical force for transforming it. And
monopoly capital, seeking to preserve its peace with
monopoly labor, might engage in a rationalization of por-
tions of the state budget. The most progressive form of
this rationalization would entail what O'Connor calls the
"social-industrial complex." This would involve "adjusting
budgetary priorities to favor the monopoly sector. In
turn, this requires centralized administrative control and
budgetary planning ." 24 Monopoly capital, then, would
become increasingly involved in current social expenditures
such as education, mass transit, job training, etc. Such
reform, however, will run up against the constellations of
interests who have entrenched, particular stakes in the
budget
.
I want to leave aside for the moment a discussion of
the political scenarios flowing from O'Connor's theory,
returning to it only after we have clarified the parts of
his analysis central to such a political discussion. This
64
requires first a general review of hls notion of fegitima-
tron, and secondly a more extended look at his overall
analysis
.
As far as a crisis of legitimation goes, O'Connor's
analysis rests on the assumption that the growing inter-
penetration of monopoly capital and the state will lead to
the transparency of .class power relations, with the medium
of this transparency being the politicized budget. The
politicized budget can play this role because legitimation,
in his theory, is tied to material factors strictly con-
ceived
.
The citizen, understanding himself to be such,
relates to the state through taxes, and through the material
advantages s/he expects from the state in return; and the
citizen relates this way as a member of a class-structured
group. Portions of the state budget thus represent prizes
to different sectors of the population. Monopoly capital
is the big winner; its dominant position in the private
sphere enables it to benefit from practically all budget
categories one way or another. Upper income, monopoly
sector workers receive substantial social consumption bene-
fits. State workers have their jobs. Competitive capital
is still important at the local level. And, the booby
prizes go to the surplus populations, whose growth is
generated by state-fed monopoly expansion.
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One way or another, the budget is a means of 'locking-
in" to the system major sections of the population, by
class, through material rewards which reflect their politi-
cal strength. The state thus helps to stabilize or repro-
duce the class structure.
These material benefits serve to lock in various
portions of the population. Yet the pre-eminent position
of monopoly capital in this arrangement is a problem for
the legitimacy of the state. This problem is solved by
lies, obfuscation, distortion, and secrecy about the actual
content and effect of the budget. On O'Connor's view, this
mysti^ation of power relations will prove less and less
effective as the state loses its ability to lock the rest
of the population into place through its budget. And this
inability will stem from the effect, indirectly, which the
state budget itself has upon the social structure through
the monopoly sector. As growth falters due to the accumula-
tion of state expenditures, the growing politicization of
the budget around tax, retrenchment, and social-industrial
issues will limit the ability of the state to explain its
relation to monopoly capital and to rectify the problem of
stagnation
.
66
II- Appraisal
O Connor s theory helps us to formulate how the American
state, structurally captive of the growing socialization of
the economy, may in the process of responding to the un-
coordinated demands generated by that dynamic actually help
undermine its own long-term effectiveness, the long-term
performance of the pcnnAmu j 1e o o y, and hence state legitimacy. He
helps us focus in the forefront of legitimation theory the
structural relations and dynamics which scientific liberal
theory, for social and epistemological reasons, has diffi-
culty in grasping. Yet there are first of all, I would
argue, some significant problems internal to his account of
the economic-managerial role of the state. In raising and
discussing these, briefly, I will be moving, in the next
two subsections, to a critique from outside his theory.
I think that O'Connor too readily accepts the
Keynesian view that the state can act as regulator of the
economy. The reader comes away from O'Connor's book with
the strong impression that, despite the contradictions
inherent in the monopoly-state relationship, state budgets
are in the long run basically positive for capitalism--the
prime source of growth and recovery. State spending,
O'Connor argues, is the prime determinant of investment
and consumption patterns in the economy, and the driving
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force behind capital's post-war expansion. In contrast> :
would argue that the growth of social spending in a capital-
ist economy represents a bigger contradiction than O'Connor
recognizes. In the first place, the spending categories he
outlines are neither clearly investment, consumption, nor
expense
:
Because of the social character nf +
expense.
1 consumPtion, and part social
Their essential ambiguity from this point of view is
a problem for understanding and controlling their impact.
This as not to say, of course, that the state budget has
no impact, it clearly has an immense one. But being able
to predict it, or being able to rationalize the state budget
for a new growth or recovery policy-in the terms O'Connor
outlines
— is another matter.
O'Connor’s argument that certain expenditures are
indirectly productive is also therefore at issue. It is
certainly plausible that certain state expenditures are
indirectly productive because they contain or lower unit
labor costs, or because they provide investments which
capital as a whole requires. Education and transportation
are the two most obvious examples.
Yet if it is true that much of indirectly productive
expenditure is required because the increasingly complex,
intertwined, and science-dependent nature of capitalist
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production requires more expenditure on coliective (and
minimally risky) goods, it is also true that the need for
these collective goods does not obviate the need for all
the other investments which private capital traditionally
makes. In this case, what we might say is that the state
Plays a necessary role in investment, and that to the ex-
tent it does it increasingly functions as a basis for
monopoly growth.
This capital deepening, so to speak, seems to be
unavoidable. However, it is possible for the state to play
an increasingly important role in this respect, and at the
same time for this deepening to express a negative trend
in the economy as a whole. For, at the same time that state
investment has been growing (post WW II) as a percentage
of GNP26 and as a percentage of total investment
,
27
the
rate of growth of the GNP as well as the rate of profit
have shown a steady, secular decline
.
28
Finally, by focusing so heavily on the positive role
of the state budget for monopoly capital, O'Connor under-
estimated the impact of the international economy on the
growth of the state budget. I would argue even more
strongly than O'Connor does that the structural position
of the U.S. in the international economy had a tremendous
influence on the economic surplus upon which the state
could draw. Policy makers had options, which they do not
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now have, given shifts in this framework: for directing
spending at subordinate populations in order to forestall
or stabilize social disorder, and for spending on what
O'Connor terms social investment. That is, this interna-
tional framework also exerts structural pressure on the
state. And, appreciating this point would help make
O'Connor more sensitive to the potential contribution of
nationalist politics to the '.solution', of the legitimation
crisis, a potential overshadowed in his theory by the
state's predicted role in fostering economic recovery
through a "social-industrial complex."
and the PMC O'Connor's
flawed view of the state's economic managerial role re-
flects his embrace of what I call the liberal problematic
of public power. This problematic cannot be understood
outside of the developing class relations which have shaped
it, class relations which O’Connor partially obscures by
dividing the economy into sectors. Even though he goes
further than liberal theories in clarifying the structural
economic constraints on state policy, if his view entered
widely into public debate it would insufficiently challenge
a widespread public resignation about private power rela-
tions, would in fact encourage more "blame" of the state
than is warranted, and would suggest, incorrectly, that
reform of the state is the primary way of solving the
current crisis.
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Liberalism's focus on public power, as well as the
very institutional distinction between state and produc-
tion, bear the imprint of early bourgeois struggles against
the entrenched aristocracy of feudal and mercantile states.
With this institutional distinction, state power becomes
relatively more visible than class power in production in
large part because the taxes which the state levies are so
transparently enacted and enforced, and appear to be
matter of convention. In contrast, the economic surplus
is no longer extracted as transparently as it was under
feudal social relations. Exploitation is mystified through
the labor market's ideology of equal exchange, and class
relations appear not as conventional or political in com-
parison to the state, but as natural.
Now, O’Connor’s theory is in part an attempt to
understand how the expanded role of the state may make
class exploitation both more transparent and more the ob-
ject of organized resistance. Yet the very relative
visibility of the state, compared to direct corporate
activity, may be a real limit to this critical awakening.
O'Connor does not directly address the state’s relative
visibility, but I can help clarify this liberal problematic
of public power through further discussion of the contem-
porary class structure, and particularly the role of the
professional-managerial class.
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social division nf
major unctl°n in the
as the reproduction of^piLlL^^!^ br°adly
capitalist class relations. CUlture and
Although this administrative class bears many resemblances
to the working class proper-the main one being the sale of
its labor Power-it still exists "only by virtue of the
expropriation of the skills and culture indigenous to the
working class .” 30 Within private and public hierarchies
and between public bureaucracies and their clients, we find
a system of direct, personal, and often face-to-face con-
trol "at the heart of PMC-working class relationships ." 31
The political dimension of these relationships is thus
informed by "a complex mixture of hostility and deference
the part of working class people, contempt and paternal
ism on the part of the PMC ." 32 The PMC, that is, occupies
positions in private and public hierarchies which put them
in a relationship of visible influence over working class
people. How does this visibility affect legitimation
problems?
The PMC is recognizably engaged in public politics
as non-official
,
political actors, especially in reform
movements. As a political class in this sense, the PMC
has historically participated in a politicization of issues
which looks to the state. In particular, PMC actors
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(through foundations and interest groups) visibly influence
the definition of politicai issues which, when embodied in
state policy
,
often impinge directly and disproportionately
on working class life. Por example, middle class activists
have tended to define pollution at the work place out of
public debate; and, they have until recently neglected to
consult, or to propose protection for, workers who would be
dislocated by effective environmental regulation. Or, as
far back as the mid-1960’s, early New Right ideologists
pointed out the class hostilities wrapped up in working
class resistance to integration; resentments of "limousine
liberals" and "pointy-headed bureaucrats" who supported
integration, but who could personally opt out of it.
The upshot of this is that the PMC in its political
incarnation, and the state, become political targets of
the working class. This is facilitated by two factors.
First, the working class especially regards its life out-
side of work as its human life, as its realm of freedom,
so to speak; this has been true, and increasingly so, since
before Marx commented on it in the Manuscripts
. Out of
necessity, working class people may tolerate most of what
they have to bear inside of work. But to tolerate similar
intervention and control outside of work by recognizably
similar people (through the state) is not thinkable.
Private life outside work is supposed to be a realm of
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free aCtlVlty
’
and the State ls suPPosed to Play a role InProtecting and realizing this freedom. Yet the state
apparently moves further and further away from its ideal
form. Second, this political frustration is compounded by
ology of the Professional-managerial class, which
for over forty years now has proclaimed itself to be a rival
for, if „ot sole possessor of, institutional power, as well
as a promoter of social justice through the state.
Thus, both the visibility of and frustration with the
growth of the state are generally compounded by the
reformist/managerial claims of PMC ideology and activity.
In particular, the managerial stance not only informed state
economic policy, but invited blame on the state for the
failure of this
"managemenf-ideologically overdetermining
the legitimation problems rooted in the structural con-
straints on capitalist economic planning. i n the proble-
matic of public power, PMC occupations play an essential
role in reproducing the social order through the convenient
lightning rod they make for the ruling class itself. They
facilitate, through political activity and self-image, the
displacement into the state of conflicts deeply indebted to
class relations in production. But like their position in
the class structure, they play a highly ambivalent role in
this process: helping create political problems (resentment
toward the state) even as they deflect from the deeper
property relations which shape them.
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toward chant.,.
Within a Marxist framework, we can go this far i„ grasping
the rootedness of legitimating ideology in social (class)
-^"®ltitions. But thorp iq r.4-,' ne e s still some distance to go in under-
standing the belief-suffused experience we all have of
social relations, and in applying this understanding both
to internal connections between authority and social iden-
tity and to the tenacity and vulnerability of various
beliefs which affect state legitimation. O'Connor's theory
requires these dimensions, I think, in order to make clear
the impact on everyday life of state activity. In this, he
shares some of the flaws of the scientific liberals'
legitimation analysis. In the Marxist tradition, recent
works developing Gramsci
' s notion of hegemony have started
to address these issues; Raymond Williams, in fact, has
eloquently and fruitfully explored them. 33 But it was the
hermeneutic tradition in philosophy which in earliest,
clearest, and most explicit fashion laid out what was at
stake in the internal link of beliefs to activity.
I will argue that it is the task of social study,
and not only art or literature, to convey the expressive
dimension of human experience. To assume, on the contrary,
a stance which necessarily or overwhelmingly objectifies
social relations, however well intended, is to participate
in the dynamic which divests the modern social world of
meaning. For, the scientific world view has not confined
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itself to the debunking of mystical purposes in the1 u^ cosmos.
ather, shaped by and i n fluencing the poW0r ^
Whrch they are situated, applied natural and social science
have helped divest many social activities of purposes
internal to themselves-especially for subordinate popula-
tions. That is, science as a facet of domination has
helped destroy the expressive meanings embodied in everyday
life by degrading the human relations which foster the
creation of this meaning-reducing the number of those who
can cooperate in shaping their own activity, as well as
the opportunities to do so.
The obvious example of this is contemporary work life
With the dichotomization of mental and manual labor and the
commodification of science, the vast majority of people
must (today) engage in abstracted, repetitive, and intense
work processes beyond their control. Robbed of the oppor-
tunity to shape their labor and products according to their
own purposes, robbed even of the opportunities to interact
m a human way at work, they give meaning to and legitimate
this bondage through external reasoning; work has little if
any meaning on its own. Instead, most work in order to
live a human life outside work; they work to sacrifice for
families and children, and project a better future through
such sacrifice in part because work and its wages cannot
justify the present.
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In chapter three, I will argue that hermeneutics can
clarify the place of such experience in legitimation
dynamics through a normative
"logic.' not available to most
liberal and Marxist theories. In the first place, it re-
veals how the depth grammar of our language establishes a
prima facie connection between human wants and purposes
and the appraisal of ".good," Because human activity is in
Part constituted by rules which embody purposes and wants,
our social relationships are essentially normative and
expressive
. Rules are also generally normative in that
they establish correct and incorrect ways of acting; they
are social authority.
Because of these qualities of rule-informed activity,
there are important internal connections between how we
—
at a practical level to engage in the institutions of
our culture, our expressive experience and social identity
within the institutions of that culture, and the authority
which that culture has over us. To cast doubt upon, or to
render increasingly difficult, contradictory, or utopian
the range of purposes that form the expressive dimension
of these institutions would be to undermine their authority
That is, I will argue that a crisis of authority, whether
political or more broadly social, can be at one level an
expressive crisis of social identity.
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Summary and Conclusion
I have argued that James O’Connor’s legitimation
theory improves upon that of the scientific liberals in
perception of structural-economic pressures on the
state, pressures which help shape the welfare state’s
mission and growth. He persuasively argues that the state
is not, cannot be, a neutral public institution, that it
structurally captive of an economy dominated by monopoly
capital. O'Connor helps us formulate how a state captive
of this structural dynamic may, in the very process of
responding to the increasing socialization of the economy,
actually undermine its own long-term effectiveness (become
captive of entrenched interests), undermine long-term per-
formance of the economy (through unplanned, disruptive
spending), and thus undermine its own legitimacy. The
problem, in short, is not with the state per se
,
but with
the terms of relation between state and economy.
But O'Connor's account also requires amendment. One
comes away with the impression that state policy, in the
long run, can be responsible for economic recovery. I have
emphasized other constraints on this outcome: the essential
ambiguity and unwieldiness of budget categories for managing
the economy, the essential vulnerability of the state
budget to social struggles, and the dependence of post-war
growth on now-faltering international hegemony.
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I have also argued that the radical potential of a
politicized state budget is constrained by a liberal
ematic of public power, an ideology which may hinder
or defuse the perception of connections between state
policy an d capital. I've argued that analysis of the
class structure, and particularly the role of the PMC in
that structure, is essential to understanding this ideology
-how it makes contact with, enters into, the immediate
experience of subordinate populations, how it can affect
the relative visibility of state and corporate power.
Finally, I have argued that O'Connor would deepen
his analysis by transcending the externalist and poten-
tially manipulative model of ideology he largely shares
with the scientific liberals. His account of tax revolts,
for instance, could be deepened by relating increased taxes
(and their relative visibility) to pressures upon the
aspirations and motivations of everyday life. I will ex-
plore this expressive dimension of social reality in the
next chapter, and appraise Jurgen Habermas' use of her-
meneutic principles in his theory of legitimation.
79
footnotes
Ways of Seeing: ("New Yn^v •
2
U ork
- Penguin, 1977), p. 109
.
Martin'ri~Press7^ th^_state (New York: St.
4
P ’ 5 ‘ See hlS basic discussion, chapter 2
.
Ibid.
,
p. 23.
6
'ibid.
, p. 3i.
Ibid.
,
p. 5 .
7
Ibid.
,
p. 24.
Monthly Revie^Press^igoo
)
.
^
^-oly CaPit al (New York:
9O'Connor, pp . 8 - 9
.
12
Ibid.
,
p. 151.
Ibid.
,
p. 31.
luxuries^nto middl^d^^^ t^ip^er-inl^e
cZZArzer0miii^ rchapter 3 (Lexington, Mass.: D. C . "Tlfst h ! ^76) ^
14
15
16
17
18
O'Connor, p. 15
.
Ibid.
,
p. 12.
Ibid.
,
p . 101
.
Ibid.
,
p. 23
.
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
,
p. 124.
20oSee O'Connor, note 45, p. 148.
21
Ibid.
,
p. 8.
80
22
23
24
25
26
Ibid.
,
P- 9.
Ibid.
,
P. 10.
Ibid.
,
p. 53.
Ibid. P- 105
Ibid.
,
"Since
1945-1950 to 22^4
"percen
t
terms and in relation t?I, ’ both ln ^soluteo private capital consumption."
between growth In°GNP anfgrow^in iVS rel ationshipincreasingly negative over successive fon ®xpendltures
,
the post-war era. Christine n-iqiec no year Per iods in
the Economy," unpublished manuscriDt
n
°i 977
tat
Th
SpendlllS and
tially replicates th^ fnnH-i ^ • 1^ . is study par-
report showing, cross
-n at i onaP ° +
recent Hudson Institute
rate 1962-3 971 -in rism ^ ’ that the annual growth
penditures^BusinessMVeek t0“ C eX "
a
U
signi flean?
1
jeUinV by -Busi^ss w4ek was part™!th^ pff0 +. , l g of opinion in business circles to
sss = 12-sis/;r>
eluded with a can
S
f
° tbe
,
Brookings Institute, which con-ll or a halt in government debt slower)
orreturninfclpital"?
“ balanced bpd^t by 1980 'af a means
,,
ur
^
l S capita to the private sector Final lvanother Brookings report details the decline of profits as
to 1974 with
corporate (non-financial ) income from 1950
and
,
a
hlgh of 22% in 1950, a low of 10% in 1969
"The
peppentage of 11 In 1974. William Nordhaus
nomic Acilvltv
”
7
° f Pr°fitS '" Brookings Papers on Eco-
29
Barbara and John Ehrenreich, "The Professional-Managerial Class," mimeo draft, p. 1.
30 x , . ,Ibid.
,
p . 14
.
31
Ibid.
,
p. 15.
81
32
Ibid.
33
See Marxism^nd Literature (Boston: Beacon, 1978).
CHAPTER III
hermeneutics and legitimacy
Introduction
In the last chapter I appraised a Marxist theory
WhlCh rSlied
' ^ ^ ^ea ot structural pressure
from the economy to explain state legitimation dilemmas.
O'Connor's account of the spending demands upon a capitalist
state represents an important step beyond mainstream behav-
'oral analyses which explain the growth of the state as
Primarily a matter of a muddling, undisciplined form of
interest group politics. Particularistic and coordinated
corporate demands, as well as pressures from subordinate
populations, upon the state are in fact a product of the
growing socialization of our economy inherent in capital-
ism's accumulation process. The state grows and spends
not simply because of a lenient public philosophy, nor only
to solve the social problems of economic expansion, but
because it must spend to aid accumulation and because it is
the sensible place for capital to centralize certain of its
common spending decisions.
Yet O'Connor's account of how this process of
structurally-nurtured state growth affects political
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beliefs is, as I have argued, somewhat less convincing
»e sees, in a shrinking economy, less material reward
available through the state budget to "lock" major classes
place socially. Spending programs serving working
dass and minorities will be slashed, as well as public
services which reach the middle class, inviting discontent
This will result, as indeed it has to an extent, in a
growing politicization of the state budget. The result is
less room for state managers to bridge the contradiction
between aiding accumulation and appearing to serve the
public interest-a contradiction bridged in part by mysti-
fications which obscure the extent to which state activity
serves capital. In assessing this scenario, I have criti-
cized O Connor s notion of class structure and what seems
to me to be an overestimation of the state's role in eco-
nomic planning in relation to private financial centers.
But deserving of equal attention is a remedy for the
truncated notion of ideology-as-mystification which enters
at a critical point in O'Connor's explanation of legiti-
macy problems.
O'Connor’s use of ideas and ideology is in fact
representative of a substantial constituency in social
analysis. Behavioral social scientists by definition, and
Marxist scholars with positivist or strict structuralist
orientations, are also part of this constituency. Wherever
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it is found, this tendency is a product of particular
scientific attitudes toward social analysis which define
their materialism so as to make ideas prima facie external
to reality. Philosophically, ideas and ideology exist in
such perspectives as external to activity itself, and/or
at the level of appearances, as products of a more basic
reality. As a consequence, practically speaking, these
perspectives almost without fail treat popular belief sys-
tems and culture as simply imposed or transmitted from the
top down by elites. In chapter one I detailed the effects
of this position on behavioral theory's account of legiti-
macy. Among Marxists, though, I would argue that O'Connor's
position on ideology is a product of the positivist and
liberal epistemology generalized in our culture. Struc-
tural Marxists like Althusser and Poulantzas who self-
consciously avoid this positivism substitute instead
another variety of scientific Marxism. Seeking to avoid
economic determinism and to give ideology a causative role
through notions like overdetermination, they hold to a
strict dichotomy between appearance and reality. Accord-
ing to this view, the great mass of people live reality
tdirough ideology
,
but are not structurally placed within
the division of labor to be able to distinguish between
appearance and reality. This possibility falls only to
strategically placed political and intellectual roles
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within the state and left nolit-ir-aiP ltic l organizations. Other-
wise, the function of ideology 1
ing this structure. activities support-
The pressure in such scientific approaches to society
to adopt a transmittal notion of belief, culture, and
knowledge rests in large part on a denial of human agency
,
especially in the lower strata of society. Human actors
are reduced only to vectors of impersonal forces, to
Physiological machines, to pawns of power, to re-actors
and imitators. Though few social scientists, of whatever
persuasion, would recognize it as such, this reduction is
arguably a moral and political act. Such a connection is
a strong contributing factor to Hobbes' state, to Althusser's
elitism, to many excesses of left vanguardism, and to the
trend in liberal thought reducing social policy to techno-
cratic questions. Deprived of agency, or viewed largely
as passive recipients of an environment, people are not
fit for democratic political arrangements, in fact are fit
basically to be led or manipulated.
While such scientific perspectives may be, as I
shall explain later in this chapter, capable of contributing
to legitimation problems, they are not well equipped to
understand the internal dynamics of the crisis in belief
which is central to legitimation problems. They are
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limited in plumbing the exP^iente people have of a social
crisis, the active dimension on people's part of such
experience, how that experience is internally linked to
beliefs and culture, and most importantly, what that
experience implies for political judgments and action.
Hermeneutic political theory presents an important
challenge to these shared weaknesses of scientific perspec-
tives. The challenge which interpretive theory raises is
this: how and to what extent is it true that ideas enter
into and constitute social reality as such? In answering
this question, hermeneutic theory, even when critically
amended, denies that there is a level of social reality
unconnected to belief systems and to the intentions of
social actors.
In three following sections I will explore this
alternative to scientific knowledge, focus on the matter
of human agency once again, and treat issues from the
first two sections in relation to Habermas' Legitimation
Crisis
.
I. The Main Dimensions of Hermeneutic/
Interpretive Theory
1* we we re to cast a broad net, the features of
interpretive theory which fell within our grasp would con
stitute a family of impulses, purposes, and methods—no
single one necessarily adhered to by any representative
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thinker, yet all, collectively, kindred. Among th0se
CO"°„ threadS
’
the overarching concern is, again, opposi-
tion to modeling the study of society after the physical
sciences. Related concerns might include a relatively
strong view of human agency in social affairs and a human-
istic respect for persons, a holistic orientation to
analysis, and culture'as a central, not derivative, aspect
of social life. In its methodology, the interpretive
approach emphasizes a verstehen immersion in the beliefs
and practices under study, conceived variously as a dia-
logue between observer and observed, as a socialization of
the observer into the culture in question, or as interpret-
ing a literary text over the shoulder of one engaged in
writing that text. The primary intent is to convey the
experience of subjects as they live it, and this requires
intimate contact with, and the personal confidence of,
those you seek to understand. These in turn are not
possible without the fundamental respect for persons men-
tioned above. Contemporary analysts who have an interpre
tive dimension to their work and/or who explicate this
approach include: Peter Winch, Charles Taylor, Jurgen
Habermas, Sennett and Cobb, and Herbert Gutman.
In this section I will raise three related points:
the rule-governed nature of language and social practice,
the internal relation of ideas and norms to activity, and
the social creation of meaning.^ For reasons that will
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become clear in my subsequent criticism Qf lnterpretive
theory, a s impl e sporting activity is a good way to lllus .
trate these points.
Whether we define an idea ora , tell someone how to
engage in a Particular activity, or ourselves engage in that
activity, we are specifying and following rules which govern
the social acceptance of particular speech acts or practices
as instances of the same thing. Moreover, defining or giv-
ing the idea of a certain practice verbally is tantamount
to giving instructions or rules on how to engage in that
activity. In explaining the game of baseball, we thus lay
out playing rules that structure roles and connections
between various elements of the game-players, fans,
umpires, management, bats, balls, etc. These connections
form a context of ideas and practices. Knowing these con-
nections, this context, enables you to identify a particu-
lar game as baseball rather than (if you know their rules)
basketball or football, and to engage in an approximation
of a game of baseball. Knowing the rules, you know that
baseball is not the same thing as football (except at the
general level of a sport).
In this sense, then, the idea of baseball is inter-
nal to the activity of playing the game itself. Followed
by participants, the rules contained in the idea enter
into and structure the game. In defining any one aspect
of the game— the umpire, for instance—we can see that
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thlS aSP60t 18 internaHy related to other parts of the
game--in effect, a window on to the who!e. Furthermore
when we explain how baseball is played, we are from
another angle describing purposes which inform particular
parts of the game and the game as a whole. These purposes
enter into the game, are internal to it and its constitu-
ent elements. For example, what is a sacrifice bunt in
baseball? it is a tactic by which a batter seeks to
advance a baserunner
,
at the expense of her own chance to
reach base safety, by deliberately striking the ball a
short distance into the infield. Recognized as a sacrifice
by the game's official scorer, a tlme-at-bat is not charged
to the batter and thus does not harm her batting average.
This sacrifice bunt has no intelligibility, no mean-
ing, apart from its purpose—advancing a runner into
scoring position-which is an internal part of the meaning
of the sacrifice bunt itself. On the other hand, a sacri-
fice is not awarded by the official scorer unless the
intention to sacrifice is evident from the batter's method
of bunting. A bunt which is obviously attempted for a
basehit is not scored as a sacrifice if the batter is put
out at first base, and the batter is then charged with a
time— at—bat for her effort.
To stress the internality of ideas and intentions
to action is to deny a positivist argument about causal
relations between ideas and activity, or on their terms,
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ideas and behavior. On positivist terms, for something to
be a cause, it must be separate and not logically conjoined
to its effect. Ideas and purposes cannoti ub be causes in the
positivist sense when they exist in internal relation to
activity, and in the paradigm interpretive sense, this is
exactly their status. If we cannot speak of causes in this
positivist sense, neither can we speak of laws of behavior
founded on such causal relationships. Instead, in an
unqualified interpretive perspective, we have rules of
activity which inherently reflect purposiveness on the
part of actors and which may change-unlike electrons, say,
which have no choice about their behavior.
egard language and activity as rule-governed, and
to link meaning with purpose, is to emphasize the inescapably
normative character of language and activity. Rules pre-
scribe right and wrong ways of doing things. There is, for
example, a correct direction for runners to circle the
basepaths. This normative dimension is also connected
with the "identity" or "sameness" aspect of rule-governed
meaning. A new fan who mistakenly describes a certain
pitcher's wind-up as a balk is unfamiliar with the con-
texts which specify the calling of a balk by the umpire.
The same physical motion (behavior) that is a balk in one
context (a full wind-up with a man on first) is not a balk
in another (a full wind-up with a runner on third base
only)
.
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The internal connection between purpose and meaning
,akes rule-governed activity essentially normative because
prima facie connection built into our language
between the notion of "good” an ri +h + u-d that which satisfies or
conduces to human needs, wants, or purposes. m describing
a social situation by g i vlng the rules of eonduct^^
pnate to it, we are also necessarily evaluating it from
the point of view of certain needs, wants, and purposes.
Descriptions of the game of baseball are also, therefore,
essentially evaluations-and this is particularly clear
when we describe real games. To say, for instance, that a
Player did not get a hit in four times at bat, with runners
ln SC°rlDg P°Siti0n each
- to evaluate that player's
performance from the point of view of the purpose of the
game-scoring more runs than your opponent-and the purpose
of a batter-to aid in the scoring of runs. The evaluation
is contained in the description "hitless in four times at
bat." To say, "This player is hitless in four times at
bat. She s had a bad day," is, in a sense, redundant.
Since players, management, and fans intersubjectively
share the purpose of the game, they know that "hitless" or
any other suitable description is also a judgment. To deny
this judgment, one would have to adduce overriding or miti-
gating reasons: "She went hitless today in four times at
bat. Playing with that broken hand has
cult for her.
made hitting diffi-
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As norms, rule-governed language and activity are
-SIM creations embodying, to varying degrees
, shared
Purposes and meanings. Rules reflect interaction on a
terrain of shared purposes, interests or „’ LS
> necessity. A
consequence, therefore oft , this social nature of rules is
the possibility of creativity, adaption, or change in pur-
poses and the activity they inform. Soclal practioes>
because they may change, have a history. Such change, like
mg itself, is not_an_ individual creation because it
takes place only in light of what has come before and only
within the possibilities left open by interaction with
other individuals; even acts of innovation and creativity
draw upon such social contexts-existing language and con-
vention. For example, as field management and owners
sought to exploit every defensive possibility in a highly
ompetitive sport, a vocabulary and practice evolved in
baseball around relief pitching. And, as relief pitching
seemed to contribute to a decline in the offensive side of
the game, and thus in fan interest, management in one
major league responded by introducing permanent designated
hitters for pitchers, who are usually weak hitters.
A pure statement of this approach works best for
small, simple societies or for cultural activities like
baseball which are themselves, in large part, interpreta-
tions or idealized celebrations of experiences in the daily
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life of work and family. Thus it is not surprising that
interpretive methods have gained a large foothold in
anthropology. Anthropological investigators can usually-
those they study--see or experience something approach-
ing the complete cultural life of a small society. Applied
to a complex society, though, this view runs into some
problems, all of which bear on a consideration of legiti-
macy
.
First, some of those who have explicated the
hermeneutic position have insufficiently clarified how
received beliefs may not only help constitute social
reality, but also distort it, as well as how received
beliefs may be contested within a society. Peter Winch's
writings on cultural anthropology are open to this criti-
cism, I would argue. In contrast, for example, Charles
Taylor's work on cultural interpretation is more consist-
ently open to the limits of self-interpretation and the
social conflict which may take place within and over the
intersubjective beliefs of a society
.
4
The difficulty of
making the distinction between social reality and the
a
-
PPearance °f that reality in the beliefs of its partici-
pants is inherent in hermeneutic principles; yet, it is,
I would argue, a difficulty which hermeneutics only under-
scores for social theory and investigation in general.
Second, insufficient attention to this distinction may
result from a neglect of the effect of social structure
94
and power relations upon the creation cof meaning. This
aspect of the problem, I think iq nnmk, s clearly not built into
interpretive philosophy in the way that thpe appearance/
reality distinction itself is. Third, the internality of
needs and purposes to social meaning can be construed in
an overwhelmingly functional-rationalistic way. if so it
would pressure us to overstate the transparency of the
’
social world for its participants, and to minimize the
unconscious and non-rational aspects of meaning. Let me
discuss these briefly in turn.
One aspect of the ideas-as-appearance problem could
be put: if meaning is rule governed, if rules create a
context of proper connections between facets of an activity,
and if rules and purposes are internal to activity, what
limits the proper context for judging the purposes internal
activity? Any activity we may choose to examine,
such as baseball, is potentially a window onto other social
activities. In looking at the game of baseball, should we
stop at the playing rules or should we also examine the
impact on the game of contract relations between owners
and players, or the meaning of the vicarious/passive spec-
tator, or the sociological composition of ball teams? Our
relational point of view, in fact, should preclude us from
seeing such questions as external to the meaning of the
game; there is no sharp dividing line between the game in
it self and the game as influenced from "outside." Thus
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there is a tension built into the interpretive method
relational thinking and the methodological rule
of beginning with the self-images of participants in a
social activity. In fact, we may only begin with those
self-images and must in various ways go beyond them.
Such self-images would limit us to prominent and conscious
aspects of meaning and risk neglecting
"background" mean-
mgs such as market relations-which are assumed as
natural, inevitable, and thus not objects of ordinary
consciousness
.
But in judging the proper context of meaning we face
the question of the theoretical and cultural perspective
of the investigator. Peter Winch’s version of verstehen
methods bridges the positivist dichotomy between observer
and participant by picturing the investigator as a partici-
pant or newly-socialized member of the culture in question.
By adhering to this position, the investigator may simul-
taneously understand the culture as its original members
do and, therefore, ideally, escape the problem of misrepre-
senting the culture to other interested persons. But the
problem in this view of the investigator, as Gadamer argues,
is that the investigator can never really shed his previous
learning and concepts. Rather than participating as a
member in the culture, the investigator engages in some-
thing more like a dialogue with members of it, translating
their meanings into the landscape of his own life world
.
5
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ThlS 18 Stl11 lnteraction which bridges the positivist
my, but it is interaction at an irreducible dis-
tance, and perhaps inescapably with an interest. That is,
the investigator can never simply represent or reflect the
meanings of a different culture-by staying wholly or
largely within its self-images-but engages in interpreta-
tion. The stance of the investigator obviously acquires
more complications when we move from cross-cultural
anthropology to domestic sociology. The academic intel-
lectual and his working class subjects, for instance, may
share a wide range of language and culture, but they do not
£ha£e the distinct life-experiences, interests, and world-
views typical of their class positions. What they share
with respect to those positions, as Sennett and Cobb among
others bring out, is a relation between those distinct
positions. This is a relation suffused subtly but power-
fully with deference, self-blame, envy and resentment on
the one hand, and on the other with authority, self-
assurance, and what we might characterize as the capacity
to render invisible or unheard the lives of those who are
not their equals. The point of emphasizing the dialogue-
interpretive nature of such studies is to open up, as
Habermas does through Gadamer, the distortive aspects of
social distance, structure, and power upon dialogue and
meaning. I will address this more fully below
.
6
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A S6COnd aSPSCt ° f the appearance/ reality problem is
A SharP dlStinCti0n
appearance and reality
13 n0t aVailable “ even a modest version of
P°Siti0n that ideas
-V enter into reality,
social world, no social reality, that is simply
'out there" at a level distinct from our ideas about it
against which we may measure the accuracy of our beliefs
The interpretive position thus opposes not only crude
empiricism, but also epistemologies which posit a dis.junc -
ture between appearance and reality, theory and ideology
Yet we must have some standard for appraising the relative
merit of various descriptions of the social world. Posi-
tions like Winch's on interpretive theory pressure us into
near-total relativism, into neglecting the search for
standards that apply across cultures or within (complex)
cultures. Strong statements of the hermeneutic position,
like Winch’s and to a lesser extent Charles Taylor's, pres-
sure us to regard social capacities of the mind-language-
as the defining characteristic of humanity. In so doing,
they seem to adopt a dichotomy between objects and persons
based on the possession of consciousness, which does not
fully capture the links which humanity has to the world of
objects, to "nature," nor the constraints imposed on us as
physical beings in a physical world, creating a social
world within the constraints of physical reality. At a
minimum, because this dualism underestimates these
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constraints, we cannot revarri +ga d the internal eoherenee of a
social theory as a sufficie^ test of the theory's validity.
At the same time, we are precluded from any simple corres-
pondence test if even a mild version of the interpretive
Position is correct. It should be said at this point that
the problem of a sharp distinction between appearance and
reality is not a flaw in interpretive philosophy itself
which only raises the issue forcefully, but rather a problem
for philosophy as a whole
.
7
Habermas proposes a certain
solution to the issue which has direct bearings on the
matter of legitimacy. Though his solution rests on a re-
worked dualism which I find difficult to accept, his notion
of a truth standard for social relations immanent in the
capacity for communication itself is a promising step out
of this philosophical maze. I shall deal with this contri-
but ion in the next section of this chapter.
This brings us to the matter of social structure.
Because the interpretive position stresses the social
creation of meaning, and because its analysis of meaning
stresses the contextual and web-like nature of language
(a holistic stance, as Charles Taylor argues), it pressures
one to neglect the effects of social structure. When
Winch, for instance, discusses the social creation of mean-
ing, neither unequal participation nor institutional con-
straints in that process are discussed. There is,
relatedly
,
a pressure to stress the common beliefs in a
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way of Ufa which may
,
as Taylor argues, form the basis for
what more apparently are conflicts within that culture
This relative neglect of structure also stems, I think
from interpretive philosophy's respect for human agency,
perhaps intensified by the battle with scientific sociolo-
gists and historians. I would argue, for instance, that
Herbert Gutman encounters this problem in trying to picture
American slaves, contrary to Genovese, as culture-makers
and not culture-takers
.
8
Yet while these are pressures within particular
statements of interpretive epistemology, they are not
necessary results of the interpretive mode. Sennett and
Cobb, for instance, go some distance in situating the pains
of working class life within a social-structural dynamic.
What we need to be able to ask, with the sensitivity to
experience which interpretive theory affords us, is: How
do the unequal interests and capacities built into social
structures affect the construction, diffusion, and content
of social meaning? How may we understand the relationship
of sub-cultures to each other and to a dominant culture?
In what sense does human agency originate, contribute to,
or sustain structures which have dynamics of their own ? 9
Later in this chapter I shall appraise Habermas' answers
to such questions.
Finally, to consider a criticism internally related
to the appearance/reality distinction, we must ask whether
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at can be meaningfully said about a ^
can be conceived in terms of consclous or ^
6 PUrP°SeS
'
h°PeS
’ wants
. The last two ofthese terms, in fact, can speah to states „hlch
, whUe
inevitably mediated socially are stilly, unquestionably
grounded in phys ic al behaviors> drives
,
Qr ^
must therefore also consider notions of structure and causa-
tion hunt upon non-conscious levels of mi „d or language,
and their impact on other realms of meaning. While such
questions, in psychological terms, are beyond my
..exper-
tise," they are still questions which must be raised and
tentatively answered within a social theory of legitimacy.
I rely on such questions in chapters four and five of this
m my discussion of the sexual constituent of
race relations and its impact on state legitimacy during
t he 1 960 ' s
.
Hi Expressive Meaning and Politics
Interpretive theory allows one to explore the internal
dynamics of an essentially normative subject-belief sys-
and their relation to activity
—with a subtlety and
depth not open to more scientific analyses. Interpretive
philosophy argues that social practices are not simply
physical behavior overlaid with meanings-rationalizations-
but are to various and problematic extents such human
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interpretations themselves. Interpretive accounts of socia!
aot lvity are not simply art imitating life, but recogni _
tions that life is, in an important sense, art. This ex-
pressive dimension of meaning, as Charles Taylor has
described it, is not just our perception of a separate
reality, but a necessary element nf oo • ty Scle o social reality as
such. ±u
With this understanding in mind, I can proceed to
lay out important internal connections between expressive
meaning, social identity, and authority. These in turn
constitute vital elements in my arguments about legitimacy
problems. To set these connections out in an initial way,
it will help to return momentarily to a discussion of rule-
governed social activity.
The expressive element of social reality is embedded
in a web of language rules which embody the principle of
authority in its broadest sense because rules are norms
lor guiding and judging activity. As one is socialized
into the practices of a society, one internalizes the
authority of the rules which govern these practices and
makes them a part of one's self. Of course this internali-
zation is not a simple process: it does not imply an
inability to be, subsequently, at least partly self-
conscious about one's identity and the practices one has,
as it were, embraced. Nor does it imply that the inter-
nalized authority is not contradictory (a foothold for
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later consciousness and criticism). And, one would want to,
among other qualifications, make some distinctions about
the centrality or importance of the various authorities
internalized. The learning of sexuality as children, for
instance, will clearly permeate the purposes we later
embrace in public and private worlds. But given these and
other qualifications,- we are left with this: By learning
the rules of activity, we establish at a basic level of the
personality a fundamental connection between knowing the
world and its meanings and knowing ourselves. And given
the nature of rules and meaning as discussed above, this
provides persons not just with individual values, but
rather with social identities. Our own purposes are in
large part purposes given to us socially, constrained by
the authority of social rules.
Yet we exist as individuals who have wills and can
make, even in a limited philosophical sense, choices
about our actions. Thus rule-governed activity as such
embodies a certain tension between each individual and the
social practices of which s/he is a part. For instance, we
have a choice about obeying rules. Yet even in disobeying
or mistaking, our actions will still be appraised socially
within the context of the rules we transgress. Because
rules are social creations, they stand in an important
sense determined, above you, opposed to capacities of your
will, yet not unconnected to it. This opposition, tension,
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in the process of knowing expresses our identity as
conscious individuals in the fact of our separation from
other physical objects and from the world of social rules
and practice. At the same time, this opposition enables us
to identify ourselves witMjn^h^onte^ of those prac-
tices, to see ourselves as part of them.
If social practice is rule-governed, then even
radically-rational, near-transparent, and democratically-
derived rules contain identification as an inescapable
feature of authority. This moment of identification is a
largely emotional feature of social practice, an experien-
tial bond with authority which substantially bridges the
gap between our individuality and a norm which is not our
individual creation. Of course in practice this bond would
vary widely in depth and strength, and one can readily
see social practices-such as degraded forms of work-in
which primarily coercion, or necessity-as-coercion
,
sus-
tains routine and in which the sense I am speaking of
authority exists largely at the level of, "This is what I
must do every day. It is familiar. It is my life." But
given the important modifications we would wish to make in
this abstract picture of identification (which I will re-
turn to below), we may still see it as a source of resist-
ance to the rejection of an authority relation, or to the
loss or undermining of familiar social practices. It is
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perhaps, a source of resist an r><=> uce to change as such, stemming
m part from the prospect of self-rejection or self-l oss
of those purposes and identities bound up with a practice.
This identification, and the prospect of losing one's
social moorings, help to explain the staying power of what
one might expect, on the grounds of rationalistic left
analysis, to be criticized and rejected. Such rationalis-
tic criticism, lacking even the rudimentary psychology I
have outlined above, would then be forced to conclude that
the resistance to change was based on false consciousness
of a reality inherently separate from our ideas or expres-
sive appraisals of it. Such a position would be hard put
to make contact, save at a tacit level, with the depth of
this experience, to understand the import it carries for
reaction even among those with other interests for change,
and to deal with this resistance in political terms. For
instance, German communists of the 1930’ s, despite all the
other important aspects of fascism which they analyzed,
systematically underestimated its expressive appeals to
the working class.
I do not wish, in making these points, to draw a
Durkheimian picture of the cohesive moral order. In my
appraisal of Habermas at the end of this chapter I will
make more explicit the contradictory implications of these
arguments. But by way of preparing this discussion, the
points I have made help us to situate a central trait of
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liberal society, rooted ultimately in its capitalist
organization. This is the expansionary, dynamic
quality of capitalist relations, destructive of tradition,
colonizing over historical time all facets of social life
which can profitably be brought under commodity produc-
tion, which require rationalization and managing to
facilitate such production, which have fallen victim to
the by now ingrained impulse to rationalization for its
own sake. This trait of liberal political economy has its
counterpart in liberal thought, in the skeptical and dis-
daining attitude of science and the Enlightenment for tra-
ditional ways and knowledge. Disenchanting the natural
and social worlds, this process renders liberal society at
its core a perpetual threat to social authority, a recurrent
source of its own social and political legitimacy problems.
In T
-
he Making of the English Working Class
. E. P.
Thompson captures the destruction of these intersubject ively-
const 1 tuted traditions and their replacement with more
closely administered, more completely dominated relation-
ships. As have others like Gutman and the Lynds
,
12
Thompson locates in this destruction a perpetual source
of instability, conflict, and resistance to capitalist
production, as well as a source of great anguish, loss,
and suffering. While Thompson is at pains to discount the
"optimistic" interpretation of this period as one of up-
heaval but also gradually increasing material living
106
standards, he also closely documents the judgments of
displaced workers themselves. These emphasized the experi-
ence of loss of opportunities for interaction at work,
loss of opportunities to help structure one's own work (i„
Part to accommodate these personal relations), loss of the
entertainments, rituals, customs, and public social life
SO characteristic of
-pre-capitalist village, farm, and
craft work. 13
Any evaluation of the aualitv n-F i -p
an assessment of thftS iff. Sntail
manifold satisfaction or depri^t^s^cu?; th?as well as material of th7n ’ cultural
From <5ii oh
l P e°Ple concerned,
view I, standpoint , the older "cataclysmic"
condUions improvement in material
Though Thompson is writing of the early 19th century,
the expansionary process which fed this cultural immisera-
tion remains a disruptive force. Written on a more abstract
level than Thompson's work, Habermas' Legitimation Crisis
appraises the contemporary form of this dynamic and its
pressures toward social crisis. 14 In so doing, he follows
a central concern of the earlier Frankfurt school, one
which regards Hegel, Marx, Weber, and Freud as historical
moments in the analysis of domination, of the extension of
rationality
,
and of the social control of internal and
external nature. Habermas has pursued these concerns with
a scope both maddening and provocative, through original
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research these thinkers, earller
linguistic and communications theory, the philosophy of
science, hermeneutics, systems theory, and so on
.
15
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turn now to a consideration of Legi timation Crisis as his
distillation of this earlier research into a more specifi-
cal ly political theory.
IH
. Legitimation Crisis
Because is a culmination of
Habermas' earlier work, it is difficult to know where to
cut into his arguments. What I intend to do is to weave
the bare outlines of his work on materialism, hermeneutics,
etc. into an overview of the book, then proceed in more
detail With major elements of his argument, and finally
appraise his arguments in more depth. I run the risk in
this summary not only of oversimplifying the earlier foun-
dations of his arguments, but also of imposing order and
linguistic clarity on his particular arguments about
legitimacy in spots where there is apparently little. To
these problems I shall also return.
In his earlier work, Habermas developed two logically
distinct but interrelated modes of human cognition which
express themselves as different postures or interests toward
their respective objects
,
16
as different linguistic forms,
as different forms of consciousness and epistemology
.
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These are the technical and practical modes, and each of
them exists as two levels of communication: communicative
action, and discourse. When we engage in either of these
modes as a matter of course, without debating the various
claims or purposes made within each mode, we are engaging
in technical or practical communicative action when we
participate in the formal process of arguing and validat-
ing the claims and purposes implicit or normally made in
communicative action, we are engaging in either technical
or practical discourse.
The technical mode is an instrumental, purposive-
rational stance towards the world. It expresses our desire
to control that world through comprehending and acting upon
its objectivity. The technical mode, like the practical,
is a developmental capacity of individuals and societies,
the progress of which is judged in part by the distinction
any society can make between what the technical mode may
and may not be applied to, and by the power it has at any
given stage of development to tap into, control, its
object. In its ideal formulation, the technical mode
applies to the world of external nature outside human
society: non-conscious objects and other life forms. The
technical mode has as its general place, therefore, the
production processes which appropriate external nature for
human use, and its particular place, in our society, in
scientific-technological activity and thought. The
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development of its ability to tan into +y r p l this world of exter-
nal nature proceeds through thpn e development of theories of
explanation which, through internal incoherencies, cannot
account for the conceptually-imbued data which the theory
brings to light and thus require, at some point, revision
or revolution which enhances their explanatory capability
The development of this ability through this process is
what Habermas calls theoretical (technical) discourse,
"the medium of ut terances that admit. of truth .” 17
Whereas the technical mode reflects the need of the
human species to work, to appropriate nature to survive,
the practical mode expresses the need of the species to
communicate and to regulate action through
intersubjectively-constituted norms and meanings. In its
ideal formulation, the practical mode applies to the
socialization of internal nature through linguistic and
related communicative structures (art, music, dance,
culture), and thus to the creation of cultural norms which
organize all interaction, including, as "background," the
social organization of production and science. As in the
theoretical mode, when the claims of practical communica-
tive action are questioned, they may be "redeemed discur-
sively" (through practical discourse).
While the technical and practical modes are ideally
limited to different facets of reality (objects, persons),
they may be, and have been historically, applied at various
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levels of development to the '.wrong', facets. The contempo-
rary attempt to apply technical reason to the study of
society is one such misplaced effort, according to Habermas.
The effort in primitive and feudal societies to understand
the workings of physical nature through magical or reli-
gious categories reflects an insufficient distinction
between practical (interpretive) and techn^TT^
(through the imputation of agency to the natural world).
And, because of this lack of distinction, in part, this
effort also represents the "underdevelopment " G f both
practical and technical modes.
Habermas views these modes as developmental by means
of truth standards which he finds immanent in technical
and practical discourse. By adopting a discourse model
of truth, Habermas is arguing that whether a technical or
practical claim is true or not is essentially inseparable
from the manner in which the truth claim is settled. The
philosophical arguments he uses to defend this position
are beyond the scope of this dissertation, but the immanent
standards themselves, if he is correct, have far-reaching
consequences for social theory. For Habermas is arguing,
against positivists, that moral arguments have an inner
logic which allows for the adjudication of moral claims.
And, he is arguing, against naturalists, that moral argu-
ments do not "admit of truth in the same sense as descrip-
tive statements," that in fact they have a separate logic
Ill
Of their own For technioal and practioai discourse
these standards are grounded on the undominated speech
situations peculiar to each mode. These situations are
not any utopian creation of Habermas, but rather exist
even within dominated discourse as assumptions necessary
to entering into any argument over truth claims. The
various components of these ideal speech situations would,
if followed, Habermas argues, guarantee a rationally-
motivated consensus on the truth claims raised in each
mode. This consensus, and the process of arriving at it,
are for all practical purposes the equivalent of truth.
By developing the notions of technical and practical
action, Habermas is engaged, among other things, in a
revision of Marxism. He argues that while Marx himself
argued convincingly for thp n i -t- -i ™
^
£ y ne ultimate primacy of productive
activity in capitalism, and while Marx insisted on the
relational character of human interaction, he never explic-
y developed the epistemological and linguistic grounding
of this relational quality. Thus, the understanding of
practical reason remains implicit, underdeveloped in
Marxist theory, embodied for instance in a base-
superstructure formulation which, while Marx might employ
it subtly, has too easily fallen victim to mechanistic
and positivistic interpretations. So, in developing
explicitly the distinct realm of practical communicative
action, Habermas therefore has need of another model of
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ciety. This he finds, tentatively and with reservations,
in a radicalized version of systems theory.
Social systems theory fits Habermas' needs, he be-
lieves, because it is formed from the point of view of the
capacity of a social system, with its constituent sub-
systems, to learn about, adapt to, "steer" within, control
environment. This may be expressed as a development of
its rationality, but also, because the development of sub-
systems may be uncoordinated, as a source of crisis. The
adaptive, steering capacity of the system is what Habermas
would describe as the overall goal-state of the social sys-
tem. As an adaption of structural-functionalism, social
systems theory posits basic functions which subsystems may
perform in relation to the overall goal-state of learning
about and controlling its environment.
For Habermas' social system, the environment consists
of inner nature, outer nature, and other systems. The
socio- cultural subsystem has the particular function of
"appropriating" inner (human) nature through socialization
by means of mtersubj ect ively constituted norms which
require justification. This subsystem consists (appar-
ently, for he does not say directly) of family, church,
media, education institutions, and leisure and recreational
institutions and practices. These institutions have the
primary (though not exclusive) responsibility for repro-
ducing the interpretive traditions which provide meaning
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and motivation to all social activity. Outer nature is
appropriated through the production or economic subsystem
ultimately through the capacity to apply technical reason
to this process. However, as Habermas would be quick to
point out, technical reason need not be confined to this
subsystem, and in fact its apparent use within the admin-
istrative or political system is an important factor in
his sketch of crisis tendencies in late capitalism. This
administrative system assumes, in late capitalism, the
steering function of the social system-an increasing
attempt within the contradictions of late capitalism to
coordinate social control of inner and external nature and
relations with other systems. Finally, although Habermas
initially recognizes a fourth system, the legitimation sys-
tem, the preponderance of his usage indicates that the
legitimation system is more appropriately regarded as a
relationship between the three other systems which provides
support for the actions of the administrative system.
Habermas recognizes that systems theory has an
inherent weakness, due to the circularity of functionalism,
m specifying the boundaries of subsystems. However, this
is not just a weakness of systems theory, but apparently a
problem over time for a social system itself, a problem it
has in maintaining its "identity" at both a structural and
intersubject ive level. This problem will lead us ultimately
to his theory of system crises, but we must first lay the
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groundwork for that discussion by relating th» ui j-a e subsystems
to each other.
These subsystems relate in two ways: through their
inputs and outputs, and through the constraints they p lace
upon each other, primarily through their uneven develop-
ment. I shall take the input-output relationships first.
The socio-cultural system provides as its output meanings
and motivations which help constitute the structured ac-
tivity of all subsystems. Apart from pre-bourgeois tradi-
tions, of which little now remains, Habermas cites two
motivational
"syndromes" called familial-vocational
pnvatism and civic privatism. The first is a tradition
of liberal society which orients subjects toward possessive
individualism, utilitarianism, and either occupational
achievement or fatalism. Civic privatism serves to de-
politicize the public realm and to provide for the admin-
istrative system a mixture of low-level participation and
"diffused support" for its policies. Civic privatism
legitimates state activity. Both forms of privatism are
embedded in the disappearing pre-bourgeois traditions and
world-views, such as religion, cited above. This anchor-
mg in non-bourgeois traditions is important for legitima-
tion problems, as I shall detail later, for Habermas argues
that bourgeois traditions cannot reproduce themselves
outside of this relation. Finally, the socio-cultural
system's output is, in effect, input for the economic and
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administrative systems. Its input, colieetive or commodity-
form goods and services, is the output, respectively, of
the administrative and economic systems.
AS input, the socio-cultural system receives work
(in part constituted by socio-cultural motivations), capi-
tal, and administrative decisions which help to steer the
economy. As output,. the economic system produces material
value, which flows as input to both administrative and
socio-cultural systems, and demands upon the administrative
system for particular and collective goods and services
(much as O'Connor would describe them). In late capitalism
as in market capitalism, class structure in production
provides the dynamic which makes the economic system,
ultimately, the structurally-determining force of social
system change. However, in late capitalism, the crisis
tendencies of this dynamic have been displaced into the
administrative system, a reflection of the need to plan for
and to control the cyclical economic and social upheavals
endemic to capitalism, and reflective of the growing
interconnectedness and scope of production and exchange.
This displacement reflects, Habermas would argue, the
development of steering capacity, or rather, the develop-
ment of both need and capacity to steer the system within
its environment.
The administrative system, or state and related
institutions, receives as inputs material value (taxes)
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from the economic system, demands from economic and socio-
cultural systems for services, and diffuse legitimation
support (as well as particular motivations for its members'
activities) from the socio-cultural system. its outputs
are collective goods and services for other subsystems
and, overall, efforts to steer the social system within
its environments. It does this through a form of technical
communicative action, bureaucracy, which applies instru-
mental rationality to the solution of problems.
While the inputs of any subsystem are the outputs of
others, the relations between subsystems are not adequately
conceived unless we introduce the language of structural
forces. In the description of crisis tendencies below I
shall make Habermas' use of this language more specific.
For now, Habermas’ idea of a struct ural constraint is best
conceptualized as the product of a subsystem imperative
which through its uncoordinated development in relation to
other subsystems, raises the problems of system integra-
tion and boundary definitions. For instance, the need of
an increasingly socialized, interwoven economy for plan-
ning, displaced into the state, is structurally constrained
by a socio-cultural system whose development (at the level
of action and discourse) is logically independent of
economic development. The growth of the’ state is con-
strained by its increasing need for legitimation from a
socio-cultural sphere which does not automatically supply
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it. Moreover, as a «tui^o^^ the growth Qf
the state (through admi„i strative planning) into the soclo _
cultural system-a boundary problem-undermines the sources
of its own legitimacy and the legitimacy of other social
institutions. Rather than simply being constrained to
legitimate its expanded activity, which to a point it can
do, the state must engage in artivit,, ^c ivity
—planning—which
undermines the basis of that activity itself
.
19
To frame the discussion of crises, it may help to
develop a spatial metaphor of Habermas' social system, one
formed from the point of view of boundary considerations
and of the centrality of the socio-cultural system for
legitimation. One might picture the socio-cultural system
as a sphere located within another, "hollowed-out" sphere
which is itself divided between the economic and adminis-
trative systems. All three systems now have "physical"
boundaries with each other, exchange inputs and outputs
across those boundaries, and by their relative size, shape
and dynamics, structurally impinge upon one another.
Habermas argues that in late capitalism, through
means I shall examine, crisis tendencies in the economic
system are displaced into the administrative steering sys-
tem. The steering system expands in (ultimately failing)
efforts to cope, as described above. The expansion of the
steering system is not only "outward" into the economy and
other social systems, but also "inward" into the
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socio-cultural system. This inward expansion of technical
rationality disrupts the process of motive-formation and
thus the constitutive dimension of social institutions
like work, family, education, etc. It undermines their
meaning and is incapable, as technical rationality, of
creating effective substitute meanings. By expanding in-
ward, the state saueezes the socio-cultural system, frac-
turing and restructuring its institutions. In so doing,
the state loses its legitimacy, for its expanded activities
require greater legitimation even as these activities
undermine the sources of legitimacy. The capitalist social
system, as it were, collapses in upon itself
With this overview in mind, I will now examine four
areas of Habermas' theory more closely. These are his
general idea of social system crisis; the state's role as
steering system; particulars of the motivations supplied
by the socio-cultural system; and his view of practical
discourse
.
Habermas' notion of system crisis is shaped by an
effort to understand society as a set of structures beyond,
but not unconnected to, the intersubjective constitution
of activity. Moreover, he is concerned to deal with what
he regards as an essential asymmetry in the reproduction
of social life. This asymmetry has two aspects. First is
the inherently greater dynamism of economic/technical
action in late capitalism relative to cultural activity.
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Second is his position that the internal dynamics of tech-
nical and practical discourse are, at a fundamental level,
"iSei^Clndmndent of one another ."20 Th i s last fact
’
r
means that the dynamic inherent in economic/administrative
(instrumental) action may undermine normative traditions,
yet will not necessarily release new norms that correspond
to this structural development of economic or administra-
tive systems. Hence, Habermas has reformulated, within an
exploration of culture that Marx never directly undertook,
Marx's argument that the relations of production become
fetters on the forces of production, and his argument that
(however it was intended) the superstructure of capitalism
is erected upon an economic base. Habermas' general notion
of social system crisis, then, is one in which crises of
social identity result from structural dislocations and
change, one in which the purposes which help to constitute
the deeper structures of social life are themselves under-
mined by the uneven development and coordination of those
very structures.
Contemporary possibilities for crises differ from
the crises characteristic of market capitalism, according
to Habermas. The cyclical crisis nature of market capital-
ism resulted in the expansion of the state as a conscious
steering mechanism for late capitalism, replacing the
unconscious steering mechanism of market forces. With the
growth of the state, based politically (as with O'Connor)
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on a class compromise In production, crisis tendencies which
ortginate in the economy have been displaced into the state;
these tendencies are ultimately sha£ed by class relations in
the economy, but a^ea, and are played out within the public
the state. It is important to emphasize, at this
point, Habermas' indebtedness to O'Connor, and also to Claus
Offe, on the role of. the <?tatp no +' sta e as the steering mechanism of
late capitalism. Habermas closely follows O'Connor's
description of late capitalism as a three-sector economy,
and endorses his arguments on the growing socialization and
collectivization of production.
On the basis of this description, the socialization
of production calls for increased state planning and admin-
istrative intervention in realms of cultural life which
previously have been (once set in motion) self-regenerat ing
.
One example of this is in education. The need to coordinate
a trained labor supply with the demands of the labor market
forces the state into curriculum planning and educational
innovation. This intervention not only requires legitima-
tion (for it is an overt exercise of "new" power in an area
previously, relatively, less dominated); by requiring
legitimation, it makes the entire matter a matter of public
debate in a way it had not previously been
.
21
Whereas school administrations formerly merely had
to codify a canon that had taken shape in an
unplanned, nature— like manner, present curriculum
planning is based on the premise that traditional
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patterns could as wpn
trative planning produces a universal press
1S ~
for legitimation in a sphere thlt ,? P ureS;iSreciseiy for its senn-dis-
As other examples of this process, Habermas cites land-use
Planning and the matter of private ownership of land,
health-care planning, and family planning and marriage laws
which bring sexual taboos and equality up for debate. He
further notes that this general process of administrative
intervention creates a consciousness "not only of the con-
tents of tradition, but also of the techniques of tradi-
tion, that is, of socialization." Among other things, this
means a questioning of the appropriate forums and agencies
of socialization: family, church, versus the state. To
the extent that this is so, and Habermas seems to have
framed a major American political issue, it means that
Weber's rational-legal model of legitimacy is insufficient.
State actions may be the product of legal authority, but
that authority will not carry the day unless it can appeal
to a standard of justice
,.
22 And that standard is precisely
what is at issue when the state intervenes.
In thinking about this overall process, Habermas
underlines a crucial problem for the state, in securing
its legitimation, which ties into important debates about
the meaning of consumption and the embourgeoisement of the
working class. The process of state expansion undermining
tradition means that "meaning is a scarce resource" in
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late capitalism.^ Among the ranks of mi sslng or scarce
meaning is legitimation for (growing) state activity. This
deficit can be partly offset, Habermas argues, by material
reward through the state or directly through a (temporarily)
well-functioning economy. This replacement relationship
though, is limited by three linked factors: economic down-
turn, the "natural" limits to state rationalization of the
cultural system, and the new needs created, fostered, by
state expansion. The limiting effect of economic downturn
clear enough. Limits to rationalization of the cultural
system lie in the constitutive motivations it supplies to
all, including economic, activity. And, the process of
state expansion revolves around, and creates, groups within
the population who are outside traditional orientations to
exchange value. These groups, such as radicalized human
services workers, welfare recipients, public transport
users, students, and the elderly, are increasingly oriented
through state activity (Habermas argues) to use values and
to collectively-provided goods. As such, they provide a
source of critical leverage when administrative ration-
ality, ultimately, re-polit icizes the public sphere through
its undermining of tradition.
In the history of capitalism, this undermining of
tradition has taken place in two distinct, though inter-
twined, areas: pre-bourgeois world views and culture
(religion, peasant and craft traditions) and the bourgeois
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traditions Habermas describes as civil privatism and
familial-vocational privatism. Habermas argues that these
bourgeois traditions have always been dependent upon his-
torical links with pre-bourgeois traditions
:
24
reproduce ?tse?ffrom^seW Wa® t
never f le todependent on motivationally Effective supplementation by traditional world-views PP
The reasons for this dependence have to do with "universal"
areas of culture which "pure" bourgeois traditions (merito-
cratic ideology) do not effectively address: consolation
in the face of death, guilt, sickness; reconciliation with
inner or outer nature, which bourgeois culture takes only
as objects; an explicit basis for understanding, fostering,
relations of solidarity within groups or between individuals;
and relatedly, a notion of politics which addresses collec-
tive needs. Pre-bourgeois world-views which addressed
these matters have been steadily eroded and with them,
Habermas argues, the tacit strength capitalist society drew
from their answers to these existential matters.
Bourgeois motivations are further weakened (apart
from the processes described above of state-fostered use-
values, and of direct undermining of bourgeois traditions)
by a widespread realization that we do not live in a market
society which justly allocates reward according to competi-
tion and merit. Rather, Habermas argues, "it has been
recognized, even among the population at large, that social
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force is exercised in the forme? ^ • oci rms of economic exchange ." 25
An example of this, argues Habermas, is increased emphasis
on schooling as an avenue to success-a situation in which
the life chances allocated by social class are increasingly
apparent
.
In this overall picture a legitimation crisis seems
quite probable to Habermas. Once the traditions essential
for the constitution of capitalist social relations have
been brought into the realm of consciousness and debate.
they cannot be reconstituted. But what remains relatively
unweakened in bourgeois culture is its abstract universal-
ism— a component of liberal society representing a develop-
ment m thought and action over pre-bourgeois societies.
Universal istic orientations enter into the public debate
created by state expansion, a force pushing the resolution
of this moral debate developmentally-forward
,
or rather,
a standard blocking permanent regression. This standard
consciously "appropriates" a segment of an ideal of undomi-
nated communication, an ideal implicit in our entering into
practical discourse. Relatively "freed," temporarily, from
the bonds of authority and domination contained in under-
mined traditions, practical discourse may approach the
process of collective will-formation which Habermas sees
as inseparable from moral truth itself. Though I have put
it pretty obtusely, this moral truth is in effect a pro-
cedural notion of democracy founded on social equality
.
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M^raisal. Habermas' arguments in Legitimation are
significant not only in themselves, but also in the reflec-
tion they provoke over a wide range of issues. My own
position on legitimacy has been fundamentally shaped by
his general concerns with the process I term cultural degra-
dation, with the nature of practical discourse, and with
the linking of intersubjectivity to the deeper forces and
patterns of social life. Often obscured by the storm of
criticism and rebuttal which Legitimation Crisis
, right-
fully, encountered, the insights he brings to these con-
cerns have not yet found their proper place in left social
theory and movements.
In appraising the book, I will often differ with
Habermas' particular interpretations of these concerns.
And m so doing, I will raise issues germane to the American
scene which, given our shared concerns, he might well
accommodate. But there remain several fundamental differ-
ences between our outlooks, manifested also in these
lesser" criticisms. These pressure me ultimately to
differing, more pessimistic scenarios of legitimation
crises and their possible political resolutions. Among
the intertwined points I shall consider are: his use of
the mechanical and abstract language of systems structural-
functionalism; the pressure in systems theory to wash out
class, sex, and racial modes of domination and the dynamics
they involve; the role of the state as a steering mechanism
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in late capitalist the direct co„tri bution of the econQmy
as well as the state to cultural degradation; and the
matter of his teleology, especially as it contributes to
his neglect of nationalism as a legitimating tradition in
the modern world system.
Before engaging these points, I want to emphasize,
again, the superiority of the interpretive view of ideology,
and Habermas' use of it, over O'Connor's view and the
behavioral treatment of ideology. it helps us to deepen
our understanding of public disaffection from the state,
which is seen—though not entirely correctly by either
Habermas or citizens who hold this view-as a bureaucratic
threat to private life and to the "self-generating" nature
of cultural traditions which secure social identity. We
need to (and will shortly) flesh out the schematic picture
Habermas draws of this process, and make it apply to con-
temporary American politics. But in doing so, we will
temper considerably the effect of the "epistemic pressures"
Habermas sees operating in the crisis. His account ulti-
mately underestimates the tenacity of traditions, whose
content and possibilities for change are also shaped by
structural forces in the international system of nations,
by the dynamics of the sex/gender system and its links to
class, and by the (related) institutionalized projections
of racial consciousness.
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1. Any novice confronting Legit
j
matlon wm
be excused for wondering how a theorist of communicative
competence may write in such tortured language. Critics
have often chastised Habermas for his language and it bears
repeating here. Of course, there are valid reasons for
abstraction or jargon. And, Habermas' peculiar combination
of German philosophy, critical theory, and systems talk
can be translated into something like ordinary language-
much as C. Wright Mills did for Talcott Parsons in The
Sociological Imagination
. But, it is possible to write
social theory in something like everyday language, and the
effort is important politically, even if not completely
possible. But there is something more at stake. The
language of systems theory is inherently at odds with
Habermas' intention to place intersubjectively-constituted
traditions in the forefront of his theory. Systems jargon
wins out in this unlikely partnership, undermining, I think,
a wider hearing for Habermas' arguments about culture. As
Habermas notes when seeking to retain the experience of
subjects as a vital element in his structural analysis,
"the problem is to demonstrate their interconnection.
He has made connections between "steering problems" and
normative structures. But he has not made palpable enough
the manner in which structural forces are creations of and
beyond intersubjectively constituted activity.
..26
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Systems jargon makes it hard to express such connec-
tions for it tends to completely reify structures, to give
them a life of their own unconnected to human agency. I„
order to make these connections, Habermas would have to
engage in a particular and concrete analysis; since this is
explicitly not his aim in Legitimation Crisis he deserves
some benefit of the doubt on this issue. In following some
of his concerns in the remainder of the dissertation,
though, I will be trying to fill in such connections his-
torically, around race relations.
2. Systems jargon also pressures one to wash out
patterns of class, sex, and racial domination within,
across, and common to different subsystems of society
(economy, state, culture). That is, we focus in systems
theory not on relations of domination and the dynamics
springing from them, but on regions of society. 27 Thus
Habermas, for instance, insists that class dynamics in the
economy are ultimately the motor of structural imbalance
between these regions. But, he fails to underline the
play of class forces in the state and in the socio-cultural
system (i.e., class sub-cultures); and, he fails to empha-
size how culture itself is increasingly degraded by being
brought under relations of production for exchange. Simi-
lar points which I made with regard to O'Connor's class
analysis specifically the role of the PMC in production,
politics, and culture—would also apply, at this point,
129
to Habermas
. To make such points, however, is to brlng
pressure within one's theory to modify an account of the
state as the immediate source of crisis. Class relations
which encompass the state and help to make it a target of
dissatisfaction play a more prominent role. For example,
the manner in which middle class reformers articulate
environmental, racial, and women's rights issues, and
bring them to the state for administrative regulation,
helps to define working class constituencies out of the
issues and/or to make them disproportionately the bearers
of administrative reform.
Systems analysis also fits a judgment which on its
surface might be sustained about late (and especially
American) capitalism, that class conflict has in fact been
muted, transmuted, into different forms. Both O’Connor and
Habermas stress a class compromise28 they see as central to
late capitalism on which the expanded role of the state
rests. The difficulty with focusing on this "compromise”
is that it never included labor and capital outside the
monopoly sector, and that labor in the monopoly sector
resisted in a variety of ways the union complicity neces-
sary to make this compromise work. As a result, I would
argue, both O'Connor and Habermas stress the state as an
arena of displaced class struggle—which it is to an ex-
tent—to the exclusion of class conflict in production
itself. Or rather, they underestimate the potential of a
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d-ect repoliticization of class relations in production.
Direct assaults on labor are an essential part of the reso-
lution of capitalist crises-a point O'Connor nates but
does not fully develop in his social-industrial complex
scenario. These direct assaults always raise the possi-
bility of outright questioning of class relations and the
state's role in maintaining them. The current wave of
union-busting, and workers' response to it, are part of
this dynamic. In confronting union-busting, workers often
have to confront the repressive force of the state in
breaking strikes and litigating union grievances to death.
Strikes over speed-ups, health and safety issues, and
important local issues all face this same possibility.
With less surplus to bargain over in time of crisis, the
repressive role of the state necessarily becomes more
prominent. My point here is not to overdraw the possi-
bility of a direct production-caused political crisis,
but to show it as an essential element in the overall pic-
ture and to distinguish between different forms of state
involvement in crisis.
If we were to incorporate notions of patriarchy and
a sex/gender system into Habermas' analysis, we would have
to consider whether the dynamic of economically-induced
state encroachment on culture fully captured the direction
of structural forces operating in the social system. Does
the structure of socialized sex roles contain a dynamic
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which interacts with the imperatives of the economic
sphere
,
and/or does it constitute a much more resistant
object to class dynamics than the fairly passive picture
Habermas paints? Does the distinction between the "private
life" of family and cultural tradition on the one hand,
and the "public life" of the economy and state on the
’
other, in fact represent an accommodation of class rela-
and patriarchal relations to one another? How do we
account for the reproduction of sex roles and of gender?
For the reproduction of domination within this system?
Let me give a thumbnail sketch of patriarchal relations
in a sex/gender system which begins to address these ques-
tions, one which I shall expand upon in chapter four in my
analysis of race relations.
Debates over the reproduction of sex roles and gender
inevitably position themselves with respect to Freud, and
involve the question of relativizing his theory histori-
cally and culturally. I would take as my point of depar-
ture the interpretations Nancy Chodorow and Gayle Rubin
make of undeveloped, or controversial, points in Freudian
29theory. And, I would note the open nature of the issues
on which I must necessarily take a position.
Sexual identity takes root in a developmental stage
in which a previously bisexual infant learns the congruity
between physical traits and socially-constituted behavior.
As embodied beings learning sex roles
,
young children are
132
learning, among other things, the norm of heterosexuality
.
Thus learning requires a prior and co-extensive process of
individuation-in which the infant learns to distinguish
itself from the world around it, a world which includes a
mother who attempts to meet the infant's needs. In our
culture, this complex process takes place in a context
where women are mothers-the primary nurturer and love-
object for the infant, whom the infant recognizes as an
all-powerful figure and who, ultimately, is also an object
of resentment because all the infant's needs cannot be
recognized or met. The process also takes place in a con-
text in which relatively absent male fathers have recog-
nizable powers distinct from and beyond those of women.
Learning in these contexts creates asymmetries in the
socialization of girl and boy children: asymmetrical needs,
capacities, and life chances which take root at the basic
level of the personality and reproduce themselves in later
love relationships and in social inequality between the
sexes
.
Both girl and boy children learn heterosexual norms
in the Oedipal phase of development, and enter this phase
with female mothers as their primary love objects. In
establishing themselves as males, boys must repress their
feminine aspects and the affective capacities associated
with them. They learn to identify with a rival for their
mother's love, their father, who resembles them genitally.
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in doing so, they accept that they cannot erotically possess
the mother, but that they can erotically and affectively
love someone physical^ like her. In establishing them-
selves as female, though, girl children occupy a more
ambivalent position. They must learn that they may not
erotically love or possess their mother or someone like
her, yet they cannot. as completely individuate themselves
from their mothers, whom they genitally resemble.
Chodorow's argument is that in learning heterosexual norms,
girl children go through a weaker individuation process
than boy children do, and do not achieve the same focusing
of erotic and affective desires upon males that boys can
achieve with respect to females. Rather, girls effectively
split these desires, retaining affective capacities for
females while transferring erotic desires to males; and,
this transfer of erotic desire is initially to a relatively
more remote figure, the father, than a boy has available in
the mother. In this weaker individuation, girl children
tend to emerge with a less firm basis than boys do for
feelings of control over the external world, for the sense
of competence and effectiveness. Later training in sex
roles encourages, and bases itself upon, this asymmetrical
process
.
In later life, men and women come together on the
basis of these asymmetries, which result in a substantial
but not complete fit between the expectations and capacities
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they bring to tbeir relationships with each other. Though
these asymmetries contribute to male dominance in society,
in ways I shall indicate below, they become at a very early
age a basic part of the personality itself, an anchor with
respect to fundamental needs which may be questioned or
overturned only on pain of deep personal crisis. They form
a core of social identity which would not neatly fit into
Habermas' picture of reasoned moral discourse over increas-
ingly transparent traditions.
The fit between the capacities and needs which men
and women bring to their relationships is not a complete
one. While meeting somewhat more symmetrically on the basis
of erotic need, men tend to demand of women a focused level
of nurturing and affective support which their differing
individuation processes cannot fully sustain. A woman's
nurturing and affective needs may be satisfied over a wider,
perhaps less intense because less focused, range of rela-
tionships that include children and other women. But a
man s emotional needs tend to be focused upon one woman,
or a series of women, and upon a smaller range of male
friends. Kis individuation process more or less focused
those needs on females and discouraged their expression
with respect to males. As Chodorow notes, in a society
in which personal relationships and family are increas-
ingly bereft of institutional supports, and increasingly
bear the burden of personal identity, these asymmetries
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and the problems and anxieties they provoke are more and
more visible. In chapters four and five, I will argue that
thts and other aspects of our sex/gender system play a
constitutive role in the dynamics of race relations and
contribute, among other things, to the sense of vulnera-
bility white men and women may feel to the sexual images
white culture projects onto black peoples.
As Chodorow and others argue, because women are
mothers they are subject to a range of primitive resent-
ments which young children accumulate when their needs are
unrecognized or unmet by their primary love-object. These
resentments are a fertile basis for anti-feminine attitudes
among both male and female, and a contributing factor to
patriarchal relations. Moreover, women cannot easily
defend themselves against such attitudes, other blaming
games, and assertions of male power or competence because
their weaker individuation process (abetted of course by
training and role emulation)
—weaker ego boundaries
leaves them more internally connected to, and therefore
somehow responsible for, the world around them. It feeds,
for women in our culture, a particular form of internal
self-blame for a world suffused with affective ties and
bonds
.
In The Traffic in Women," Gayle Rubin argues that
contemporary Western sex/gender systems are organized along
lines similar to those of kinships systems Levi-Strauss
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uncovered in ,„ore
'primitive- societies. In such pre -state
societies, kinship systems organize economic, political
ceremonial, and sexual activity. In these systems, incest
taboos and "eri ftqn OT7 _ ^ .P y major role in organizing these
activities, and together constitute the process he calls
the exchange of women. Incest taboos mandate who may and
may not become sexual partners, and thus mandate marital
exchange between groups composed of members forbidden
sexual activity with each other. m these marital ex-
changes, women moving between groups form the basis of
kinship and alliance between the groups
.
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results in a wide network ofi , a set of people whose connections withone another are a kinship structure. Ml otheflevels, amounts, and directions of exchange—
ture
Udl
Thp
h°Stlle ones—are ordered by this struc-. e marriage ceremonies recorded in theethnographic literature are moments in a cease-iess and ordered procession in which women
children, shells, words, cattle names, fish
ancestors, whales teeth, pigs, yams, spells,’dances, mats, etc., pass from hand to handleaving as their tracks the ties that bind.’
In this organization, men are the beneficiaries of the
total exchange system because they have as fathers and
brothers what mothers and sisters do not have—the rights
of bestowal in their daughters or sisters. These are
rights that women do not have (fully) in their own persons
or in the persons of their male kin. These rights, and
the system of kinship itself, are based upon the incest
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taboo, heterosexuality, and an asymmetric division of the
sexes
.
Freudian theory does not analyze kinship systems, but
it does analyze their bases, as described above; it analyzes
the reproduction of sexuality. As in ChodoroWs exigesis
of Freud, central to this reproduction is the role of the
Oedipal stage of development, in which heterosexuality is
forged through an individuation process involving incest
taboos, penis envy, and castration fears. Rubin argues,
following Lacan to a point, that the Oedipal drama is the
conscription of previously bisexual infants into kinship
structures, and that to understand this conscription we
must particularly understand the concepts of penis envy and
castration fears as expressing the symbolic role of the
phallus in kinship systems.
In original Freudian theory, rivalry with the father
for possession of the mother leaves both girls and boys
with the "choice" of having a penis or being castrated.
In choosing to have a penis, in fear of being castrated by
the father, the boy renounces his right to the mother but
not his right to women. In contrast, a girl cannot physi-
cally have a penis, and so experiences herself as biologi-
cally castrated, unable to satisfy the mother, inferior,
and thus gives up her struggle to possess her mother (or
other women) and acquires the passive and heterosexual
characteristics of femininity. Though Freud can and has
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been read overwhelming biologically i„ hls analysis Qf
these processes, it is possible, as Lacan and Rubin do
to "conceive of psychoanalysis as a theory of information
rather than organs ." 31 (0 f course, as Rubin notes, it is
not simply a matter of either/or, but of both biology and
information
.
)
Rubin's use of Lacan distinguishes between the bio-
logical fact of the penis and the social information of
the phallus. Thus boy and girl children, in the Oedipal
Phase, are presented with information which confers meaning
upon the genitals. This meaning includes not only hetero-
sexuality, but also male dominance over women based on the
possession of the phallus, of which castration fears are,
in part, recognition. These meanings are structured in
part by a child rearing system in which women are mothers,
the primary love-objects of young children who have genital
differences. Rubin argues that in the Oedipal phase, boys
and girls learn that men have capacities and rights in
women, based on the possession of the phallus, that women
do not have in themselves. In learning this lesson along
with their heterosexuality, boys and girls enter for the
first time (in a conscious way) a kinship system, with its
taboos and enjoinders, in which women are symbolically
exchanged for phalluses.
In this Oedipal exchange system, a girl symbolically
acknowledges her social inferiority in her "castration,"
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“ reCOenlz1^ ^at she may only have a phallus as a gift
from a man. It is a gift which the mother can not give
to the young girl, for the mother does not possess the
Phallus either physically or socially, and herself went
through a similar acknowledgment as a child. it is a gift
Which the girl's father does not give her, although he does
possess it. In fact, the father can give it to (acknowledge
it in) his boy child. The boy in turn must "give away" his
mother to his father in order to receive a phallus, in order
not to be castrated, an exchange which expresses his future
right to possess a woman. In this exchange system the girl
is systematically disadvantaged, for she must also "give
away" her mother to her father, but receives no acknowledg-
ment of the phallus the right to possess someone physically
like her mother—from her father in return. She learns,
through a process filled with ambivalence, resentment, and
self-doubt, a passive role with regard to the phallus:
she does not have a phallus to give, may only receive one
from a man (in intercourse or through child bearing), and
as future mother will herself be "exchanged" against the
phallus. In this original, primitive exchange of the
Oedipal stage, boys and girls gain basic identities that
rest not only on an (abstractly) universal process of
individuation, but also one that rests on disparities of
power
.
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These disparities revoive around a social division of
labor in which women are primarily responsible for child-
rearing. The extent to which this role can and should be
shared by men, the desirability of one primary love-object
for the infant for a certain period after birth, the ques-
tion whether the eradication of patriarchy requires changes
in child-rearing that would result in androgyny, and other
issues are all matters of intense debate. I myself, for
Instance, do not think that Rubin's arguments require
androgyny as a solution to patriarchal domination. It is
also not clear to me that 32
is that ?t r SV°nSpl™ features of kinshipIS I has been systematically stripped ofits functions--political
,
economic, educationaland organizational. It has been reduced to its’barest bones— sex and gender.
Particularly for working class, poor, and minority communi-
ties, kinship systems continue to play a significant role,
organized to a great extent by women, in many of these
33
areas. Moreover, I want to argue in the next two chap-
ters that kinship systems play a major role, emphasizing
but not limited to sex and gender, in constituting American
racial subordination. These and other considerations sug-
gest that a critique of patriarchy's roots in our sex/
gender system is not as clear-cut or as telling as Rubin's
arguments would lead one to believe.
In the following two chapters, I shall argue that
property relations and taboos central to the operation of
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our forms of sexual identity and kinship are central to
any consideration of race relations and to race-connected
legitimation problems of the American state. These property
relations and taboos, widely but incompletely shared across
white middle and working classes, 34 i„vo ive particular forms
of the regulation and repression of sensuality. As Freud
noted with regard to
-the incest taboo, such regulation and
repression have been historically essential to the mainte-
nance of social harmony through the reduction of possible
conflicts over sexual activity. But, early capitalist
patriarchy and its heirs have repressed sensuality twice
over: not only to render sociality possible and to reserve
energies for productive activities, but also as the basis
for a quantum, qualitative increase in productive activity.
In this qualitative leap, peoples of color served as foils
for projections of this repressed sensuality, projections
which helped constitute and legitimate their sexual and
economic oppression. As colonized peoples, they entered
interwoven class and kinship dynamics. These interwoven
dynamics have been particularly opaque not only to everyday
participants in racial practices, but also to analysts and
resisters themselves in this patriarchal culture of
productivity
.
3. A number of questions revolve around the charac-
ter of the state as a collective capitalist. I addressed
most of these in my appraisal of O'Connor's theory, and
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because Habermas imports O'Connor wholesale into Legitima-
ii°H^risis, they apply with some modifications to Habermas
as well. Among these are: a neglect of private financial
institutions which play a major role in coordinating invest-
ment and supporting the array of policy institutions which
help shape state options; overestimating the contribution,
on the whole, of state economic planning to the accumulation
process economic steering function; overestimating the
institutional capacity of the antique American state to
serve as economic planner and coordinator; and underplaying
the dependence of our post-war accumulation on U.S. hegemony
in the international system of nation states. Let me
qualify these somewhat.
Though Habermas is writing about Western capitalist
states in general, his discussion may still be more geared
to the Western European experience than to that of the U.S.
(or, for that matter, Japan). European states have employed
indicative economic planning for quite some time and have
organized regional political-economic integration, 35 These
states have advanced welfare bureaucracies, and their adop-
tion of welfare principles preceded that of the U.S. by 25
to 50 years. His discussion of both economic planning, and
the penetration of political bureaucracy into private life
seem more suited to the European experience, though I would
not deny its applicability, with revisions, to the U.S.
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In fact, the
sive issue,
expansion of public power may be a more
in some respects, in this country than in
explo-
Europe
.
many compelling reasons, Habermas, like O'Connor,
focuses on the state as the displaced arena of economic
contradictions. But m making this argument, Habermas, also
like O'Connor, needs. to directly address the relative visi-
bility of public power. To fail to do so is to unwittingly
lay one's argument open to the detours and roadblocks of
liberal ideology. The particular detour I see Habermas
encountering affects his argument that the state will be a
target of dissatisfaction over its attempts to "plan cul-
ture" for the benefit of accumulation. On his terms, this
dissatisfaction with the state leads also to a questioning
of the capitalist priorities behind the state's planning.
According to Habermas, the state falls prey to this
blame because its cultural intervention, as a clear exer-
cise of power, must be legitimated. This need for legiti-
mation disrupts the pattern of civil privatism, or
generalized acquiescence to state activity. Yet capitalist
investment decisions and consumption management contribute
heavily, though less "visibly," to cultural change; in fact
they contribute heavily to frustrations which are then
aimed at the state
.
6
Thus not just structural constraints
upon the state to try to "manage" capitalism, but also the
relative visibility of state compared to private power,
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Play a crucial role in the displaces o f crisis into the
state which O'Connor and Habermas argue. This visibility.
Ideologically conditioned, is something they both partly
assume and find no need to explain. Whatever the source
of cultural disruption, Habermas is correct that it could
lead not only to a state crisis but also to a crisis of
capitalist relations.. But if Habermas clarified the direct
role of corporate power in this disruption, and his theory
entered widely into public discourse, it would challenge
the ideological detours which limit the questioning of
class relations. This clarification, as I argued in chap-
ter two, would require an examination of managerial ideology
and the role of the PMC. It would also require a broader
theory of ideological hegemony beyond the scope of this
dissertation
.
4. Habermas' neglect of nationalism is a major prob-
lGm in legitimation Crisis, stemming partly from a neglect
of the social system's "external" environment. Other impor-
tant reasons lie in his overestimation of the decay of
pre-bourgeois and bourgeois traditions, and in his optimism
that such decay—because of the nature of practical dis-
course— is essentially irreversible. These traditions, as
I shall argue, play a key role in nationalist politics.
Though he is clearly sensitive to the problem of
fascism (the extreme form of nationalism), Habermas'
teleology of communicative-social development hinders him
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from grappling theoretically with the problem. His philoso
Phy is a variant of the general Enlightenment teleology
which has, necessarily, been so repeatedly confounded by
historical "regression." An entire spectrum of theory
indebted to this teleology has not done a good job at all
of dealing with the range of nationalisms, "good" and "bad,
in modern history and so has adopted a series of theory-
saving rationalizations in order to save the notion of
progress. In this way, the horrors of warfare, interna-
tional domination, and fascism can be regarded as aberra-
tions, perhaps even necessary stages or counterpoints to
the march of history.
Nationalism poses an acute problem for Marxism and
socialism, for it contradicts the notion of a universal
class they have appropriated from earlier Enlightenment
theories, as well as of class-based social revolution.
Instead, modern history seems replete with examples of
nationalist politics, and all too bereft of open class
struggle. And these nationalisms, in fact, rest upon some
sort of class alliance against outside linguistic or ethnic
groups. How are we to understand this phenomenon, whether
or not we can somehow intuit its "good” manifestations
(struggles against imperialism), its "bad" manifestations
(fascist class collaboration), or its confusing Jekyll-
and-Hyde manifestations (say, Vietnamese nationalism)?
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in raising the problem of nationalism, I shall expand
and deepen Tom Nairn's work in The Break-Tin 37
His major contributions are in thinking about combined and
uneven development at the level of the international
economy, and in dissecting the content of nationalist
ideology. He pursues both of these with great insight and
subtlety, limited however by an externalist view of ideology
and a neglect of kinship systems. To his credit, he recog-
nizes the first problem, and suggests in his concluding
essay that a proper consideration of nationalism would have
to transcend orthodox dichotomies between materialism and
idealism. I want here to give another short sketch of my
arguments which, as they regard nationalism, gather in or
imply much of my previous discussion on the state and
kinship
.
Nationalism must be understood, I think, as a con-
stellation of myths and constitutive traditions akin to
nostalgic populism, grounded partly in a world structure
of combined and uneven economic development, in which mem-
bers of various social classes make claims upon each other
that emphasize their cultural solidarity in the face of
competing external cultures. As a capitalist dynamic,
combined and uneven development is at bottom a product of
class struggle, but is in no way reducible to it. National-
ism is a reality indebted to, but beyond
,
that of class.
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These myths and constitutive traditions are also partly
grounded in another stature central to culture in any
society, kinship systems which reproduce sex and gender
identity through variations of patriarchal arrangements.
Widely but not completely shared across class, sexual
taboos, norms, and patriarchal arrangements help to ground
the claims made across the class stratification that stems
from production. Grounded in these structures, national-
ism historically has been an essentially conservative,
reactionary, but real alternative in an array of possible
modes of social consciousness and action.
Basic to this understanding of nationalism is the
recognition of capitalism's relentless expansion and domina-
tion from its urban and geographic core areas. The Enlight-
enment first conceived of this expansion as an even
diffusion of civilization and progress. But in reaction
to the initial outward expansion from Holland, England, and
France, market-oriented elites in outlying regions of Europe
and later the New World forged coalitions with their
subordinate populations to challenge this external domina-
tion and to embark upon their own course of internal devel-
opment. That is, the process Enlightenment intellectuals
saw as an even dispersion of material progress itself
created a system of conflicting, warring nation states
and colonies.
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the history of nation building within the process
of combined and uneven development, different nations came
into being at different times, and with widely varying
material resources and traditions at their disposal, others
failed, are still trying, or are even now emerging out of
imperial or multi-ethnic states. These factors have placed
each nation at a structurally more or less advantageous
position in the developing world economy. Those early into
the game tended to remain at the core of the world system,
with opportunities for colonies, while latecomers have
emerged for the most part out of the ranks of colonies and
peripheral areas of Europe (i.e., Italy, Turkey, the Balkan
states) and have been relegated to "permanently " disadvan-
taged positions. In this historical process, the U.S.
occupies a rather unique position: as one of the first
new nations, the inheritor of ideology from a colonial
struggle against a mercantile state (as Lipset points out),
and yet early enough into the game and with sufficient
resources to become a core nation itself.
These nationalist movements, revolutions, and subse-
quent internal political-economic development mobilized the
subordinate masses and brought them "into history" as a
legitimate and recognized social estate. In this mobiliza-
tion, folk traditions were a major basis of elite-mass
coalition and a resource for defining economic development
as a collective aspiration against an outside "threat."
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Bourgeois elites could not afford to develop, as older
tocracies did, a culture and ideology sharply divergent
from those whose labor they would profit from. The embrace
by entrepreneurial elites of folk values, customs, and
languages represented a claimjipon mass support in the
struggle against outside states and capital, against
internal feudal, absolutist, or mercantile interests that
restrained market development, and for internal commodity-
form development. These claims to unity in turn contributed
to subordinate/working class claims to political rights and
equality within the new nations.
By describing nationalism as in part nostalgic popu-
lism, we are highlighting the general elite embrace of pre-
Eodern traditions to mobilize a population for modern
development. Nationalism is, as Nairn argues, Janus-faced,
facing forward and backward at the same time. In the U.S.,
though, the initial colonial struggle and first 100 years
or so of internal development did not employ feudal peasant
traditions to articulate collective aspirations (as did
peripheral European states and third-world colonies).
Rather, for 150 years by the time of our Revolution, our
collective myths, traditions, and practices had been
shaped in the developing craft /entrepreneurial self-image
of the English middle class and mercantile minded land-
owners. Thus the U.S. colonial struggle was not, as we
all know, so much a social struggle as a political one
150
against a restrictive mercantile state not yet (until 1831
and the Corn Laws) under the dominance of market elites,
constraints, and ideology. That is, U.S. nationalism did
not initially meet Nairn's description of nostalgic popu-
lism, at least from the point of view of craft practices.
If we look at 19th century U.S. history, I would
argue that four areas, of myth and practice stand out in
defining the particular content of U.S. nationalism and
cross-class alliances. These involve craft, religion,
race, and democratic aspirations. Each of these, and in
interwoven ways, are regions of motivation that helped to
constitute and sustain national solidarity and internal
development. All four continue to play central roles in
the currents and possibilities for contemporary U.S.
nationalism
.
Craft practices and self-images dominated the Ameri-
can landscape up through the late 1800 's, a mode of small-
scale, self-organized production for market which
industrial capitalism largely destroyed in the process of
creating a dependent class of labor. These craft practices
were the root of market ideology, and the living source,
as many sociological studies of Enlightenment thought
reveal, of beliefs in material progress, science, and the
civilization of productivity. Craft organization of pro-
duction included not only the artisan producers we
associate with urban life, but in a more general sense
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“ farmerS Wlth a ™cular interest in markets and
geographical expansion. 38 When we include small farmers in
our calculations, upwards of three-quarters of the popula-
tion, through the 1870-8, fall within craft society. The
craft mode was crucial to the geographic and economic
expansion of Manifest Destiny and related expressions of
U.s. nationalism in the mid-1800's.
Craft was, through the 1300's, a constitutive source
of resistance to concentrations of private and public power.
I would argue that populist revolts in the 1890's, centered
in South and West farming regions, were in a sense (failed)
proto-nationalist movements against finance and industrial
capital centered in the Northeast. In terms of economic
power (and political power), South and West became at the
end of the 19th century geographical regions of underdevel-
opment. In sharp contrast to the heyday of Manifest
Destiny, craft independence came under attack on the farm
and in the factory, rendered permanently subordinate by
large capital and its emerging alliance with the state.
Given widespread acceptance of privately-organized produc-
tion, common to craft and industrial production, the power
of large capital at this point in history rendered craft
aspirations forever (temporally) reactionary and futile.
Today as historical resource and myth, and in part because
they tap into the need for satisfying worklife, craft/
market ideas remain an important aspiration which American
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reform movements
indeed an element
nationalism. 39
turn to. And this turning to the past
in the potential for current U.S.
is
Protestant and
role in articulating
and. in providing the
evangelical religion played a crucial
U.S. nationalism in the 19th century,
training in mores shared by working
class, craft, and middle class families. Evangelical
religion sanctified not only property, individualism, and
geographic expansion as God's plan. It also shaped and
provided outlet for the sensual repression required by the
social engine of production and by patriarchal relations.
In doing so, it promulgated a complex of kinship relations
and economic disciplines that defined the internal and
external "threats" which nationalism set itself against.
For the U.S.
,
these threats were defined largely in racial
form, a not uncommon but in our case the unusually dominant
feature of our nationalism. The pattern was something like
this: the threat consisted of the dangerous sensual im-
pulses which only uncivilized peoples could not control
and which therefore justified racial conquest of the conti-
nent and the segregated subordination of non-white peoples.
In an extremely powerful way, race defined and contained
the craft-based, civilization of productivity self-image
during the 19th century.
It is important to stress the multiple role of a
patriarchal kinship system in American race relations. In
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the service of production, this system first of aU gener-
ated a high level of sensual repression. White culture in
turn projected this repressed sexuality onto non-white
populations, making them into threats to the civilized
order which had to be segregated and subordinated. This
sensual repression also existed in the service of patriar-
chy. For instance, it was an asymmetrical repression
which sanctioned a double standard for male and female
sexual activity. Also, by picturing black men in particu-
lar as sexual criminals, it posed a perpetual threat from
which white women and children might be protected by male
paternalism. Kinship thus defined a system of collective
white male sexual property, in white and black women, and
it helped organize economic, political, and sexual inter-
action with outgroups of nonwhites.
Race, unlike the craft element of social identity
during the 1800's, seems to have provided the nostalgic
element of tradition which Nairn is so right in emphasiz-
ing in his general description of nationalisms. In the
first place, American racial practices had a history of
almost 200 years by the time Manifest Destiny was pro-
claimed in 1814. Secondly, Anglo myth makers of the mid-
19th century drew heavily upon the cultural heritage and
the continuity (it seemed) of '’Western Civilization" in
order to establish their racial point. And high in the
pantheon of this heritage were the peculiar democratic
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traits of Anglo
-Teutonic culture a qnPH a i
, speci l preoccupation
of myth makers at this time.
Fears of social equality, based on the pattern of
threat outlined above, helped to shape the democratic
pirations of significant numbers of working class and
craft people. Heru^nvolk democracy, democracy for the
master race, defined certain men as equal not necessarily
in economic terms but rather in racial terms. This par-
ticular definition embraced not only Southern, but also
Northern and Western peoples, and gave peculiar content to
the general market society aversion to state power. Except
for brief periods of crisis, the American state has not
been able to sustain interventions against Herrenvolk
democracy; the cost of doing so is the state 'e legitimacy.
It is important to stress that these four regions of
motivation and self-image served, as nationalism, to
mobilize 19th century white Americans for internal economic
development in a context of "external" racial threats.
U.S. nationalism in this era is not the garden variety
which Nairn analyzes in his book. From the angle of main-
stream historiography, the U.S. was in this period isola-
tionist and not particularly concerned, even at the end of
the 19th century, with acquiring colonies. But the Native
American nations with which the U.S. competed in this era
are largely invisible to us now, and the other "external"
racial threat is not neatly captured in the usual
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terminology of
something like
nationalism. Non-white Americans constitute
internal
, quasi-colonies which are in part
the creature of internal psychological dramas. But
these intricacies, territorial expansion in the 19th
given
century was without a doubt a nationalist endeavor set in
a unique racial context.
^
Whatever U.S. nationalism is or could be now depends
m large part upon this history of myths and constitutive
traditions, which represent a sort of living storehouse
of populist memorabilia. This storehouse has, depending
on its items, a tenacity which I think Habermas' theory
does not acknowledge. Is religion an anchor of bourgeois
motivations? Evangelical religion is, has always been,
alive and well in this country, a recurrent phenomenon and
key vehicle for organizing the nostalgic revival of
threatened values. Given the eroding position of the U.S.
economy worldwide, evangelism might now serve as a focal
point for reworked notions of sacrifice and self-denial in
an age of scarcity. One might imagine various wings of
this revival absorbing crucial issues like the environment
into their world views—sanctioning ethics of environmental
plunder (the Reagan wing) or environmental preservation
(the Jerry Brown wing) in the name of competing images of
the capitalist future. Is the structure of power behind
the market increasingly transparent to citizens? Various
reform movements dip into the nostalgic storehouse of
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social Identity to express their dream of a market society
or of democratically restrained corporate power. Can
America be re-industrialized in a rough world of interna-
tional competition if only we rededicate ourselves to one
of several competing images of the American dream? Perhaps
the going will be rough indeed. In that case, the continued
vitality of patriarchal kinship systems, and a call to
self-denial in the service of economic development might
sustain and rekindle racial consciousness, a valuable
unifier especially in the context of Third World resource
politics
.
Summary
I have argued that hermeneutics can deepen our under-
standing of what scientific liberals separate out as the
normative or evaluative component of legitimation problems
It allows us to grasp the expressive dimension of social
activity
,
to make connections between knowing the social
world, forming an identity within it, and the authority
which that social world has over us. Thus a crisis of
authority, in the broadest sense, can be at one level an
expressive crisis of social identity, a crisis of a way of
looking at and knowing the world.
Yet to fully grasp the complexity of this expressive
dimension requires a sensitive grasp of pressures upon
cultural meanings, pressures originating in relations of
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omination and in the array of impinging yet distinct and
unevenly developing institutions of American society.
Jurgen Habermas' work is a step forward in grasping these
systemic relationships. His arguments help us deepen our
understanding of public disaffection from the state, which
is widely perceived as a meddling, bureaucratic threat to
private life. He paints a persuasive picture of a state
undermining the very basis of its own authority-generalized
acquiescence m a context of economic expansion
—simply by
pursuing its general mission of rationalizing the social
and economic conditions of accumulation. Its expanded
activities, indeed, call for increased legitimation at a
time when those activities help undermine legitimation
processes themselves. That is, Habermas goes beyond other
theories of legitimation I have examined by linking experi
ential crises of social identity to the expanding and
uncoordinated domination of political-economic structures.
Yet in appraising Habermas, I have noted that by
importing O'Connor's fiscal crisis arguments into his
theory he is subject to similar criticisms on class struc-
ture and on state-managed capitalism. I have also noted
that Habermas, though to a significantly lesser extent
than O’Connor, encounters problems with the relative
visibility of state (as compared to direct corporate)
intervention in culture. And, I have directly introduced
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the problems of patriarchal gender systems and nationalism
to the legitimation dynamics which Habermas sketches.
in reaching this point, my dissertation turns to an
extended application of the framework I have developed
through the first three chapters. I shall explore the
intimate connections of sexual/racial identity to the
motivations which help sustain capitalist work life and
patriarchy, to the meaning of racial segregation, and thus
to a range of purposes and social "right" which state
legitimacy has traditionally rested upon.
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CHAPTER I V
SEXUALITY, RACE RELATIONS, AND
LEGITIMACY: PART I
Introduction
Contemporary concern among political movements and
alysts with the state seems to be overwhelmingly focused
on fiscal problems and the expansion of bureaucracy into
private life. If one traces the genealogy of these con-
cerns, he inevitably confronts an array of conflict
acknowledged by phrases like "the turmoil of the 1960's."
The expansion of government appears deeply indebted to the
struggles of this period, and scientific-liberal, Marxist,
and interpretive accounts concur in seeing this period as
a crucial one for state authority.
Yet the dominant scientific-liberal model of power
and change, elite-pluralism, did not anticipate this period
of turmoil, despite its practitioners’ goal of a predictive
science. With its focus on stability and electoral
politics, the behavioral consensus stressed survey research
findings of citizen disenchantment with government and an
increasing neglect of voting. 1 The resulting picture was
of a government beset by an unusual number of discrete
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Problem, often bad ly handled by a mushrooming bureaucracy
whtch was itself an object of disaffection. Urban blight
Poverty, racial struggles, the Indochina War and its after-
of stagflation, activist youth confronting social
problems and older generations, and finally the revelations
of Watergate— these problems, sometimes inevitably and some-
times unnecessarily, fostered citizen disaffection.
The most cogent analyses of this disaffection
appeared, in mainstream circles, within renewed discussion
of electoral realignment. 2 From different perspectives,
analysts gave varying accounts of some neglected majority
of ordinary people who felt unacknowledged for their devo-
tion to steady work and patriotism, and threatened by change
abetted by a state seemingly more responsive to the needs
of minorities and the highly educated. Conservative
politicians appealed to this constituency through issues
of crime, size of government, taxes, housing and school
integration, and more recently, family issues and national
defense. As I have argued in chapters two and three, how-
ever, scientific liberal analyses of these trends have been
handicapped by a rudimentary understanding of pressures
from within the economy for state expansion, and by a view
of ideology which does not tap the depth of experience
people feel about state expansion and other issues.
Marxist accounts of legitimacy see the turmoil of
the 1960's (usually implicitly) as the visible ferment of
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a brewing political-economic crisis.3 Problems that^
seen as relatively discrete from a behavloral perspectlye
or as failures of an evolving New Deal approach to govern-
ment, are united in the Marxist view as outcomes of
corporate-state interpenetration. This symbiosis must on
the one hand promote the conditions of private capital
accumulation and yet on the other present state policies
as serving a public rather than a private interest. Thus,
O'Connor sees a fundamental contradiction between the
accumulation and legitimation functions of the capitalist
state.
Theorists using interpretive methods, such as
Habermas, while accepting such economic imperatives, see
in the turmoil of the 1960's and in later legitimacy prob-
lems a broader erosion of culture. 4 With a more sophisti-
cated view of ideology, Habermas traces the state's role
m undermining the motivations and purposes that sustain
the social institutions of modern society— family and
private life, work, citizenship. But as I have argued,
Habermas' arguments do not easily account for the deep
resistance to social change which new conservative movements
draw upon. This is also a problem for the Marxist accounts
which Habermas, in part, incorporates into his theory.
Valuable in ways previously discussed, these three
perspectives nevertheless misread the social turmoil which
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initially informed their treatments of legitimacy. They
systematically underplay. I would argue, the distinctive-
ness and importance of racial conflict in the pattern of
legitimacy problems facing the American state. Each per-
spective, first of all, has problems internal to its own
treatment of race.
Elite pluralist
. views of the state
scientific-liberal tradition have treated
within the
race as an impor—
tant but vestigial, isolated problem basically redressable
through the political system. 5 This view seemed reasonable
to many during the movements of the 1960's, but today one
would be hard pressed to defend the isolated and redress-
able character of racial inequality. Vast injustices
persist, apparently intractable, in the face of 1960's
"equal opportunity" legislation. While sophisticated in
analyzing the internal problems of the New Deal coalition
from an electoral point of view, behavioral accounts have
rarely discussed the internal connections of race to the
functioning of the economy and to family issues.
Works with an interpretive moment, like The Hidden
Injuries of Class, begin to address contemporary white
working class racial beliefs in a sensitive and revealing
6
way. These works bring out some of the binds confronting
people who in their embrace of the work ethic cannot under-
stand how anyone could accept welfare (associated of course
with minorities), who see busing as a threat to the
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chances of their children for social mobility, and who
prize their own ethnic communities. Yet though this and
similar accounts tap the important experiences many whites
have of race relations, they would be considerably deepened
by a more historical focus and by attention, again, to the
functionality of racism for capitalist economies.
Generally stronger Marxist analyses of Afro-Americans
as a "surplus population" or as an "internal colony" rely
as a corpus too heavily on manipulation to explain working
class racism (as I shall argue in more detail later in this
chapter). And, Marxist works on legitimacy which stress
fiscal constraints upon the state give the impression that
capitalist or class dynamics are the only pressures to
which the state responds. They thus tend to picture the
way m which economic change shapes racism and racial
struggles as coterminous with race itself.
Any understanding of 1960 's race relations would bene-
fit from the strengths of these different perspectives.
Yet, they still share a shortcoming which would limit our
efforts. This is a neglect of the sexual aspect of race
relations, "sexual racism" in Calvin Hernton's terms. 7 I
would argue that unless we bring this factor into our
analysis, we cannot fully understand the emotional depth
and intensity of American race relations and their impact
on state legitimacy. Nor would we have a clear picture of
168
how race relations are connected at the deepest level to
prevailing forms of family life and work.
My basic argument is that in the dominant culture,
interwoven dynamics deeply indebted to patriarchal and
capitalist relations foster a projection of sensuality
onto non-white peoples, interpret this projection as a
threat to white family life, and encourage a sense of vul-
nerability to this threat. These projections are a central
element in such important cultural themes as the contrast
between civilization and barbarism, and the beast or animal
element in human nature. The essential capitalist sources
of these projections have been the historical need, varying
character by class position, to channel human nature in
the service of disciplined, intense production, and the
progressive degradation of manual labor (that is, of physi-
cal qualities) in the context of its abstraction from mental
labor. The patriarchal context of emerging capitalism
helped answer for our culture the "question" of what facet
of social life to channel in the pursuit of methodical pro-
duction: the sensual, physical qualities most completely
identified with women. These capitalist and patriarchal
factors, in a sense, rest upon a "base level” of sexual
repression involved in the establishment of heterosexual
norms, incest taboos, and other rules restricting sexual
gpartners. In sum, capitalist patriarchy either establishes
or intensifies important physical/sexual connections
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between the domination of inner and outer nature, and
fosters the projection of this sensuality onto Afro-
Americans
.
These projections establish asymmetrical sexual-racial
taboos which speak to white ambivalence about "undisci-
plined" lifestyles and those who seem to embody them; black
"sexuality" is not only an object of fear, but an object of
fantasy and attraction for men and women. These taboos are
asymmetrical by virtue of the sexual property relations
which patriarchal gender socialization helps establish at
the level of the personality
.
10
Thus black people appear not
only as threats because of the generalized sexuality they
represent; black males in particular appear as superior
sexual competitors and threats to white males. Yet sexual-
racial taboos are not mere reflexes of patriarchal and
capitalist structures. They enter into and help constitute
the social distance and hierarchy of racial segregation
and subordination, establishing boundaries that have
repeatedly been tested by an interracial sexuality fraught
with conflict and exploitation.
In short, pressures toward racism are inherent at
the deepest level of the social identities which individuals
form in capitalist patriarchy. In the history of our race
relations, they ground consistent ideologies of and fascina-
tions with supposedly degraded black family life, with
miscegenation and interracial sexuality, and with
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supposed black sexual criminality-prostitution and rape.
Sexual projections, and especially patriarchal mores, have
grounded the reproduction
"within" the working class itself
of racial ideologies and practices. Sexual projection, and
the patriarchal mores widely but varyingly shared across
class
,
have also grounded the frequent and often successful
appeals to racial solidarity made across the class struc-
ture. These appeals are a distinguishing mark of the
racial nationalisms which especially mark our domestic
history, nationalisms internally related to the interna-
tional rivalries which have so often restrained class
politics in modern European societies.
I want briefly in this introduction to explain white
"supremacy" as a form of nationalism
;
in the next chapter
I shall develop these reasons more fully. American race
relations are an attenuated form of nationalism in that
white and black Americans share, to a significant degree,
a common culture
.
11
Yet white nationalism is an apt term
because it conveys the intimate connection of race to the
political-economic development of the American nation. It
is also fitting in its sense of the economic, cultural,
and political unity of racial inequality, as well as the
historically self-conscious nature of this unity on the
part of most white Americans. I also employ the term as
a critical way of insisting that patriarchy and sexuality,
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as well as economics and ideology, have been essential
elements of community and national life. Moreover, the
term underlines the historical, cross class unity on the
question of race. And finally, the idea points to the
state and its legitimacy as, in part, creatures of racial
politics
.
Before expanding. on this argument, I want first to
state the limitations I am placing on it. I am not arguing
that race relations are the prime legitimacy problem re-
cently confronted by the American state. Rather, race
relations are one of several factors in legitimacy problems.
They are a factor which in many ways distinguishes American
politics from those of other Western capitalist societies.
And, they are an element not satisfactorily dealt with by
behavioral, Marxist, or interpretive accounts of legiti-
macy. Yet, to deal with this element successfully would
be to make deep internal connections between the structures
of a capitalist economy, sexual inequality, social identity,
and the political system of the New Deal state.
In making these connections, I will be drawing on the
strengths of the three perspectives previously appraised
m this dissertation. From the scientific liberal stance
I will be drawing, among other things, on analyses of the
New Deal electoral coalition
. From a Marxist viewpoint
,
I will extend the argument that nonwhites were subordinated
in the service of capital accumulation. And, using
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ent of social identity which transcends class divisions.
I shall explore my basic thesis in this and the next
chapter. Thls chapter opens with a comparison of caste and
Marxist theories- contributions, respectively, to the sexual
and productive dynamics of race. This comparison highlights
important themes which a subsequent historical sketch deals
with. This sketch covers three topics: the period of
racial enslavement, the contribution of evangelical reli-
gion, and the post-Civil War "black scare." The following
chapter carries the themes of the historical sketch into my
rpretation of 20th century housing struggles. And, the
final section in that chapter elaborates white and black
nationalisms and ties them into the emergence of racial
legitimacy problems within the "New Deal" welfare state.
I. Caste and Marxist Theory
— —
-
Ste theory
’ The Periodization of racial ideology is
a complicated matter; Allen, Frederickson
,
and Jordan,
among others, scarcely agree on the broad outlines. 1 Caste
theory, though, signalled a shift in public discourse away
from biological toward cultural explanations of racial
inequality. At the same time, in its origins it was close
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to an earner era of race relations whose a„alysts in
^"r f°0US °n SOUthe
-
-res, paid specific attention tointerracial sexuality. And, as a liberal theory ^
inequality whose proponents by and iarge condemned the
effects of caste, caste theory helped set the terms of dis-
course which described race relations as primarily a set
of values, a moral question, a moral irrationality. it
encouraged, I would argue, the view that race relations is
racism, racial ideology, which might be illuminated pri-
marily by a study of racial social psychology.
Caste explanations of free blank xnh-n-i c -w ite relations date
back to the 1860's in the U.S. the earlip^t 1 •, n es time at which
British experience in India could be applied here. 2 m
this century its prominence dates to the efforts of Robert
Park and others in the 1930 's. Basing themselves on
notions of the Indian caste system, various sociologists
focused on a number of similarities in the Indian and
southern U.S. social systems, often disagreeing on the
features which rated most attention. Among the character-
istics cited were: accommodation to sharp inequality,
intercaste "etiquette"—manners of deference and subordina-
tion, intermarriage proscriptions, and barriers to legiti-
mate descent in mixed marriages. 3 In making the argument
that whites and blacks constituted castes, these sociolo-
gists were attempting to reconcile their rejection of
biological explanations of inequality with those conditions
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' th6y reJ ec ted the category of raceAmong the constraints they faced in their enterpris
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^^ e were:
^ & i d ^^t^ricll inpniiQ 1 t 4- iinequality between races; the seeming
inapplicability of M clas<3" +ss due to economic divisions with-
in black and white communities; rigid color segregation andthe seeming uncleanliness of nonwhites; and fearful pro-
scnptions against interracial sex. And, on these con-
straints, the caste system of fndia offers a ready analogy.
By far the most important example of caste analysis
xs Gunnar Myrdal-s An^merica^Dil^.4 Its medla and
political acceptance helped popularize the notion of caste
and indicated the shift to cultural explanations of race
the transfer of the burden of argument to those who
would oppose, rather than propose, public and social inte-
gration. The critical functions of this (and most other)
caste theory are powered by the notion of an American creed
or value structure. The creed affirms the basic equality
of all men and is the standard against which Myrdal and,
he hopes, the nation judge the racial situation
,
5
The
CrSed
’
ln American Dilemma, is both mocked by caste
and, through people, struggles against it. Because caste
is a cultural (rather than, say, economic) convention
, its
persistence is primarily a matter of morality and the will
to change. By adopting this position, of course, Myrdal.
other caste theorists, and the public debate they help
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SVStematiCally
the economic institutions
and forces which operate to make th^ interpretation of
e creed a mockery, and which have historica lly sustalned
alternative creeds denying the humanity of non-whites
Myrdal and others, though, through their focus on social
Psychology, gave important recognition to the constitutive
role of sexual interests and ideology i„ caste relations
John Bollard's Castejujd^lagg in a Southern nw,
is worth attention in this respect.® Though he echoes the
main caste school concern with deviations from a "value
structure" of equality, his analysis also gives white caste
members much more of an interest in the maintenance of the
caste system. Thus the moral choice of abandoning caste
advocated by Myrdal, though argued for by Dollard as well,
is not so self-evidently likely i„ Bollard's work; rather,
he gives plausible reasons for caste's longevity. Sexual
freedom for white males is one of the gains accruing to
the white caste, and in fact as far as Bollard is con-
cerned, sexual practices are the defining characteristic
of caste relations. In addition to denying legitimate
descent (white status) to offspring of mixed liaisons
,
7
caste in Southerntown is also a categoricalbarrier to sexual congress between upper-castewomen and lower-caste men, within or without themarried state. It does not result in such a
wnm^n
er *et™en upPer "caste ^n and lower-casteo e . In this it seems to be modeled on thepatriarchal family with its possessive preroga-
tives of the male; it has a double standard ofthe same type. Nothing else seems absolute
about the caste barrier.
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Whlle noting and d“„ tlng that sexual freedom in the
caste system is relative to race and gender, Dollard dQes
not really pursue these connections nor link them to caste
economics
.
The emphasis in Dollard’ s and other caste writers’
work on interracial sexuality seems to have been lost with
the supercession o f . the Southern-oriented caste school by
writers concentrating more on urban, northern, ln8tltu-
t ionali Zed,^^ segregation
.
alWayS beSn m°re t0lerant interracial couples (ante-
bellum Charleston, for example). But the relative inatten-
tion to sexuality in racial studies once the north also
became a focal point meant the atrophy of an important
understanding, one in fact applying to the north as well.
Caste explanations of race entered into public dis-
course in a powerful way and continue today to be relied
upon as a general reference point in discussions of race.
Yet there are problems with the caste interpretation which
render it largely inapplicable to the American experience.
In making this clear, I will rely upon the work of Oliver
C. Cox, an unjustly neglected theorist of social stratifi-
cation. His systematic comparison of caste and race-
something caste writers never engaged in—shows that caste
relies upon religious distinctions for dividing social
labor, while physical traits serve as the standard of
inequality for the American situation. In short, "The
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as inra ., T relatl°nShiPs not the samem racial situations ." 8
p
. t
C°X BOeS °n t0 SPeU °Ut
-tat distinction.
’ PhySi ° al CharaCteriStics unite members of a racean, aiffenentiate them from other races. But in castepractice
, regions rituals and occupation, expressed i„
c othing, jewelry, and soc . ai demeanor>
castes. color differences within the indian population do
~ coincide systematically with caste differentiation
.
9
Second, therefore, miscegenation or amalgamation
disputes do not apply to caste relations, though there are
for other reasons. Physical
melding cannot threaten caste lines because caste lines
are not drawn on a physical basis. Yet, "obviously, when
two or more races have amalgamated, all possible 'race
questions' will have been answered ." 10
Third, the appearance of a new caste in a caste sys-
tem is historically common. But, "the appearance of a new
race is always startling." Fourth, since caste is
culturally-organized apart from biology, an individual may
be initiated into a caste or expelled from it. Yet one is
born into one's race and has "no alternative but to die
in it ." 11 Fifth, therefore, in a caste system you are
either a member of a particular caste or you are not. Yet
in a racial system, amalgamation can make degrees of color
12a problem:
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conveyances, while a dark°^
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ghway because his
FlnaUy
’
C°nfliCt Wlthin ea<* system is of a funda-
mentaily different sort. The caste system is inherently
-re stable than the racial system. This is because
-race
conflict is directed either against or toward the mainte-
nance of the entire order of races. On the other hand,
caste rivalry never brings the caste system into ques-
tion." (My emphasis.) Thus the usual state of affairs
in the race system is one of "suspended conflict," charac-
terized even in quiet times by "anxiety, fear, mutual dis-
trust, and social stricture ." 14 On the other hand, lower
castes may try to improve their position vis-a-vis other
castes, but do not aim to abolish caste distinction and
inequality altogether. Castes know, value, and maintain
their station in a way that precludes dissatisfaction with
the system of castes
.
15
In fact, the major applicability of the Indian situa-
tion to that of the U.S. was the relationship of the white
British to the nonwhite Indians, rather than the internal
workings of the caste system. Race coincided with nation-
ality in this colonial situation in a way that exacted
dreadful costs to Indians' public and private lives. In
The Jewel in the Crown
,
Paul Scott captures the anguish,
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explosiveness, and impli catlons of one
.
bpect
> the miscege-
nation bflri'i p-p •; „a r er, ln a way that sheds uBht. on + k .
experience
.
16 American
Set in India before and after WW II, this sensitive
ook brings out the strong sexual aspect of British racism
in Britain, returns to his own country. Once back, Hari
Kumar meets and has a brief, disastrous affair with a young
British woman, disastrous for + ufor the consequences it brings
about for the two lovers and their communities. The
subtlety and power of this story cannot be unfolded in a
few sentences. But its impact leaves the reader acutely
aware of the complications of interracial sexuality, the
responses it evokes from disapproving communities, and the
very threat to social order itself seemingly contained in
the coupling of a non-white male and a white female. The
story is about racially-dif ferent elites, yet has the ring
of truth which transcends its geographic and class setting
(which is characteristic of the matter) to the American
situation. One passage not involving the lovers directly,
but a related theme, particularly strikes home. A British
school teacher, Miss Crane, visits an Indian counterpart
,
17
Miss Williams, who wore a grey cotton blouse lone-brown skirt and black button boots, and was yo^nglrthan she and sallow-complexioned in a way that someof the most insufferable of the European women werewho had spent a lifetime in the country; onTy inMiss Williams' case the sallowness denoted a
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half Indian origin the kinH o-f
horror
"^ 6 had ^ ta^ht to 1eeJTce^ain^*
The horror of course is at the physical evidence of inter_
racial mating evidenrp nf -fviq +. -a.e, ce o the act itself, despite Miss
Williams' Western cultural appearance.
The Marxist interpretation
of American race relations is a compelling account of the
utility of racial subordination to capital's accumulation
process. Because I consider my own work to be indebted to
this basic view, I will provide here a short summary of the
major themes in Marxist writing on the subject, then relate
some important criticisms, especially i„ relation to the
caste school's contribution.
The Marxist account traces modern racism back to the
need of expanding European mercantile economies for a
suitable labor force in the exploitation of the New World
.
1
Slavery and other forms of servitude for nonwhites ensured
a sufficient supply of labor for mining and intensive cul-
tivation of agricultural staples. Racially based slavery
ensured that there would be a pool of readily identifiable,
exploitable labor for these tasks, for it made impossible
the biological and thus cultural assimilation of Africans
into the English North American colonies
.
2
As an essential
part of the labor force, slaves not only mined and tilled,
they also provided the bulk of crafts people and artisans
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in the Southern colonies
of free blacks). 5
therwith a restrlcted number
Afro-Americans thus contributed directly to the
^mutation of agricultural and^^before and after abolition, bei„ g forced after ^
::::n;
ites int
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the soutte
y system. Factors including poverty, the Klan,
mechanization of agriculture, and the availability of’industrial work in wartime promoted black migration to urban
an northern areas after 1900. i„ these areas
_
wm ^
transition to a monopoly-capital era of stagnation and
underemployment, blacks formed a lor.Pu a a ge, reserve army of
the unemployed, a surplus population. 5
Since at least the 1830's, conflicts between black
^ite ln thG W°rking Class have Periodically broken out
over labor market competition. White unions in the south
helped destroy the strata of skilled black labor after the
Civil War, with craft unions particularly up through the
1930
' s maintaining dual unions. 6 Employers fostered and
manipulated racial divisions through shop floor tactics and
the importation of black strike-breakers. 7
As blacks moved into urban areas in search of work
and relief from virulent Southern repression, conflicts
erupted in tight housing markets and at the boundaries of
black and white neighborhoods. De facto segregation in
urban areas added to the list of historical conditions
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The conclusion of the Marxist argument is that
capitalism in the u.s. is deeply lndebted t<j
inequality. Capital has always relied upon racial
-equality as a source of cheap labor and a caUse of social
-organization within the working class. This view of
course is completely antagonistic not only to liberal but
O 1 -4
' ~ d DU
also to conservative, free-ma-rkoi oma et critics of liberalism:
One of the paradoxes of experience ^ +
frequently^f
“
enablingt^^XSTto^ ^^^factor
9
I have two basic criticisms of most Marxist accounts,
as I understand them. First is a certain tendency, espe-
cially among academic Marxists as opposed to those directly
involved in organizing, to overestimate, in an elitist way,
the ability of bosses and corporations to create and
manipulate racist, ethnic sentiments among the white work-
ing class. With race clearly a problem for working class
solidarity, the temptation is great to interpret working
class racism as an elite-imposed attitude. There is no
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, widespread atterrm+<= Q +
tion on this score But rn
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' thOUgh concentrating the blamebosses may have finite political value
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-Clal a«itudes areooted m everyday life.
Undoubtedly, working class racism has primary roots
“ the USS "—— Scabs «* northern industry and1D " m° re generallZed lab°r
-ket competition. But thisVleW iS °ften adVanC6d ln with a view that tails todistinguish sharply between race relations and ethnic rela-
tions, especially in light of discrimination against
southern and eastern European workers. Behind both argu-
ments is the idea that all social rP i a tiel ons are expressions
of a calculable economic interest which effectively ex-
plains their pattern. Thus the arguments suggest in effect
that economic competition is a regrettable but often under-
standable excuse for both race and ethnic discrimination,
especially when fostered by capitalists. Ashton takes this
view in his discussion of the ethnic hierarchy developed
within the working class : 10
South*"
hlerarchy was further refined. Workers of
semiskiUlS iohf ^
r°Pean °rlBi " "o^Hp into
the bottom^ Rut t
bbacks were incorporated at. B not, however, without considerablestruggle and bloodshed. For in addition ?o the
heritage ^lack
Wblcbwa s Part °f the nationalc , blac s faced manipulation by capitalists
: d^rbatedraClal h°sti lity and'fSSher S Sdivi ed the working class. Economically desperate,
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racial violence n ’ a Sreat deal of the
at the beginning of this^eni” Northeri> citieslinked to the use of blacks ^lT be directlVtition and conflict over1L! abs ' And compe-feature of urban racial and^th 6”81 " 8 a centraltoday. l i d et nic violence
Ashton further, correctly, discusses the role of trade
unions in attaining this hierarchy. But such accounts
neglect the difference in kl „d between racial and ethnic
group distinctions, reflected in the possibilities of cul-
tural and physical assimilation and based in part upon
H°2zrational beliefs about Afro-American sexuality.
It is especially important to place the "economic"
action of trade union discrimination in a context that does
not separate economic and sexual/kinship factors as dis-
tinct causes." Recent work by Mary Ann Clawson clarifies
the extent to which trade unions organized as fraternal
orders reflected and supported the patriarchal organization
of working class communities and cultures. 11 These unions
served not only economic, but also a spectrum of needs in
those communities.
As craft organizations, they served as a repository
of production skills which belonged to a white and male
world. Thus, as Robert Allen points out, post-Civil War
craft unions in the south acted to exclude black craftsmen
and artisans, who made up a high percentage of that re-
gion's skilled workers up through 1865; this effectively
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’ unions refuqpH + ~ ^sed to admit black workers ororganized them into separate i, ,locals; their power overhiring, training andg
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shut blacks out of skilinn ^S l led trades in that regioniv
-6tuu as wellMoreover, as Allen argues th e
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" Uni °nS l° black unen)Ployment and low levels ofSklU helPed make “ POSSlble for emPl°yers to import and
use black scabs, often with tu^
, 13
the connlvance of black church
eaders. where black scabs were used, the numbers wereinvariably exaggerated, and their general use greatly
exaggerated by the Dress* p and striking workpr? i n „b Ke s m comparison
to the use or white rural and immigrant strikebreakers. 14
As communal organizations, craft unions fostered
solidarity through their rituals of brotherhood among
white males and through their contributions to community
leisure and recreation activities. These activities
coexisted with activities sponsored by clubs and lodges
some predominantly working class, many others with a vary-
ing mixture of business and working class men (Masons,
Elks). That is, the world of working class leisure had
prominent organizations promoting solidarity amo^g working
class men and between working class and business class men.
Craft unions also thus drew their solidarity not only from
shared skills but also from fraternal rituals. Clearly,
their exclusion of black males from membership expressed
12
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concerns that were not simple economic rentes, but abroader den ial of social equality between the races. And
social equality, as ! shal! argue, had indelible associa-
tions with miscegenation issues.
It seems to me that many Marxist accounts of working
class racism focus on elite manipulation and imposition of
racial attitudes because they share a very orthodox version
of Marxism which gives them little else to turn to. This
lack of alternatives, I would argue, is a product of both
an external view of ideology, in which ideas as superstruc-
ture are determined by production, and of a slighting of
sexuality and relations of cultural reproduction as deriva-
tive, supe rs t rue t ural phenomenon. One tendency, exempli-
fied by Cox, has been to dismiss sexuality as a
psychological, and thus an ideological and not material,
matter. Another major tendency has been to interpret the
sex/gender system as the more or less passive object of
pressures from developments in production-a one-way flow
of influence or constraint—and thus to render power,
property, and affective relations between the sexes the
status of a secondary rather than primary contradiction
.
16
Socialist and Marxist feminists have recently begun
to address this shortcoming, but their insights have yet
to affect the main body of Marxist work on race. Writers
like Angela Davis and George Rawick are exceptional for
the theoretical work they have done in this area More
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ace relations. Yet authors such as Calvin Hernton, who
" °UtSlde ° f the MarXist tradition
, have usefull y con-fronted these stereotypes and analyzed them. 18
Surrm^X- In this brief comparison of caste and Marxist
analysis, several themes stand out which bear closer exami-
nation. How are the links between the economic and sexual
aspects of race relations best conceptualized? What are
the significances of blood lines, miscegenation, and
assimilation in race relations? Does the sexual aspect of
race date as far back as the need of expanding mercantile
economies for New World labor? In addition to the family,
what institutions have been important historically in sus-
taining sexual racism? And. what particular forms has
sexual racism taken in the public sphere of politics?
II. Historical Overview
Introduction . I had originally intended in this chapter
to examine the debt of 20th century housing integration
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- « ».,«clear that issues relate + ~ +. •ated to nationalism would be vital tomy argument. Given thi^ ^lS need
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amonS Others, an historical
Perspective would be retired to lay out and support the
nature o f white cultural unit, on puestions of race, stin
1 d° n0t lntend hiSt °riCal overview as an exhaustive
’
account of sexual racism
,
hut as supportive, indicative
evidence for my theoretical interprets
-irpretations
. By means of
this overview and the section ™ uon housing in the next chapter
I want to suggest the historical depth, continuity and
development of sexually-indebted race relations and their
impact on politics.
I was also moved to this historical survey by the
tendency of political theory to slight the social bases of
ideas. This problem is often compounded, I think, by the
importation of theory originated in a distinctly European
context, outside the particular conditions of American
history. Domestic race relations are clearly one of these
particular conditions. Yet, American racism is not simply
a false consciousness impeding class formation of the
European sort. It is also to some degree an alternative
reality fostered by mores extending across class boundaries.
To make this clear, more than a contemporary focus is
needed.
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Were sexual
projections onto nonwhites a constitutive reason for the
enslavement of Africans by the English i„ North America,
I argue in this section that the subordination of sensu-
ality in a patriarchal setting was in fact interwoven at
the earliest point with the personal disciplines of emerging
market society, and with the decision of the English to
exploit nonwhite labor. The sources I cite in this section
make various parts of this argument, but none of them have
made the argument as a whole. In order to make this argu-
ment successfully, one must lay out why the Irish, who
were also seen by the English as sexual barbarians, were
not enslaved along with, or instead of, Africans. There
are, in fact, telling reasons related to the contradictions
of European politics why the Irish were not also enslaved.
And, in illustrating the entire argument, the emerging
theme of the domination of nature underlines the linking of
patriarchal and productive concerns in the subordination
of sensuality.
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The
" a lab° r SUPPly in the eXPl°ltati
- o* the New
n,ay be taken as a given. The reliance on racial
slavery by European powers as part of the answer^7otbe- But, slavery as a source of labor did exist for the
English as both historical anaica and contemporary examples ofhow to carry out colonial policies.
Economic developments in Western Europe after 1400
led to the development of what Wallerstein terms the
"world system,, in the mercantile era, a succession of key
countries (core economies) led a process of national con-
solidation in which the search for national wealth through
colonization and exploitation of the New World played a
major role. In this system, first Portugal, then Spain,
seized the initiative and contested for colonial hegemony.
Their position as core economies in the world system
received papal recognition in the Treaty of Tordesillas
(1494), which divided the non-European world between them
for plunder. 1
The pattern they set was later followed and super-
seded by the English. It involved the chartering of royal
companies, usually named after the port cities of their
principal merchants, which were given dominion over
peoples and vast tracts of land in the New World for the
planting of colonies. 2 Portuguese and Spanish colonists
made use of slavery in agriculture and mines, but this
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But the Church eventually moved away from this prin-
ciple, as a result of a debate which took place in the
Church and Europe during the middle 1500's over the poten-
tial equality of heathens; this left colonial interests
free to increase the degradation and exploitation of their
labor forces That is, in the face of the enormous wealth
to be extracted from the colonies, a crucial shift in
ideology and practice was forced upon the Church by the
great landed and commercial interests of the day. This
was possible in large part because of the Church's intimate
ties with the aristocracy, being a "career" outlet for the
aristocracy's younger sons (driven there by primogeniture
in inheritance). 5 Even so, Iberian countries did not
achieve the thoroughness of racial definitions of humanity
prevalent in later Protestant, core economies such as
England and the Netherlands. 6
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.
61 aCC°UntS and *!«* Venice a„d Spain
cquainted the English wlth colonlal^
^
ude and slavery in conquered lands
. Their ^
a„7t
y lnflUen0ed En8llSh Plantati°n
— in Ireland
reatmeDt " the Irish culture. Later in
e »id 1500 England had Span . sh poUcy and advioein subduing resistance by the Irish. 7
This is important
, because the E„gllsh experience in
-land served as a training ground for racially-informed
colonial policies in North America against Native Americans,
as a basis for comparison between Irish, Native
American
,
and African labor.® Comparison between different
of labor was in turn a vital matter, because ulti-mo reliance upon black slavery as a labor system rather
than other forms of servitude was not a foregone conclu-
sion. we must forego the temptation to lose sight of
other options during that period which from the vantage
Point of centuries of racial subordination may now seem
unlikely or superfluous. It was not a foregone conclusion
that the Engiish would enslave Afrlcans . p & wholesale ^
rather than rely upon bond servitude applied to any nation-
ality, or attempt for that matter to enslave rather than
press into bond servitude the Irish.
In Ireland, English planters and soldiers gained
valuable experience in confronting, subduing, and exploiting
an extremely different culture; they had been trying to
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1
jy still do on viewing the Irish nce 1 as a separate
race. The TvichIr s , up until 1650 were not ^’ Peasants of theEuropean type; they were largely a pastor* ! ae y al and nomadic
people organized in clans nr. + • ua C °r tribes. Thev „y llved a way of
° f Whi °h thS Engllsh no recent experience or
understanding
,
and which appeared to the English as barbarian
-d savage, particularly in the ferocity and style of their
warfare. Irish sexual and family practicesy i r encouraged the
English sense of the Irish as an entirely different order
appearing by evolving English standards as licentious. The
Irish intermarried with relatives forbidden by English kin-
ship rules, engaged in trial marriages, and allowed for
easy divorce by man or woman.
Our concept of race, and the notions of a civilized
culture as opposed to a barbarian life, emerged out of the
English colonial experience, which began in Ireland. The
Irish underwent the same wholesale destruction of popula-
tion and culture and expropriation of land for redistribu-
tion to English planters that the Native Americans did in
North America. Facilitating this transfer of policy were
many English planters who were active first in Ireland and
later in North America, where they were struck by the
similarity of the Indians to the Irish, especially in
their cultural savagery and style of warfare.
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t0 eStabllsh ln thi s section that sexual
2
lves
' wtdely construed, operated in the English use ofrtcan racial enslavement. Vet both West Afr i Ca„s andthe Irish appeared as licentious to the English, though
perhaps not the Irish to the same degree. And, the I rish
-re clearly seen by the English in proto-racial termsG-en these parallels, why does our history record African
racial slavery rather than Irish slavery, or why does it
record only African slavery as a widespread system and not
a long-term combination of African and !rish servitude,
slave or bond labor? The answers lie in a combination of
factors about Irish and African people themselves, and
about their connections or lack of them to major contra-
dictions in English and European society. These ruled out
large-scale Irish servitude after the mid 1600's. This
disqualification emerged at the same time as a leap in the
demand for plantation labor. 9 African labor filled the
bill because it was available; and African slavery, it
seems, satisfied not only economic, but sexual motives as
well
.
It must be made clear that we cannot explain African
enslavement on the basis of pre-existing English racism,
though my argument is indeed that the ingredients for this
stance were already present and brewing. Three labor sys-
tems were available for use in the colonies: free labor,
bond labor, and slavery; slavery only expanded after the
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first two proved inadequate to plantatlon^ 10 ^ _t ions that were not n-P a racial nature applied to the firsttwo systems. Yet all thro
.
three SOUrces of labor-free laborbeing largely English, bond labor
^
slavery after 1650 for a
-
p—-; _i Africans
—were pynio-n-^j
.
.
exPloited up to theimits applying to each, limits determined in part by
sexual concerns.
No great love was lost by English merchants and
planters for their nwnui o laboring rlaqcoo. +g Ci sses
,
it would be incor-
rect to conclude that their exploitation was limited (in
the sense of not being forced wholesale in bond or slave
labor) solely out of a strong cultural or racial affinity
for them on the part of the upper classes
.
11
The upper
classes were limited rather by considerations of domestic
politics. The English poor might be shipped off in bond
forced to emigrate as small farmers, but clearly could
not even be considered for that great pool of fixed labor
required by plantations except at the risk of domestic
unrest or rebellion. When upper class economic spokesmen
could say:
the^urp^t
na "t ion where s i aves are not allowed fe su est; wealth consists of a multitude oflaborious poor, (Cox, p, 339)
we can be fairly sure that slaves are disallowed not simply
because of an emerging ideology of freedom in market rela-
tions. There were, in short, limitations set by a history
of peasant rebellions and by a tinderbox of wandering,
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displaced poor upon their use in E„glish soclety
The system of bond or indentured servitude reliedheavily upon Irish labor for -i + o ,
West Indi
nUm erS
’ especially in the
es upon sugar plantations. 12 They were imported
^ Sarly ^ the 162 °' S
-
bUt SOOn developed the reputation
of revolting and killing their English masters. Still
English colonial policies in Ireland made available large
numbers of displaced and prisoner of war Irish, who were
transported in great numbers during the 1650- B as permanent
servile labor for the sugar plantations. Bristol sugar
chants, gaining here invaluable experience for their
later role in the African slave trade, 13
had ag^te actively employed through Irelandseizing women, orphans, and the destitutee transported to Barbadoes and the Envli^h
°
Plantations in America o r P ls
the We^t t n Hi o
iirneric
- • • • a great benefit to
ten and b^s
dl
?or
U
Ihe
rifb^SnWh° deSi^ the
for^n.^oLn^and^^L^fL'slnl 1?^ HT “
Commi"
plantatlons in the West Indies. The
6
mmissioners for Ireland gave them orders uponthe governors of garrisons, to deliver to themprisoners of war; upon the keepers ofgaolsfor offenders in custody; upon masters of work-houses for the destitute in their care "whowere of an age to labor, or if women weremarriageable and not past breeding" and gave
wh.
e
H H°
nS t0 a11 in auth°rity to seize ?hoseo had no visible means of livelihood, andeliver them to these agents of the Bristolsugar merchants, in execution of which latterdirection Ireland must have exhibited scenes inevery part like the slave hunts of Africa
Once in North America or the West Indies, Irish labor
was often worse-treated than African labor, primarily
because of its rebellious character and a pastoral
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lri>„ >ir
7“*" -
thino- o ^
b dangerous
Afr .
C°ntrlbUted t0 ^ ^'easing reliance upon
of th
6rVlle lab°r rather a further development
e rish bond system. These rebellions drew upon a
o*S (even by that
.time) history of Irish resistance to
“ Sh d°mlnati0n
'
-Pon international rivalries f0Pthe French were available as allies against the English
This international connection available to the Irish
touches upon a major contradiction in English and European
society which I think plausibly seems to have limited any
Irish servile labor into a major, long-lasting
system, despite its plentiful supply and utter defeat on
home soil. Thic? c -r .that the Irish were Catholic Christians.
ately prior to, during, and following initial coloni-
sation of North America, English society was being agitated
and convulsed by the effects of its own Reformation and
coming Civil War and Restoration. Cromwell himself put
down the bloody rebellions in Ireland of the 1650's. The
Protestant-dominated balance of power in England at the
end of its struggles sought to defuse religious issues and
not afford, it seems to me, to press very far along
the road of permanent servitude with a population having
such clear connections to major divisions internal to
England and Europe.
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" “ ”“”*1 affinity, tln,
sharpiy ^ ^
Irish, in addition to the obvious political oppor-
tunities at hand in French rivalry with the English. But it18 Cl6ar that EngllSh
- racial identity with
the Irish which then prevented Further develops oF Irish
servile labor. In fact, as I have argued, merchant and
Planter Englishmen who were involved in Ireland and North
America came quite close to seeing the Irish in racial
terms; had their availability as bond labor persisted much
longer, we might today be discussing the "Gaelic race."
African labor had virtually none oF these limitations.
Africans were less likely to revolt than the Irish, being
initially divided by language barriers amongst themselves
and with no allies in warFare as the Irish had in the
French. They could not escape to their Free brethren, as
could Native Americans upon whom servitude was imposed.
And, they came largely From agricultural societies, and by
accounts of contemporaries adapted more easily than the
Irish or Indians to the disciplines and seasonal rhythms
of plantation cropping.
^
With the popularity of Irish bond labor declining by
the end of the 17th century, and African slavery on the
rise, we see the emergence of the historical pattern of
free or wage labor for Europeans and coerced forms of
labor (slave and colonized labor) for nonwhites. The role
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English or Irish labor could have
tions was filled by nonwhites, who
tions of shared culture or of the
to English and European society.
served on colonial planta-
were without the protec-
contradictions internal
It is essential not to
separate this fact
and black, free and
the same historical.
into two separate histories, of white
coerced, labor. They are aspects of
process. This will become clearer once
we discuss the contribution
mores to the work ethic and
2-1 Patriarchal market
of developing English sexual
enslavement
.
__
society
_and the domination Q f
In
—
lte 0ver B Ia.ck
, Winthrop Jordan offers a
thorough and insightful account of the early years of race
relations in British North America. He acknowledges, often
in spite of himself, the key role of labor requirements.
More importantly, he describes the pre-colonization social
attitudes of the English which he feels made up a climate
conducive to the enslavement of Africans. Central among
these for our purposes are ancient linguistic traditions
associating white with good and black with evil, and the
associated development of more contemporary conventions
linking blackness, beastliness, and sexuality. 16
Jordan brings these out in his discussion of the dual
voyages of discovery, internal and worldly, he pictures
the Elizabethan English set out upon. To bring out these
themes, he makes brilliant use of Shakespeare's Othello.
In the play, Othello’s being and actions (as the dark-skinned
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Moor) convey
-the integrated imagery of blackness ^
whiteness
,
of Africa, of the sexuality of beasts and the
y sex. Jordan concludes that: 18
gi ven this charged atmosphere of self dieit is scarcely surprising that r
® ~ lsc°very
,
have used people overseal
l Engllshmen should
that they were esnpn'nii
a
?
lal mirrors and
attributes £ savages t0 discOT«
could not speak of in themselves.
“ flrSt but
This sensitivity to African sexuality Jordan attrib-
utes to several sources. One was the circulation of
Spanish accounts of West Africa, particularly one published
in 1526 which vividly embroidered on cultural traits
appearing as savage, lustful, and wanton. The Spanish
account itself had self-conscious precedents in classical
descriptions of Ethiopia which associated a hot climate
with lustfulness. Also in this vein, in 1556 Jean Bodin
reconfirmed this association, declaring that: 19
Ptolemy reported that on account of southernsensuaHty Venus chiefly is worshipped inrica and that the constellation of Scorpion
continent
talnS t0 ^ pudenda
> dominates that’
While Shakespeare could rely for dramatic interest
upon intimate relations between Othello, a black man, and
Desdemona, a white woman, other popular tales show the
credence already given to our familiar stereotype of
African female sexuality. We find prior to 1600 widely
circulated stories of copulation between male apes and
black women, in Africa, as related by English and other
201
eyewitnesses.
" The stereotype ^ q
^ - IBth century, according to Jordan> ^ ^ ^sexual aggressiveness of Negro women was virtually de
-Sueur for the African commentator
.
"
2
° It seems
,
in
effect, that a particular type of pornography grew up
Quite early around the matter, quite useful in selling
travel accounts.
The titillating nature of these accounts is undoubt-
edly related to the influence of Protestant asceticism in
England, the other major factor Jordan mentions. Jordan
does not pursue the matter fully, and I believe this is
related to his failure to explore the reasons why England
should in the 1500's and 1600's be going through internal
voyages of discovery. I shall discuss the Protestant con-
tribution in more detail in the next section, but a con-
trast to Jordan of George Rawick's work will be useful in
raising certain themes I intend to develop.
In The American Slavej From Sunup to Sundown The
Making of the Black Community
,
Rawick draws upon Jordan's
work but places English concern with their physical natures
in the context of emerging market society. 21 He argues
that the Puritan/Dissent movement, as an important social
base of market society, helped diffuse repressive atti-
tudes throughout England. Their push away from traditional
to "modern" habits of work and family required a more
disciplined, less spontaneous personality. But because
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“t S°Ciety ^ °nl* — in England> Rawick seesthe English over a lQng periQd u£& llng with some majorbut largely obscure, problem " ThoP
' The Problem of course was
e
-sue of sexuality a„d self-expression. Thus ln thelrinitial confrontations with the more traditional societies
of West Africa, merchant Englishmen saw themselves as they
recently used to be and cti
n
. still were under the veneer of
civilization
:
In order to ensure that he wi 1
i
„ + .the old ways or act out hid u i -f
0t sllP back into
sies, he must see , ? ? half-suppressed fanta-
his reformed self and^hoSe
0
^
dl“erence between
sembled
. But because L !! T he formerly re-
he cannot accept he must i
1 as fantasies which
to the realities 'o? somlone
m
^sI.
theSe f“ ies
It would make little sense for any analyst to separate
the English perception of Africans as essentially sexual
creatures, defined from the very beginning by their physi-
cal natures, from their early European and later English
use as beasts of physical labor in the slave system. Nor
does it make sense to cull out the sexual aspect as a
simple effect of the economic, especially given the vital
relation of asceticism to Protestant work disciplines and
given further evidence of the impact of patriarchal rela-
tions in this complex. It was a combined sexual economy
which made a racial slavery possible, which denied the
possibility of assimilating Africans on the grounds of
both labor needs and patriarchal and Protestant-ascetic
barriers
.
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We see some evidence of these connections in the
crystallization during the 16th and 17th centuries of a
tiajor theme in Bnglish culture: th
. ^^
.
^ " thlS ldSa ~ articulated and popularized
" emerglng markSt «« the fusing too* place of'
sexual and labor factors which denied African assimilation
And, to introduce a- thread which we can pick up again at
the end of the next chapter, these factors in turn are
important constituents in the development of white nation-
alism in the U.S. during the 19th century,
In ™e_Dominat^^ Wiiliam Leiss charac-
terizes capitalist development as the extension of domina-
tion over both external and internal nature. 23 The modern
notion of the mastery of nature has its roots in the work
of Francis Bacon during the early 17th century. The spirit
of the age, if Le i S s is correct, focused not simply on the
adventure of discovery but ai cny, o lso on the power of control
over natural forces.
According to Leiss, mastery over nature as elaborated
by Bacon contained two elements: empirical observation of
natural phenomenon freed from moral (Aristotelian) cate-
gories, allowing an increased utilization of nature; and
the social benefits accruing from this new science,
"notably an increased supply of goods and a general lib-
eration of the intellect from superstition and irration-
24
ality." Bacon's work is an initial statement of
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Enlightenment faith in u - .
-naitn, m which science would provide them
;
erial “d lnteUectual basis « °rderly and materi _any abundant society. The association of these ideasWlth llberal PhilOSOPhy iS ««™ an old and innate one.
Leiss' major argument is that the proiect ofj mastery
over external nature, far from freeing society from
irrationality
,
was
.nurtured in the context of class domina-
Thus, man not only dominated man as one class
dominates another tmi 0 -i~,
’ alSO arranged to dominate himself
through the disciplines required of the personality in
market society. On the matter of personality disciplines
Leiss is not so explicit. But he does bring out an impor-
tant point in Bacon work which requires further explora-
tion, and that is the language of gender which Bacon uses
to articulate the notion of mastery.
Nature is female in Bacon's writings, an old enough
tradition which has its basis in the association of
femaleness with the bringing forth of new life. The rela-
tionship of this association to patriarchal conditions is
not completely clear. But any casual effort at anthropology
will uncover customs and rituals in most societies which
reflect the mystery and fear in which nature as a general
category and women as part of fertile, life-giving nature
have been held. Menstruation confinements and taboos are
a familiar example.
205
What is unusual or new in Bacon's work, and during
hlS era
'
iS the
*2SS2 with Which the project of controlling
nature in general, and nature as represented hy the sexual
and reproductive capacity of women, is presented. Thus in
referring to advances
they "do not 'merely
course; they have the
in the mechanical crafts, Bacon says
exert a gentle guidance over nature's
power to conquer and subdue her, to
shake her to her foundations.'" 25
of science, 26
In short, for his method
you have but to follow and as it were houndnature in her wanderings, and you win be able
^
e
th
yOLI like, to lead and drive her afterwardsto e same place again. ^ir
Present in this and other passages, as Leiss points
out, is an explicit if sublimated sexual aggression. 27 In
retrospect, Bacon’s writings seem to herald and reflect a
growing concern in sections of English society with the
repression and rechanneling of libidinal energies into
work, discovery, and the conquest of the material world.
In this it does not seem possible that the gender-laden
language Bacon uses, nor his enterprise, was not condi-
tioned by patriarchal relations in the sexual division
of labor.
First, it seems likely that the legitimacy of con-
quering nature was aided, not only by Bacon's appeal to
Christianity, but also by emphasizing that nature was
female. What more telling characterization for men of all
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stations could there have been of nn k
•
object appropriate for
domination*? Ke lat ed ly
, therefo r e, it was proper husbandry
for men to do the dominating of nature. Scientific hus-
bandry, or mastery, would enable man to benefit from the
secrets of increase which nature had to offer.
Patriarchal relations could also have provided, as a
resource of existent attitudes, an answer to the problem of
what facet of social life to repress in the pursuit of
methodical work and discovery. In an egalitarian society,
one might imagine a collective decision to forego or mini-
mize certain activities, perhaps for an agreed-upon period
of time, until a goal requiring an intense and sustained
commitment was met; moreover, everyone would share this
burden equitably. But in Bacon's time, the Puritan move-
ment, led by male elders, made another kind of choice,
albeit not very consciously. Patriarchal relations defined
the link between women and nature as essentially a sexual-
reproductive one, with women supposedly distinct from men
by virtue of their emotional rather than rational natures.
In this context, the Puritans achieved a sober, diligent,
methodical life in the pursuit of work by repressing that
part of the personality most closely identified with
women: sensual, physical appetites. And outside the
Puritan community, the interpretation of this solution by
other elements of the new middle class rested on a double
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ard of sexual freedom which ensured the burden of
repression would not be equitably shared. 28
Moreover
,
as market society expanded, and with it thedivision of labor, women were excluded from new crafts andSlut out from old ones which they previousiy had access to
and in some cases, monopoly over. They particularly lost
out as economic activity left the v,y I i the home
.
with male appren-
tices replacing labor by wife and children. This was the
the printer's trade, which quite early developed
into a profitable undertaking; protests of male apprentices
helped exclude female labor by about 1650. Thus science,
virtually synonymous in Bacon's day with craft knowledge,
served patriarchal as well as economic functions. Another
example, which took until the early part of this century
to play itself out, was the appropriation of medicine from
midwives and female folk-healers (often accused of witch-
craft by Puritans), and the long-standing exclusion of
women from medical training. Another is the appropriation
of brewing by male craftsmen; the title of brewster for-
merly had the meaning of a woman's art in the home or
, 29
avern. The list is long, but in sum it documents the
increasing confinement of women to reproductive labor
(among the middle class) as productive and reproductive
work separated.
Patriarchy and the developing repression of sexuality
were vital threads woven into the fabric of colonial
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lses which the e
—— to the New world
. AlonKwith the
.“ *— «- they were woveninto defined
,
in the face of other limits we have discussed
a racial slavery hy about 1650 that superseded free andbond labor as the major system in the southern colonies.
Clearly, the unassimil ahi y f .— ot A ricans guaranteed a
exploitable labor force. Between 1660 and 1700
racial slavery achieved full legal recognition in one colony
an°ther
- BGtWeen 1650 »d 1726, miscegenation laws
ntlng assimilatlon also were codified. Because colo-
nial documentary evidence prior to • „P ° 1660 is "equivocal," the
precise contribution of sexual noii-r- .politics to enslavement
cannot be assessed. 30 But in addition to English cultural
vacillations over sensual expressiveness, two patriarchal
factors stand out.
First is the relative number of men and women of both
races in the colonies. 31 m the English West Indies,
blacks heavily outnumbered whites, and white women were
scarce." In this context, Jordan argues, planters could
not begin to recreate English culture, and so viewed the
colonies as a temporary place, a respite from English
mores, and engaged quite openly in the white male, black
female miscegenation which would have been legally for-
bidden inside English culture. But in all North American
colonies except South Carolina, whites for some time out-
numbered their slaves; with English culture intact and
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available for reconstruct ln the colonlal
miscegenation statutes were the law of the day
. „
Carolina, on the other hand, especially Charleston, ledthe colonies in openness of interracial sex between white
males and black women. And, both the West Indies and
South Carolina had the strictest law,a -n s against black male-
white female sex. The matter of relative aaccess to white
and black women was clearly a factor in m iy l miscegenation
politics.
in this context the double standard operated in part
out of patriarchal concerns over property in women as
individuals and as a group. These informed the strong
tendency, even this early, to see white women with inde-
pendently chosen nonwhite lovers as fallen and lustful
and to strictly forbid the "availability of this property
to the subordinate black male population. Jordan cites a
Maryland miscegenation statute of 1681 which castigated
white female-black male marriage. In these situations,
according to the Act, (describing white women) marriage
D Z
was
andTuJ? ?h? Satisfaction of theire Lasciviousnd L stful desires, and to the disgrace not
Christ ian^N t"
8113 *1 butt alls° of many otheren a ions.
Ihis language in miscegenation statutes of the day is
33common
.
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Secondly, for white me „ of property, nonwhite concu-bines rarsed the issue of legitimate descent so important
to the transmission of property rights and inheritances
.
34
The not infrequent, wrathful reminders throughout the his-
tory of American slavery from Southern press and legisla
tore condemning this activity by propertied men represented
a collective elite concern for legitimate male heirs and
the preservation of white male authority in the plantation
system.
Given all of these factors, it seems likely that
sexual politics, broadly construed, were an important con-
buting factor to the English enslavement of Africans.
To pull these threads out of the fabric I have described
would unravel and muddy the pattern of social concerns it
describes. In some manner which we may only interpret,
the English planters and middle class were in a sense
chaining themselves symbolically when they enslaved
Africans for their labor and with that labor conquered a
new world. And in this process, of course, the real and
psychological chains were more tightly secured, respec-
tively, around African labor and women, especially in the
South.
The mixture of patriarchal, sexual, racial, and
economic concerns I have described in this section repre
sents the genesis of white nationalism as a force in
American history (also, as well, in English history).
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These factors were all .S'-Ll present virtual i\? , ,
„
ly from the inceptionof modern American history Th^ -f
cnlt ,
y ' e refUsal ° f biological and
ura assimilation of non-Europeans was an essential
Part of the
.motivational matrix whlch helped propel capi_talist economic development, and which allowed a new white
^iier society to pursue policies of extermination toward
Native Americans and exploitation towards enslaved
Africans
.
As a social-political stance, nationalism is not usu-
ally spoken of by historians until the middle of the !9th
century, first in reference to European economic competi-
tion, then in reference to colonial independence movements
W. a. Williams has used it in the sense I now am, in
describing U.S. westward expansion after the War of 1812. 35
The racial basis of mercantile policy, however, makes the
notion useful for an even earlier period. The value of its
use in this period, as in later ones, is its indication of
cross-class, cultural solidarity achieved by English
settlers in the face of exploitive relations with other,
less modern' cultures. Thus, Jordan notes the transforma-
tion in the colonials' self-image between 1600 and 1700
from "Christian" to "English" to "White." 3 ®
This experience of cross-class ties is not unlike
that related by an English nanny in India, in The Jewel
in the Crown
:
3 ^
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It was Miss Crane
'
snobbery abroad, which was^e^
16 "06 ° f socla l
snobbery at hom4 because ?t the same asthe demands, sometimes eon
f
1
Wa
f
•
COmplicated by
Solidarity and white supremacy §1
° f W
?
ite
felt a duty to accord h„
T
y ' Her employers
would have withheld from h recognition they
Indian, at the same P the hiShest-born
her on one of the lowest
a comPulsi°n to place
of their own sell ™ngs of the ladder
side the household than in'*
®°clety— lowet out-
she stood in a position t ’
Where
'
of course,
of any native servant superior to that’
Entre
Preneurs and early factory owners were obvious contributors
to an ethic of self-denial in the service of production
How did other elements of the population come to accept
this ethic? This section is not intended to be an account
of the accommodation of the working class to industrial
disciplines. It is thrmn-h
,
oug , one exajnple of the contribu-
tion of religion to this process, to the spread of the
ethic of self-denial across region and class. In this
process, religion was not simply a tool of propertied
classes for manipulating working class into producing
more or for manipulating divisions within the working
class. Evangelical religion of this era was to a con-
siderable extent a product of interaction between working
and middle classes, a means of coping with, even as it
shaped, the upheavals of the period.
In this respect, evangelical religion was an indi-
rect but major contributor to the projections of
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sexually- in formed raclal polltlcs
. In ^
explore Natlvlsm as an example Qf '
sexual drama
,
an historical model for post-Civil War and
m°re r6Cent raClal Confli
-t. in addition to important
economic motives, Nativism exhibits the typical role of
sensational press and literature, and the appeals made
across class boundaries on the basis of shared mores,
which has characterized racial politics in the U.S. While
manipulation by elites is undoubtedly a key factor in such
politics, it is necessary to ask: manipulation based on
what? The answer, it seems to me, is manipulation based
on shared beliefs and purposes which help to constitute a
culture of production and which are also indebted to
patriarchal interests shared across class boundaries.
^"gelicals and the laboring classes: back -
££21ind- The ethic of self-denial developing among men of
property in England and the colonies was not a simple
repression of sexual needs. What was at issue was a com-
plex of belief, a way of acting, which undermined the
validity and value of the body except for labor. Physical
needs (sex, the enjoyment of food, the need to eliminate,
etc.) were
_
s
_
hameful things to the Puritans, who embodied
these attitudes in the extreme. 1 Self-denial, or self-
control, is the proper characterization for this attitude.
It was an internal discipline that denied the authority of
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e physical self, whloh accepted the methodical external
disciplines (i„ one’s lifespan) first of the parents, then
of the worldly calling, work. i„ Weber's words: 2
°nly
that of monasticism 7 Principle, from
vegetable diet and cold bathe °?i?
Wlth a moderate
tion is given for all
d s the same prescrip-
used against re?Lfi ^Z 1 temP tations as is
.oral ShC sense ofUIK nard in your calling."
Evangelical heirs of the p11T.uPuritans m America developed this
y emphasizing, for both men and women, the vestiges
of Proper female personality remaining after the breaking
°f the will m childhood (the will a particular characteris-
tic of adult men) and the repression of sexuality. As
brides of Christ," they celebrated a meek and humble sub-
mission of will to a highly sexualized, father figure of
Christ. 3
This constellation of beliefs, though, was a relative
attribute of groups in colonial North America. Geographi-
cally, Puritan settlements in New England were character-
ized by this ethic to an extreme degree, as part of their
notion of a closed community in the Devil's wilderness; it
is probable that this aspect of Puritan culture helped
exclude Africans as integral members of society. 4 Southern
planters, on the other hand, Anglican on the whole and
thus a mi lder part of the Reformation, had both the eco-
nomic need and social attitudes (and opportunities) which
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allowed them to exploit African labor and th
, .
D
> rough concu-bines, African women.
Because self-denial was conditioned both by patriar-
chy and by business opportunities, non-Puritan colonial
merchants could partake of this ethic in varying degreesThem zeal was partly a response to the unwillingness of
underclass labor to- work steadily and to drop their tra-
ditional rights to portions of the material and products
of their labor. Thus during the transition to production
for exchange during the late 1700 's and early 1800's, we
find elites condemning these workers for sloth, indolence,
theft and intemperance. Such castigation was an aspect of
attempts to impose the new disciplines upon emerging wage
workers, first in the putting out system of manufactures,
then in early factories.
The generality of self-denial thus varied by class,
and, through the process of extension into the working
class, it also varied by time. Protestant sects played a
major role in bringing this ethic to farming and craft
workers, who carried these beliefs with them in their
experiences with and transition into wage workers. These
sects also directly proselytized the emerging class of
wage workers in urban areas. Not simply a source of
discipline, evangelical sects helped interpret and shape
working class experience of an often troubling world, and
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were in turn shaped by clas<=; •y s exPerience
. I would argue
that in an indirect but powerful way this rei 1 •y, xn ligious experi-
working classes, for the sensual repression inherent in its
ethic of work was fertile ground for racial ideology. It
is inseparable from the .entire ethic in question. There is
an internal connection in it between an "uncontrolled-
lifestyle, including sexual expressiveness, and a lazy.
unwilling, unmotivated worker; these two sides of the coin
are important in racial stereotypes.
In the colonies, the original major churches were
Congregationalist in the north, and Anglican in the South
These were established state churches; other sects such as
the Quakers flourished mostly in the middle colonies
.
5
The colonies remained overwhelmingly Protestant up through
the early to mid 1800's, with the exceptions of early
Maryland and of the urban Irish. Within this Protestant
culture between 1700 and 1850 we find the growth of
fundamentalist-evangelical sects whose members helped to
supply the emerging working class in the latter part of
the period in question.
Although Congregationalism was an established reli-
gion, its faithful membership in the population was never
a complete matter. Many in the underclass were indifferent
to Sunday services out of choice or out of the necessity
of scrabbling for a living in New England villages. This
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commo„ ly noted absence of piety among the underciass was
addressed after about 1725 by the Great Awakenlng ^
was a revival
.ove.ent begun in the middle colonies and
glV6n great lmPetUS the Northampton
, Massachusetts
Preacher, Jonathan Edwards. This revival lasted approxi-
mately until the Revolution, and coincided with the growth
of the Baptist Church in the middle and Southern colonies.
in this period, we find on the one hand that emerging
market society was increasingly apprehended and popularized
g the upper classes in rationalistic, Enlightenment
terms: the material and spiritual progress of society
through science and knowledge. This belief was not incom-
mensurate with the ethic of self-denial. On the other hand,
the rural poor and laboring classes helped shape evangelis-
tic revivals as part of their response to the same histori-
cal process, often an experience of hardship, and especially
in the early 1800's, great disruption and loss of
traditional ways of life.
Evangelistic conversion to Christianity was an excep-
tionally cathartic experience, requiring a complete debase-
ment of the saved individual. Greven describes the attitude
of key evangelical figures in the Great Awakening as one of
"profound alienation of individuals from their own bodies
and an intense hostility toward their innermost natures."6
This attitude of utter "personal corruption," based on
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physical alienation, was the basis for the belief in the
complete gravity and sinfulness of human beings, a central
enet in evangelical preaching. Exhorted with thls
message
, revival participants experienced
-a deep conscious-
ness of sin with an accompanying anxiety for salvation " 7
Succumbing to their sense of debasement, meeting
members released and shared the frustrations of the diffi-
cult lives they led, through spontaneous displays of emo-
‘iobg ThSy reSP°nded to a charged and violent preaching
with
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muscular spasms of the body and ° rground in a dead faint.
V ’ (alllne to the
Indicative of elite, Enlightenment-informed distaste
for the movement is a letter of 1742 from a Boston preacher
to a minister in Edinburgh, Scotland. 9 The Boston preacher
saw the revivals as the "Spirit of Superstition ." as "gross
Di-orders and barefaced Affronts to common Decency," though
indeed the revivals possibly had led many to a "truly
Christian temper." 10 Disturbingly, 11
they place their religion so much in the Heat andl^our of their Passion
, that they too msflT
emphasis
)^Glr
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aS°n and
°iidgment.- (original
The good preacher commented further on the revival
leaders who were emerging from the common people, another
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sign of the underclass character of the movement. Known as
exhorters ,
" these lay preachers were: 12
most commonly raw i 1
1
itova + z,
young Men or Lads’. “—-ssr— ’ weak and conceited
better thought~of than'anv •
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moters of them
"f-is indo h
the
^reatest pro-
Of these poor ignorant
1 SurL^??^^0"5ordinarily the most Noise and there 18
emphasis) Confusion. (original
In comparative terms, Methodist revivals, occurring
largely after 1810 in the U.S., outstripped in fervor the
-re restrained Baptist versions, and were rivaled in inten-
sity only by the earlier Great Awakening. 12 E
. P. Thompson's
description of English Methodism during this latter period
closely parallels 0.8. Methodist experience in their camp
meetings and regular Sunday services. Methodists went
further than other churches in regu^rizi^g the outpouring
of emotions as a feature of Sunday sermons, which Thompson
describes as "Sabbath orgasms of feeling." 14 And of
revivals
:
15
The word is unpleasant: but it is difficult noto see in Methodism in these years a ritualized
tions°wh?ch
ChlC m
rtUrbati °n - Energies and Mo-i were dangerous to social order, or
Ure's sense)
nich were merely unproductive (in Dr.
were released in the harmless form of sporadic lovefeasts, watch nights, band-meetings, or Revivalistcampaigns. VdUbl
These later doctrines, to varying degrees, kept intact
the Puritan teachings of the sinfulness of sexuality and
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sexual organs. A iong with th0 loss Qf tradltionai
and th<3 lmP°Sltl0n ° f
— disclpllnes
, these teachings
themselves established the need for the periodic catharses
revival. At the very least, in Thompson's
Phrase, these teachings constituted a
-pollution of the
sources of spontaneity."'*'®
Religious activity after 1800 follows no simple pat-
tern, admits of no simple Interpretation.” The major
denominations sometimes split, sometimes cooperated, i„
their strategies, to a considerable degree in each direction.
were lines of tension between clergy and laity over
tactics, authority, and doctrine. Upstart Baptists and
Methodists, the latter much more hierarchical than the
former, both appeared to the established clergy of New
England to be dangerously associated with democratic and
emotional excesses. These two sects had a virtual monopoly
on the religion of the frontier and of the urban poor, and
were associated in Congregationalist minds with first
Jeffersonian and then Jacksonian politics. In the Congrega-
t ionalists
' home territory, Deism and Unitarianism reared
their heretical heads.
The collapse of Federalist power and the growth of
manufacturing meant a loss and an opportunity for churches.
After 1800, the familiar world of established churches with
their intimate connections to public (Federalist) power was
undermined by disestablishment and the growth of the West
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and South. The clergy learned to „gy cope with these conditions
y supporting private organizations, interdenominational if
Possible, to influence public morals and policy. These
organizations could not be said on the whole to have been
controlled by the clergy, though, for an increasingly vocal
middle class segment of the laity found religious activism
vital for imprinting its stamp on new social conditions.
This phenomenon has been called by one historian the "evan-
gelical united front " 18 •+.One of its major accomplishments
Which bears on my arguments was its takeover and promotion
of the Sunday School movement. Once in evangelical hands,
these schools provided a major means of bringing the ethic
of self-denial to the new working class.
Early Sunday Schools were founded for the education
of poor boys, girls, and millhands, with a certain religious
content but no particular religious mission. The First Day
Society of Philadelphia, in 1790, and a similar school in
Pawtucket for Samuel Slater’s millhands, in 1797, are
examples. Between 1800 and 1812 the idea blossomed in
Philadelphia, with new schools serving all ages and both
sexes, but intended for the "poor." Methodists again seem
to have been active in many of the early schools. 19
An appreciation of the possibilities of these schools
resulted in what Foster calls "a craze for voluntary teach-
ing beginning around 1814 in large eastern cities.
Philadelphia, New York, Boston, Charleston (S.C.),
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Pittsburgh, and smaller cities ~experienced rapid growth inSunday Schools. Foster comments
,
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The targets of these schools were wage earners and their
children, who by and large held to traditional customs and
morai in particular they hadn't a well-developed sense of
Private property, showed up late and irregularly for work
drank, cursed, and fornicated. 21 The influx of middle-class
volunteers to combat this menace through the Sunday Schools
provides the first substantial example in U.S. history of a
ained missionary impulse to remake working class culture
in the middle-class image,
phenomenal; for example
:
22
Philadelphia Year
1818
1821
1824
Expansion of the effort was
Schools Teachers Pupils
43 556 5,970
313 2,754 24,218
723 7,300 49,619
The American Sunday School Union, formed in 1824, reported
in 1828 that it had 394 local unions with 3,760 schools,
32,806 teachers, and 259,656 students, mostly children.
About one in seven children, five to fifteen years old,
attended these schools, and a much higher percentage if we
consider only the areas where manufacturing was beginning
to concentrate. Middle class children began enrolling in
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larger numbers at thi<?is time, peer-models for other students
Key to promoting the whole system was the American Bihle
Society, formed in 1816. It provided Bibles and inter-
denominational literature to the schools, and was one of
the first successful commercial publishing ventures in a
national market .
^
^
" Nativism.
- a model for sexual l v -• _p ,£H£_« i y- in formed politic
The Sunday School movement and the printing concerns" which
’
supported evangelical causes established important institu-
tional and cultural links between the middle class and
emerging working class. The expansion of literacy and
evangelical morals among the population in turn provided
Part of the political basis for Nativism and created a
potential market for profitable anti-Catholic literature.
Nativism united middle and working class Protestants,
through some shared and some distinct concerns, against the
waves of immigrants, largely Irish Catholic, landing in the
after 1830. One embracing sentiment was the fear of
papal designs on the western U.S., a conspiracy between the
Pope and Austria to seize western territory as a base for
spreading the evils of Romanism throughout the continent
and for denying land to Protestant settlers. A book by
Samuel Morse (of telegraph fame), serialized in a New York
newspaper, was the genesis of this story. Protestant
ideology had long been a vehicle for the expression of a
major theme in American nationalism, westward expansion. 25
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In retrospect it makes sense that longstanding tears about
European designs on the west would be expressed in religious
terms
,
for they provided some of the sharpest distinctions
possible between the U.S. and Europe. Catholic immigrants
would have, from this point of view, supra-national loyal-
ties to the Pope and thus to those European thrones which
were still Catholic,
As a threat to the American way of life, Catholics
represented in particular a threat to working class economic
26security. Billington reports
fromAmerican ^workers
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o f ^living^and'of^ec V ’ ° f aas factory owners adjusted their wage levels to^
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To those in the middle class without a direct interest in
cheap labor, Catholic immigrants were another undisciplined
population, but one frustratingly beyond the reach of their
evangelism; held in mystical ignorance by their priests,
they were a permanent menace in a way the native working
class was not. For many middle and working class nativists,
Catholic communities with their clerical leadership served
as opportunities for sexual fantasizing and projection.
Billington judges this theme to be the most prominent in
the flood of anti-Catholic vituperation, capitalized on by
urban press, church literature, and book publishers.
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Celibate priests were a nnr-f--;^ iparticular metaphor for the
Probl eras created tor Protestants by self-denial, symboli2 _
1,16 the ^ " temPtati°" at hand (the „unnerythe confessional ) as well as the wish to break the rules
’
of sexual conduct as priests were imagi„ed to. Priests
were pictured as wont to entrap, seduce, and sexually ex-
young women, a pattern set by the success of Maria
"°nk ' S
«*• b°ok, a young Protestant
glrl 13 1Ur6d tQ a C™b ^ abused there at the leisure
of priests and with the connivance of ranking nuns, who seem
madams. Another tale centers on the intimate
atmosphere of the confessional, where a priest succeeds in
placing lurid suggestions in a girl's mind: 28
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Such tales could seize upon the imagination and be credited
as reality. The mob which in 1840 torched a convent out-
side Boston had been inflamed by sensational newspaper
accounts similar to Awful Disclosures
. These tales were
also fundamental, along with backing from pulpits and evan-
gelical groups, in laying the social bases for nativist
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Political movements like the Know-Nothing party, with
organizational sources in secret fraternal orders such as
the Order of the Star Spangled Banner, Nativism also sug-
Sojts that opposition to Catholic immigrants, l ike later
craft-union exclusion of blacks, obtained some of its
cross-class and sexual elements from fraternal Protestant
solidarity. y
These Protestant crusades, as Billington aptly terms
them, are instructive for several reasons. First they
attest to the power of Protestant ideology and institutions
to shape a social climate, a politics, indebted to sexual
concerns. Second, they are fundamental examples of middle
and working class interaction around common concerns. While
middle class evangelists seem especially concerned with
social control of new immigrants, and working class nati-
vists seem especially concerned with job competition,
nativists from both classes shared feelings of threat
indebted to their common mores, upon which cooperative
action might be based. Finally, the crusades were a major
impetus to the development of a popular press committed to
sensations of crime and sex. Each of these factors played
a major role in race relations, especially with the growing
power of Abolitionism, the possibility of war, and the
threat of increased social contact with newly-liberated and
"uncivilized" slaves. The post-Civil War "black scare"
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succeeded nativist theater,
social-sexual drama.
ln a Permanent way, as in part
Post-Civil War "b lack scarp "
Between 1800 and 1860 the
development of evangelical Protestantism, capitalist work
relations, literacy and popular press, and debate between
pro and anti-slavery forces all contributed to a deepening
of the ideological ties between Afro-Americans, sexuality,
and the devaluation of sensuality as a "civilized" trait.
Politicians and printed matter increasingly traded upon and
fostered an evolving popular view of blacks which insisted
on their inability to exercise the sexual controls that to
the white community were a hallmark of civilization. This
iew was not confined to the South, even in 1800, and
definitely not by 1860. In this context any suggestion of
black social equality, or even of black freedom, carried
the automatic suggestion of increased intermarriage and
other sexual crimes (rape, prostitution).
The intermarriage barrier itself carried a heavy
freight of meaning, not exclusively sexual as we have
seen, expressing a complex of motives best defined as
white nationalism. The notion of nationalism conveys the
-~
allty of economic, sexual, and cultural concerns which
the white community carried into the process of racial
separation and subordination. Bans on interracial sex were
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absorbed into this tendency to articulate national expan-
sion in terms of Anglo Saxon superiority. Blacks were
either to be separated, subordinated, and exploited asm the slave system, or were to be excluded as far as
Possible from all social and economic contact with whites,
as in the northeast and northwest. In this process of
self definition, economic motives, where they existed with
regard to race, differed widely. Sexual and social con-
cerns though, rooted in a denial of sensuality indebted to
both a shared work ethic and kinship affinity, were more
widely shared across region and class. That this was so
helps to explain the frequency and power of the resort to
sexual rationalization and tactics in the politics of
racial subordination, a resource called upon with increas-
ing frequency after the 1850' s.
Although the image of blacks in the white mind was
already by 1800 indelibly associated with sexuality,
descriptions of free blacks by northern evangelical clergy
and middle class emphasized other concerns as well. Evan-
gelical criticisms were not unlike those accorded to white
wage earners, as being given to "Idleness, Frolicking,
Drunkenness, and in some few cases to Dishonesty." 2 As
such, free blacks were part of the larger social danger
perceived by northern clergy during this period. But the
clergy recognized limits to the social redemption of blacks
in the white prejudice which they felt contributed to the
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degraded COnditi °n ° f the This preJudice would
not allow blacks to be an integral part of American
society
,
and thus was one reason why Afro Americans were
regarded as candidates for emigration to t-v •Liberia through
the African Colonization Society
.
3
Beginning in the 1830 's, though, southern propa-
gandists contributed to a strengthening of the conceptual
connection between blacks, animality, and sex as an animal
function, as well as trading upon existing connections. 4
Tracts, pamphlets, and books flooded both north and south
with the ideology of biological racism, its first full-
scale enunciation. This ideology developed in response to
attacks by abolitionists on the degrading nature of slavery;
as Frederickson notes : 5
unart iculat pd
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coblnism
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e assumptions to the level of defen-sive ideological consciousness.
One major strain of the southern reaction justified slavery
on the grounds of the subhuman character of Africans,
locked by biological necessity into savagery and licen-
tiousness. Together with the other major strain of
paternalism, southern propaganda stressed that blacks were
safe elements of American society only under external white
controls. Propagandists justified the continuance of such
controls in part by appealing directly to pre-existing
deep-seated white fears of miscegenation" on the part of
freed slaves.
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The fears and social identity these propagandists
traded on and fostered were not confined to the south.
Northern farmers and free soiiprc +.
.
le s, anti-slavery by moral
Principle and economic interest, fought for white homo-
geneity in the west. Supporting African colonization, and
el forts to exclude and remove blacks from the northwest,
y subscribed to climatic theories which found African
Peoples suited only to the deepest south. Confined there
by nature and law, blacks would eventually die out or be
eliminated through Darwinian racial competition
.
7
Negro excl usionist sentiments were particularlv
immigration and to remove the blacks^ho^ere
6^0
already there. In 1851 Indiana prevented allNegroes from entering the state, and Illinoisfollowed suit in 1853.
Iowa as well passed an exclusionary law in 1851. Referenda
in four states— Illinois, Indiana, Oregon, and Kansas-
averaged 79.5 percent in favor of excluding free blacks.
In all of these efforts, the whites (that is, white males)
drew heavily upon the unacceptability of miscegenation, a
sure consequence (they thought) of social proximity. "The
point was raised too often to be overlooked." Even in
Wisconsin, which allowed free blacks but denied them the
vote, politicians warned against voting rights as encour-
aging blacks "to marry our sisters and daughters, and
smutty wenches to [marry] our brothers and sons." 8
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in the 1850's, Democrats and the new Hepublican part,
tlme and aBaln US6d the interracial marriage and
to attack one another. Republicans were accused of
favoring social equality, and labeled amalgamation's.
Democrats were branded the "Mulatto Democracy" in reference
to widespread interracial offspring in the south, a region
in which Republicans were not organized at all. 9 And,
Lincoln's well-known denials of racial equality included
acceptance of the prevailing amalgamation issue; he was not,
he declared, 10
in favor of making voters or jurors of negroesnor of qualifying them to hold office nor to
’
intermarry with white people.
Post-emancipatio n "black scare .” Emancipation set a
new context for the sexual designs and proclivities white
culture imputed to blacks, the context being the lack of
external controls that slave codes seemed formerly to have
provided, and thus a correspondingly greater threat to
white society. Blacks had all along been, and would con-
tinue to be, a social metaphor for the subordination of
sensuality which white culture had imposed upon itself.
Events after 1863 confirmed the nature, limits, and depth
of the sexual drama inherent in racial subordination.
The miscegenation controversy of 1864 establishes
some of the content and limits of this drama. It was in
part an extension of political tactics developed in the
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1850
' s
. But emancipation afforded a test of the connec-ts between white identity on the one hand, and state
policy and legitimation on the othpr nn e . Copperhead opponents
Of Lincoln circulated an anonymous pamphlet, to be linked
with the Republican party, which argued for racial inter-
marriage as the vehicle to a truly superior race. The
authors coined the word
"miscegenation', for this policy,
and left no doubt as to its meaning: 11
T^th^whiL^8^
°ne
Sism-r
the
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an attempt to influence the election of 1864 and
topple Lincoln's government, the pamphlet was a failure.
For most whites, "the whole miscegenation issue was just
too fantastic" 12 to be credited as the policy of a major
party. Even negrophobes during the reconstruction era did
not generally subscribe to the belief that radical Republi-
cans would force social equality upon the south. 13 It
could not be credited that whites themselves would pursue
a policy of social equality for the races; it was not
thinkable, it contravened a deeply rooted identity.
It was, however, thinkable that blacks would have
such designs as part of the larger threat they posed to
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d°mlnanCe
- ThUS WS * national pattern, not Justa southern one, in which the threat of sexua! erime by
'
blachs symbolised the total threat that racial equality
represented to whites, and which united disparate elements
° f WMte S°Clety
o f shared sexual mores and
kinship interests. The shared notes sustained any allega-
tion of black sexual misconduct as prima facie evidence of
guilt, and any such allegation proved sufficient to set off
community retribution through lynching, pogrom, or bombing
and to justify the violence that was in fact directed
against blacks for other non
’ non-sexual reasons. In the south,
such retribution involved community participation in the
reproduction of segregation practices that persisted between
the lapse of the slave codes and the codification of Jim
In the north, particularly after 1900, violence jus-
tified or incited by allegations of sexual crimes helped
create and enforce segregated patterns of housing, which
state policy later absorbed as a condition of profitable
property speculation and social legitimacy among the white
working and middle classes.
The intertwining of black sexuality and crime in the
public mind was, as in all past and present matters of
race, both traded upon and fostered by the daily press.
The 1860's press was rife with reports of atrocious sexual
outrages committed by black men, as well as attention to
the "tendency" of newly arrived black women in urban areas
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to become prostitutes ^ m. nhe Copperhead press was espe-
cially responsible for th-io ^ ut is emphasis, as part of anti-
Republican politics. The evidence indicates not only a
desire on the part of capitalists or the upper class to
divide black and white in the underclasses, who were in any
event already socially divided. It also suggests an attempt
to use a volatile issue both to sell papers and to influence
national polif ics it , a0 well as an appeal by authors of these
articles based on mores they shared with their readers
These newspapers luridly recounted such incidents as: 15
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Detroit Pno n P°n amalgamation."Free Press
. February 16, 1863.
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' Cleveland Plain Dealer
. April 10,
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Other papers gave equally lurid accounts of black male
assaults on a thirteen-year-old white girl (New Haven), a
five-year-old white girl (South Orange, N.J.), and two white
women and a thirteen-year-old white girl (Chambersburg
,
Pa.). The point of course is not to dismiss sexual
assault as a trivial crime, but rather to show that such
reports had an automatic credibility and attraction (which
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the press could trade upon to sell papers). Nor was the
power e,
„„„
newspaper
lses ^ ^
set off by a life sentence given to as 11 x black man convicted
of raping a nine-year-old white girl- an *>„+•t, entire community
was punished for a crime (which we are required to doubt
was) committed by a particular member of that comity.
Emancipation brought into play the belief that blacks
were retrogressing into savagery in the absence of the
strict controls and exposure to white influence available
under slavery. As Hall notes, this idea influenced "popu-
lar and academic thought into the 1930’
s
M
:
18
The chief evidence was sexual immoralitv - familvfeeling
,
the cornerstone of social order' wls
Y
lapsing into
116 communlt 5'; black women wereprostitution and illegitimacv
• ahrw-all, black men were acting upon thl innate'lasciviousness of the savage beast.
In the post-bellum south, Hall sees the development
of a folk pornography of rape around this theory of retro-
gression, an obsession echoed in other regions because "it
was rooted in the deepest of American communal preoccupa-
tions: the conflict between 'civilization' and 'savagery.
The white woman's humiliation at the hands of the black man
t ?T
was
19
escribed in minute and progressively embellisheddetail: a public fantasy that implies a kind ofgroup participation in the rape of the woman al-
most as cathartic as the subsequent lynching ofthe alleged attacker.
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Rape was the popular and offlcial ratlonallzation Qfthe entire practice of lynching, though ±t figured ^("only") 23 percent of the i»,3,38G lynchings of blacks be-
tween 1882 and 1930 ^ tt ^ ,,. Undoubtedly, even this figure repre-
sents a distortion of reality through the use of a credibie
excuse. For our purposes, the significance of the rape
accusation (or the professed fear of it in the absence of
lynching) is not that it was a false one in the vast
majority of lynchings, as An.es, Cox, and NAACP studies have
argued. Rather, the significance is in the credibility
extended by whites to the allegation in all
And, secondly, the significance is in the solidarity which
the accusation evoked in the white community against blacks
HL^eneral, apart from the atrociousness of rape per se.
All segments of the southern white community participated
in, condoned, or supported lynching. As late as 1939
.
65 percent of whites in a national survey supported lynch-
ings for sexual assaults. 21
For lynching of course was not the righteous punish-
ment of an individual, something conceded by white
participants and well known by blacks. Studies by Arthur
Raper and the NAACP, as well as first-hand accounts,
emphasize the use of lynching as a general social control
device, following a set pattern, and depending upon wide-
spread popular and official support for its existence. 22
Although rape was the ideal excuse for a lynching, the
237
threat of economic or politinni
..
encroachment was a common
motivation
. As Cox points out ( in 1947
,
,
ment makeS lyn °hinS P°ss ib le
,
and lynchlng speedily
squelches any movement among Southern Negroes for enfran-
chrsement." And, Piven and Cloward conclude that the
disappearance of lynching and i to +.on s terrors was the major
change brought about in the dailv -py lives of southern blacks
by the civil rights movement.
The effectiveness of lynching as a social control
device depended heavily upon its arbitrary character and
upon the savage character of its execution. Individuals
were selected as targets almost at whim, because they were
handy; any individual might do, because it was a punishment
of the community. Richard wv!o.v,+y rticnar Wright recounts the effect of
this culture of violence
:
23
I?d ^T thf lnfluenced my conduct as a Negrodi not have to happen to me directly; I needfdbut to hear of them to feel their full ef?ects inthe deepest layers of my consciousness. Indeedthe white brutality that I had not seen was a more
I knew
1Ve
The
n
art
1 ^ behavior ttlM that which
see the rea^nf' experience would have let me
haonenincr v, ?
tlC °utllnes of what was really
terrihi
g>
S
Ut aS l0ng aS i1: remained something
and Mood ^et remote, something whose horror
was comnelTefj descend upon me at any moment, I
t
P Hed to give my entire imagination overI I ;l"nf whlch blocked the springs of thoughta feeli g m me, creating a sense of distancebetween me and the world in which I lived.
The horror lay as well in the mutilations which consum-
mated many lynchings, frequently castration and symbolic
rape (of black women). Once finished, lynchings frequently
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led to mob actions against black neighborhoods themselves
1,1 Sh°rt
'
t0 Whit6S aS a
-xual offenses effectively
symbolized the encroachment of the blank nn Di c community.
Reprise
I have developed the following points in this chapter.
First, sexual concerns are a major constituent of race rela-
tions and have been present within American race relations
from the very beginning. Second, these concerns are
deeply indebted to a combination of patriarchal relations
and the sensual repression required of persons within capi-
talist development. Third, a direct vehicle of this repres-
sion, and thus an indirect source of sexual racial images,
was the religious message of evangelical Protestantism;
this movement moreover established important institutional
ties between working and middle classes. Fourth, evangeli-
cal culture and the general distinction between civilized
and barbarian races fostered social dramas (miscegenation
controversies, rape scares and lynchings, later, housing
politics) in which black men and communities symbolized
the threat of unrestrained sexuality to the dominant white
culture. Moreover, the image of black sexuality in these
dramas symbolized a total threat (sexual, economic, politi-
cal) from black communities to white society. The next
chapter will explore more fully the housing integration
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an expression of white nationalism in which sexual
racial concerns play a prominent role, and link these
matters to political legitimacy.
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CHAPTER V
SEXUALITY, RACE RELATIONS, AND
LEGITIMACY: PART II
Introduction
In this chapter I want to lay out my understanding
of how sexual concerns among whites fit into the totality
of subordination which Afro-Americans experienced in their
migration to urban and northern areas. I will use residen-
tial segregation and racial housing conflict as the point
of departure for my discussion. The first section of the
chapter will discuss these conflicts and the matter of
sexual taboos. The second section will link these concerns
to emerging legitimacy problems for the state and political
institutions after WW IT Finuiiw „ ,
. mally, a concluding discussion
will broach possible future courses for racial conflict,
state policy, and legitimacy. The embracing thesis of
these sections is that the historical commitment of the
state to the concerns of white nationalism, with its con-
stituent of sexual racism, was significantly altered in the
Post'™ 11 era to the detriment of the state's legitimacy
among many white citizens.
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Housing Integration rnnfi^ t
gii^Liiaci a i
-sexual Tahnno
Racism was not so much exported from the south,
after the Bourbon reaction of the 1890-3, as it was acti-
vated as a cultural theme by the urban migration of blacks.
The boll weevil, repression, and changes in land tenure and
agricultural practices forced many of the black peasantry
out of the rural south between 1890 and 1930, and again
after 1940; a large percentage of the displaced ended up
m northern cities, along with displaced southern whites.
In response to this black migration, and to extremes of
racial violence and ideology (lynching and retrogression
theory), some white intellectuals developed a paternalis-
tic racism. 1 Most whites, though, drew upon a racial
stance closer to the extreme, a stance that was a social
production of family and community.
Ihis stance fed the popular violence which enforced
racial subordination, a violence which spread out of the
south with black migration and of which lynchings and a
resurgent Klan were only one aspect. In addition to con-
flict over jobs and scabbing, much of this white violence
was precipitated, fanned, and justified by allegations of
either black sexual crime or black male violence which
injured white women and children. For example, in Congres-
sional testimony about the East St. Louis riot of 1917
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labor leader Edward F. Mason "gave a vivid account of the
report that Negro men had committed vicious acts of assault
against white girls in the East St. Louis streets." 2 Riots
in Washington, D.C.,and Waukegan, Illinois, were precipi-
tated by reports of black male attacks upon white women. 3
And, riots were only the tip of the iceberg; racial bomb-
ings and assaults (as I shall note) were common stories in
urban newspapers of the day.
The Chicago riot of 1919-essentially a pogrom
directed against the black community-has been character-
d as especially indebted to housing competition. 4 How-
ever, the housing issue, in the riot and in general,
expresses much more than competition over a scarce resource,
or economic subordination of the black community. The
housing
' integration" conflict is deeply indebted to sexual
racism and ideology, and thus focuses an entire range of
social and power relations between the races.
As the commission investigating the Chicago riot of
1919 found, the "sex myth" was a prime contributor to the
atmosphere of violence against black neighborhoods. It
noted "the common belief among whites that Negroes are
rapists by nature," and found the white press guilty of
trading upon kindred beliefs and thus of fanning the
r
flames of white violence. Newspapers continually re-
ferred to sex matters which provide[s] a powerful stimu-
r*
lant to public interest." Such matters were not limited
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to crime reporting, but included as well stories of inti-
mterracial contacts: intermarriage, interracial
dating at "black and tan" resorts, and love affairs such
as WIFE VANISHES HUSBAND SEEKS NEGRO." 7
While press accounts stressing the use of black
scabs may well have been direct attempts to use racism to
divide the working class, news accounts sensationalizing
interracial sexuality have other important dimensions as
well. They were written by men who had their own social
training as a source of and guide to the popular attitudes
on race they were trying to tap in order to sell papers.
Moreover, the manipulation involved in these stories (and
scab stories as well?) was not the paradigm case in which
the manipulated is unaware of the process. Rather, one
must conclude that such whites as were affected by these
stories participated in their own manipulation by giving
their imagination over to these tales. Although a non-
rational process, it is at some level a seeking out of
the titillating information, a channeling of unacceptable
impulses not unlike the consumption of True Romance
.
Detect ive
,
and Argosy stories.
White images of black sexuality and sexual crime
played, and continue to play, a constitutive role in the
housing politics of Chicago in the 1910's and other urban
areas then and now. These images invited and sanctioned
violent white resistance (native and immigrant ethnic) to
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lack urban migration. Urban riotg ^ ^^^ ^
simply explosions
,
but culminations of a pattern Qf^lngS
' aSSaUUS
' ^ *«"”*«* border areas between
white and (growing) black residential areas. i„ Chicago,
a three-year period at the end of the decade saw 45 bomb-
ings of black homes and establishments. 8 As with the
post Civil War "black scare," the atmosphere carried not
only sensationalism about black sex crimes (the rape myth)
but also eternally-associated rumors of blacks arming them-
selves. Both attest to white fears of black male aggres-
sion, revenge, power. Violent reprisals by whites for
breaching or appearing to breach the unwritten law of
racial separation continued to be a major tactic in the
north (as well as in southern cities) through the early
1950's, especially in the decade immediately following
WW II. Then, a widespread housing shortage coincided with
renewed black migration to urban areas. The result, as
Abrams documents, was "a wave of violence [which] swept
through the country from the South to the North, from East
to West." Cities outside the old confederacy which
experienced this violence included: San Francisco;
Richmond, California; Los Angeles; Chicago and Cicero,
Illinois; Detroit and Dearborn, Michigan; and the Bronx. 10
Housing conflict is an important area to consider
because of the focus it provides for the economic, sexual,
and ideational aspects of legitimation. In the first
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Place, good housing in capitalism is scarce: building
housing requires significant capital, and housing produc-
tion especially low income housing-is generally a less
Profitable investment than others for those who have the
capital-banks and builders. This scarcity underwrites a
struggle for good housing in the working class, and racial/
ethnic animosities definitely have this material component.
Yet homes in our culture also provide a locus of sexuality,
socialization, and patriarchal property relations, as well
as an important symbol of major cultural themes: the cult
of domesticity, and the family as refuge. In helping to
constitute housing segregation, sexual-racial taboos keep
at a distance those who seemingly negate or threaten that
which is gathered in the meaning of the "home."
These interwoven economic, sexual, and cultural
motives for segregation have historically been traded upon
by the constellation of interests which dominate urban
housing production and rentals: banks, builders, real
estate agents, and landlords. These interests helped to
develop and heavily profited from the post-1900 residential
segregation which whites were culturally inclined to, 11
even as the housing production these interests underfunded
created the material conditions for shelter competition
within the working class. When the housing market col-
lapsed in the Great Depression, the state helped under-
write mortgaging and low-income housing in order to
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forestan class conflict around this basic material need
.
12
In doing so, state policy sanctioned and promoted segrega-te as a condition of its legitimacy, both to the white
public and to the housing interests which found state fund-
tng and segregation so profitable. !„ this policy, f would
argue, as well as in the effects of its later symbolic
eversal, we can see an intimate connection between legiti-
mation and social identity. And in this policy, I would
argue, the state responded to and represented an aggrega-
tion of popular and elite interp^fq hootr ests best conceptualized as
white nationalism.
Whether one owns or rents, housing is a physical
locus of immensely important cultural meanings relating to
family life, to the split between private and public life,
to aspirations which help sustain the daily struggle to
get by. If to a critical eye these meanings appear roman-
tic or (increasingly) without substance, then perhaps we
are missing the contemporary threat that is felt when even
the aspirations and symbolic meanings wrapped up with
housing become unrealistic, untenable, impossible to sus-
tain. Perhaps especially when this is so, and when the
"home" is felt to be the last redoubt of old and threat-
ened values, the meaning of a "home" remains a central
constitutive element in our culture, and its defense from
all threats becomes imperative. And make no mistake,
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blacks have always been felt by whltes tQ fae & ^
these meanings.
Here are some broad generalizations which relate
meanings and aspirations: Home is a refuge from the
bustle, cares, and impersonality of the publio world; home
IS where your boss can't order you around, where you can
be in control; home
-is a family where you love and are
loved; home is where your children are, to whom you are an
authority, and your children are your future because you
sacrifice for them and because (inevitably) they often
reflect what you are and hope for them. Or as Abrams
says: 3
The word "home,” one of the symbols of the[housing] problem, embodies the deepest sentiments of American folklore. Home is tL sea['
where
6
the ?
1SU
r hours ’ security, memories,
b-.fit
® fampy rs raised, where hopes arebuiit, where treasured possessions are keptand good friends fed. P
These are romantic meanings and aspirations, often held
more dearly by some of those who have them (women, working
class people) because an alternative or extra world of ful-
filling career or community life is not available to them.
Such meanings, if they reflect as I think they do a
substantial opinion, reach paradigm significance when you
aspire to own the building which houses them. (Working
class families were able to do this in significant numbers
only after WW II.) Owning is arriving or "making it" in a
substantial way, representing a pinnacle of security, an
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with equity, as well as peace from landlords (if
not the mortgage The aspirations built up around owner-
P re in part the creation of government and real estate
industry advertising, the dream of security standing out
all the more sharply against the reality of substandard and
insufficient housing.
But underneath the hype, the aspirations, and the
romantic visions are other realities which also shape the
meaning of housing. The family that lives in any house or
apartment is a locus of socialization, even though parental
ty increasingly competes with media and educational
institutions. For the vast part of the period under con-
sideration, 1910 to 1980, families in the working and
middle classes lived and reproduced an ethic of self-
control, self-denial in which a significant degree of
sexual repression was central. 14 Religious training still
played a major role in sustaining it. For many in the
working class, both Protestantism and Catholicism bound
family and community in a straitjacket of guilt over the
demands of the flesh, while a secularized Protestant ethic
was available to all in their early schooling. The ideal
of self-denial retained its strong internal connection to
patriarchal relations, sexual property, and the sexual
division of labor. Thus, in addition to the romantic
expression of the withdrawal of meaning into private life
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cited above, housing-as-home was constltuted as^ ^ &Powerful background of denial and inequality.
ecalling the discussions of gender identity in
chapter three, it is important to note how theUL n asymmetries
and power relations of the nirrpnf ,n cu e t gender system foster
important vulnerabilities for many people around hetero-
sexual sensual and sexual relations. Men and women tend to
develop differing, gender-related combinations of affective
and erotic capacities and expectations, deeply complicating
even frustrating, intimate relations. 1* Evolving ideals of’
virile men and sensuous women, indebted to patriarchy, may
add burdens of "performance" to the sensitive process of
developing and sustaining intimacy. These and other areas
of vulnerability are compounded, manipulated, by the deploy-
ment of sexuality in consumer ideology
.
16
They are also
sustained, perhaps intensified, by taboos which may hinder
or prohibit the discussion necessary for reducing this vul-
nerability; these taboos affect both men and women, and
especially in Anglo cultures discourage male openness about
emotions
.
Domesticity is thus not a trouble-free preserve, in
sexual terms. But the ethic of self-denial encompasses
much more than sexual practices. As an attitude which
reins in emotional and sensual expression, it may affect
styles of dance, modes of dress, the use of bright, varied,
or subdued colors, public and private display of strong
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©motions (grief nno-cn~^ i) a ger, joy, tears)
to the practice of sacrificing for
m the way children may be the bene
sacrifice
.
17
It also contributes
the future, particularly
ficiaries of that
None of these facets of self-denial belong exclu-
sively to white society. As Afro-Americans, living for
hundreds of years in. the context of +xn these developing mores
and their religious and public supports, black people have
appropriated many of these qualities from liberal society
in their own way. But for a long period during slavery,
and arguably to the present, Afro-American isolation from
mainstream institutions ensured the social space for the
preservation of cultural practices from a West African
heritage.
While black nationalist movements in the U.S. have
repeatedly emphasized and celebrated these practices as a
matter of racial pride, white nationalists have repeatedly
seized upon and exaggerated certain of these in order to
justify their projection of black people as innately
sexual. White racists during slavery righteously seized
upon and embroidered "evidence" of sexual immorality in
the relative tolerance in the slave quarters for out-of-
wedlock first births among black women. But as Gutman
shows, this tolerance traces to a freer attitude among
West African societies toward pre-marital sex (which
Western Europe also held before capitalism) and their
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unwillingness to make young „omen maritaf captives of thelr
first conceptions
.
18
Comparatively exuberant styles of
religious celebration, song, and dance are a part of a
common racial stereotype that in f
u
fact has an arguable basis
in West African culture
.
19
My point is not that differ-
ences between modern European and traditional West African
world outlooks justified at any point the terrible stereo-
types built up around black people. These stereotypes were
the result of European attempts to tame sensuality in the
service of expanded production and of the resulting taboos,
bivalences, and projections of this project. The point
is that it would be foolish to deny that some important
cultural differences did and continue to exist between the
in the area of emotional/sensual expression.
But in the context of the continued reproduction of
the ethic of self-denial in the home, and the intensified
commercial exploitation of the ambivalences created by the
ethic, and in historical continuity, white culture continues
to give credence to myths about black sensuality which set
Afro-Americans up as a threat to white homes and communi-
ties. Black people continue to serve as the "social
mirrors” Winthrop Jordan so aptly described, their social
utility often learned by white children as they imbibe the
ethic of self-denial.
To make clear how the ethic of self-denial and
actual cultural differences tie into race relations, I
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want to recap and expand on my baS ic argument
: In thg
dominant culture, interwoven dynamics deep ly indebted to
patriarchal and capitalist relations tester a projection ot
sensuality onto non-white peoples, interpret this projec-
tion as a threat to white family Ule, and encourage a
sense of vulnerability to this threat. These projections
are a central element in such important cultural themes as
the contrast between civilization and barbarism, and the
beast or animal element in human nature. The essential
capitalist sources of these projections have been the his-
torical need, varying in character by class position, to
channel human nature in the service of disciplined, intense
production, and the progressive degradation of manual labor
(that is, of physical qualities) in the context of its
abstraction from mental labor. The patriarchal context of
emerging capitalism helped answer for our culture the
"question" of what facet of social life to channel in the
pursuit of methodical production: the sensual, physical
qualities most completely identified with women. These
capitalist and patriarchal factors, in a sense, rest upon
a "base level" of sexual repression involved in the estab-
lishment of heterosexual norms, incest taboos, and other
rules restricting sexual partners. In sum, capitalist
patriarchy either establishes or intensifies important
physical/sexual connections between the domination of
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inner and outer nature, and fosters the projection of this
sensuality onto Afro-Americans.
These projections establish sexual-racial taboos
which have three important qualities
.
20
First, as Freud
emphasized, a taboo seems to express a fundamental ambiva-
lence about the situations, persons, activities, or objects
it proscribes. A taboo by its very nature is both feared
and desired, an object of attraction and repulsion, even a
morbid curiosity. The history of white-organized relations
blacks clearly reflects this dual nature-an obsession
with black sexuality, with interracial sexuality construed
in a criminal manner, and a simultaneous keeping at arm's
length, a segregation of the suspected qualities, with
surreptitious testings and crossings of the dividing line.
In white sexual stereotypes, black people are the creatures
our morality forbids us to be, not fully civilized, not in
control of themselves, still part savage that will always
ut
, insatiable, prostitutes and rapists, easy prey (black
women), the ultimate lay, little respect for property or
work, living for immediate gratification. These images
are ambivalent because they not only picture (exaggeratedly)
part of the personality that must be controlled, but also
because they express doubts about the control itself. The
images are not only of scapegoats, but of fantasies.
Second, the social distance which sexual-racial
taboos require is not only a geography of communities. It
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IS also a hierarchy of men, women, and sexual property
relations. Sexual racial taboos are asymmetric! by vir_
tue of the sexual property relations which patriarchal
gender socialization helps foster at the level of the
personality. They proscribe not simply interracial
sexuality, but especially sexual relations between white
women and black men.
Third, sexual racial taboos are not mere reflexes of
patriarchal and capitalist structures. They enter into
and help^onstit^ the social distance and h^^ f
racial segregation and subordination, establishing bounda-
ries that have repeatedly been tested by an interracial
sexuality fraught with conflict and exploitation.
It is important to note the bitter social irony, for
both blacks and whites, contained in ambivalent, asymmetri-
cal taboos. Black people are socially degraded by white
society m part because they are pictured as innately
sensual; not really ’'civilized," their "savagery" shows
through, seemingly confirmed by restriction to hard physi-
cal labor in agriculture and industry
.
21
But the projec-
tion of physical, sensual qualities onto Afro-Americans
ironically endows them, especially black men, with an
appearance of power which seems to threaten patriarchal
relations and capitalist culture within the white
community
.
266
Historically, the record shows that situations which
Seem ^ all °W
’ inVlte
>
°r possibility of breach-
ing these taboos-integration, sexual crimes real or
imagined are often met by whites with resistance, repres-
sion, and violence. For, at bottom, we are talking not
about black sexuality, but about interracim sexuality,
about the feared meeting up of white culture with its own
projections. The circumstances of this meeting are often
a violent reception for the "return of the repressed."
It is essential to acknowledge the connections be-
tween these taboos and the persistence in the popular mind
-abetted by academic sociology-of the notion that Afro-
Americans are innately or culturally hindered from enjoying
a solid family life. when this attitude rests on biologi-
cal arguments, it is, as Jacquelynn Hall notes, an out-
growth of the "retrogressionist” view propounded during
the post-Civil War black scare (see chapter four, this
dissertation). More recent variations on this thesis con-
tinue the notion of degraded black family life but assess
the blame for the situation on hundreds of years of oppres-
sion, i • e
.
,
slave-holder practices of breaking up families,
or the transition to urban life and a consequent breakup
of social institutions in the black community under the
pressure of poverty and discrimination. E. Franklin
Frazier, in The Negro Family in the United States
,
pro-
pounded this latter view in the late 1930 's; more recently
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Daniel Mo y„i ha„ and Nathan Glazer (among others) have kept
thxs position alive with their analysis o f urban minori-
one might turn to various explanations of the
urban education crisis to see the persistence of this
attitude among educators, who blame the family Hfe of
minority students for poor student conduct or performance
in the classroom. 23 -
I certainly would not want to discount the tremen-
pressure of oppression and poverty upon black family
life. It is crucial, though, not to generalize the frag-
menting pressure of poverty to all black families, not to
see it as the norm, as well as to recognize the crucial
resilience of black family life in most settings, poor or
not. Thus in T B ck_Fam i ly__i n Slavery and FrPPjnm_
1Z50-1925, Herbert Gutman extensively documents the per-
sistence, indeed the flowering, of Afro-American family
sentiment and kinship and community ties through slavery
and the early period of migration to urban areas. 24
Patterns of family and community life which he uncovered
are both indebted to West African heritages and to the
strength of a distinct underclass population in adapting
to difficult conditions while preserving valued social ties
and traditions. In short, Gutman persuasively argues for
the direct role of Afro-Americans in creating and repro-
ducing their own family life, social space and ties, and
culture— a reservoir of support and meaning despite, in
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the face of, racial oppression. And, more contemporary
work by carol stack reveals doth the destructive impact of
poverty upon adult love relations for Afro-Americans, and
the strong kinship ties which nourish and cherish adult and
child.
But overwhelmingly negative views of black families
continue to exist. Intimately linked to ideologies of
black sensuality and criminality, they feed white resist-
ance to the expansion of black neighborhoods. Though
these white images clearly have little contact with the
reality of Afro-American personal, family, and community
life, they nonetheless help constitute and sustain real
practices of racial segregation and inequality—white
nat ionalism
.
Race Rela t ions, Nationalism,
and Legitimacy L
We are now at a point where I can tie together my
arguments about sexuality and race relations and connect
them with some clarity to a position on contemporary
legitimation problems.
Racial-sexual images are part of a community of
economic and cultural practices I have labeled as white
nationalism. I choose this label for several reasons.
First, it emphasizes the self-consciously racial character
of American economic and geographical expansion since
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g ish colonization. Second, it ties this development to
an intennationa! economic onder of which our domestic race
relations and economic development have always been a par-
ticular, and special, instance. Third the teJ-nira, rm emphasizes
the unity of economic, political, and social practices
which constitute racial super/subordination. Fourth, it
allows me to insist that a patriarchal sex/gender system is
an essential part of that unity. And fifth, it leads us
directly from social experience to the state, and to con-
clusions about the constraints and contradictions posed by
race relations for political legitimacy. The second and
fifth of these reasons are of particular concern in this
section
.
As I have argued, when core economies in the emerging
capitalist world system confronted underdeveloped regions,
familiar contrasts such as "civilization/savagery" emerged
within Enlightenment thought and popular ideology, carrying
a consciousness of national and racial superiority. The
racial character of American identity (to be a full person
m social and legal terms was to be white) was fully
established by 1700, with the transition of colonial self-
perceptions from "Christian" to "English" to "white."
This self-image depended on the relative permanence of an
enslaved African population and of continual successful
conflict over land with Native Americans. When one in-
cludes the transformation of slavery into peonage, both
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factors persisted until the late 1890
-s. and peonage muoh
longer. As described in chapter four, during this long
Period of nation-building and expansion, costing images
of the process held by northern labor, farmers, and indus-
try on the one hand, and southern planters and small
farmers on the other shared a common ground: denial of
social equality to blacks (with its implication of mis-
cegenation), limiting the range of social variation to
complete racial subordination or complete exclusion. If
any national consensus on values existed, this was part of
it. The national, cross-class character of these beliefs
ensured that Afro-Americans would confront them in their
migration to northern and urban areas— in housing, for
instance— in their own transition from rural and peasant
folk to working class.
Yet the state endorsement of housing segregation
which I have previously described emerged at the begin-
ning of a change in state racial policy and in the white
nationalism which it responded to, especially at the na-
tional level. These changes were possible in a period of
highly contradictory legitimation requirements with re-
spect to race, contradictions literally embodied in the
Roosevelt electoral coalition of white native and ethnic
workers, PMC reformers, the "solid South," and Afro-
Americans. The sources of this change were complex, long-
term, and cannot be adequately represented in this
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SS6rt clt io n
.
^ Th©v 1 nnlurlc i.y i c ude, however, the demographic
and subsequent electoral pressure of black urban migration
after 1900, itself encouraged by war jobs, Southern repres-
sion, and the increasing capitalization of Southern agricul-
ture. They also include a set of threats from the left
which helped force corporate liberal planners, politicians,
and PMC reformers to. embrace, and attempt to channel, black
struggles. Among these were Depression-era labor and black
community organizing by black and white leftists, the left
and nationalist tendencies within the black movement which
helped "moderate" groups look respectable, and the range of
inspiration which post-WW II colonial liberation movements
provided for black struggles in this country. And finally.
the sources of change include an evolving climate of racial
consciousness indebted to the paternalistic, social-welfare
consciousness of PMC reformers.
This PMC racial consciousness, emerging after roughly
1900, challenged the extreme biological racism popularized
by opponents of Reconstruction and by defenders of lynch-
ing. It initially viewed Afro-Americans as child-like,
amiable, and genetically inferior yet capable of cultural
improvement. In accord with the PMC Weltanschauung
, it
offered a future of inegalitarian harmony and cooperation
--of the races. This consciousness informed such reform
groups as the white founded and financed NAACP
,
the Cam-
paign for Inter-Racial Co-operation and Harmony, and the
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Southern Women's Campaign Against Lynching. Initially
favoring black
"improvement” within segregated institu-
tions, this opinion gradually shifted under black and left
pressure to one which could regard segregation as an unjust
“ni^ntion, and one whlch CQUld therefore ^
actual integration. 27 The history of racial caste theory,
I would argue, expresses just such a development.
As these factors opened wedges in the historical
alliance of white nationalism, the state was forced in-
creasingly into contradictory positions: between, at
least initially, Southern and Northern power blocs, between
national and state levels of government, and between the
need on the one hand to calm the disorder of non-electoral
struggles through concessions, and on the other the need to
respect still-powerful white nationalist forces. The re-
appearance of black nationalism, after roughly I960, played
a key role in shaping these tensions.
Black nationalism re-emerged as a force in Afro-
American politics (as it had earlier in the century) as one
alternative appraisal to the community of interest which I
have described as white nationalism. 28 in classic nation-
alist fashion, black power advocates sought to mobilize a
people short on politic-economic resources around a kind
of romantic populism: black history and traditions, black-
ness as an aesthetic standard, and so on. While the
articulation of black pride came to suffuse the entire
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spectrum of black struggle, it informed separatlst
ln PartlCUlar
- trough the media
,
many whites-inc ludlng
those previously sympathetic to civil rights-experienced
thus explicit black nationalism as a nightmare threat, andm one sense directly intended by advocates, as a materi-
alization of black manhood. The white backlash fed in part
on the dread of black male power immanent in the sexual
aspect of race itself.
^
In the post-WW II era, survey analysts uncovered
important distinctions made among working class whites in
particular, and among middle income whites to a somewhat
lesser extent, in their evaluation of the expansion of
federal government into daily life. These distinctions
have important bearing on the thesis that state interven-
tion in everyday life, a function of the state's role in
capitalism as "steering mechanism," is a primary source of
loss of meaning and thus of legitimacy problems. Whites
in the I960 's made important distinctions between federal
social-economic programs on the one hand, such as Medicare,
FHA, and Social Security, and civil rights legislation on
the other, such as fair employment practices, equal public
accommodations, school integration, and open housing
30laws. Wallace supporters made this distinction much
more sharply than other citizens, and were drawn by and
large from southern and northern working class Democrats.
^
Even on this score, as Samuel Lubell noted, the Wallace
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vote far underestimated support among whites for his well-
known opposition to integration: 32
Ieasu?e
e
ofthe
C
racIaT
!“ thS
f°
rth was not the
Sis?; : rll;
Finally, Lubell's analysis and first-hand investi-
gating showed that Wallace drew some of his strongest vocal
and electoral support in the north from white working class
neighborhoods that bordered on expanding Afro-American
neighborhoods. I would argue that what he most astutely,
and other survey analysts somewhat less deeply, uncovered
were the fears and threats to a particular self-image of
white community, the sexual bases of which I have devel-
oped in this and the previous chapter. 33 Open housing and
hool integration in particular seem to have raised fears
among whites of eroding disciplines and order in their
community. The sexual bases of race relations which I
have elaborated were, and are, constitutive elements in
resistance to integration and thus in disaffection from
the state which was seen as promoting such policies. Sup-
port from the state for this community had always seemed
assured, and was an integral part of that self-image; now
the state had betrayed this common understanding. It
would be a serious oversight to miss the distinction made
by most whites during the 1960 's between racial reforms
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and other social programs with which they are too often
lumped. Social Security and Medicare were seen by most,
particularly working class, whites as supports for family
life, and earned by hard work at that. Racial reforms
like open housing and school integration were threats to
family life and neighborhood, and welfare concessions par-
ticularly were rewards for not working.
Both politicians and planners in corporate-state
policy institutions approved civil rights and welfare
legislation only in the face of increasing Afro-American
militance and social disorder in the ghettoes. This mili-
tance and disorder made reformers such as Martin Luther
King and the NAACP seem benign by comparison, and raised
the possibility that Afro-American discontent could not be
contained. The moderate reforms which militant black
power advocates help make necessary, I would argue, helped
satisfy the reformist consciousness of white liberals,
undercutting key support for further progress. 34 And
since 1970, the impact of some reforms—especially affirma-
tive action and school int egration--seems to have signifi-
cantly eroded abstract white middle class support for
integration, thus to have helped restore a certain amount
of white, cross-class unity against integration, and
therefore to have made it possible or necessary, in the
absence of black social disorder, for the state to retreat
on racial issues. In this retreat, the state has shored
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up one of the few areas of its legitimation problems that
is reasonably within political control-unlike, for in-
stance, economic planning. This retreat, I think, cannot
be fully understood without analyzing the sexual sources
of deep, intense, and widespread white resistance to
integration
.
Conclusion
My analysis indicates that racial turmoil in the
I960' s played a major role in state legitimacy problems of
that period, a larger and more independent role than that
attributed to it by behavioral, Marxist, and interpretive
theories of legitimacy. The state acted not simply as a
capitalist state, or as a liberal-democratic state, but
also as a state constrained by white sentiment. In this
situation of threatened and declining legitimacy, disaf-
fection among whites over integration and social upheaval
was inevitably shaped by the sexual racism I have elabor-
ated in this and the previous chapter. The state, in
effect, threatened to breach a major taboo and common
purpose of the dominant culture.
The conditions which fostered Afro-American social
struggle in the 1960's, the constituents and consequences
of white nationalism, remain largely intact, bubbling
through only occasionally into public acknowledgment.
Afro-Americans still overwhelmingly bear the burden of
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sharp, increasing income differentiais between themselves
and white Americans, along with disproportionately bad
housing, schools, and so on-consequences of the national-
ism which confines them by and large to reserve army,
under/unemployed status. The situation awaits only some
catalytic development to precipitate struggle again. For
as Cox insisted, race relations, unlike caste relations,
are inherently unstable, reflecting even in dormant times
a situation of suspended conflict, characterized by fear
and mutual distrust.
What are the possibilities for racial struggle and
related state policy? A few likely paths suggest them-
selves. As a general rule, state policy-making by cor-
porate political elites (overwhelmingly white and male)
will make symbolic or substantive concessions toward
subordinate population needs only under the duress of
social disorder or struggle, or its imminent threat.
State policy will continue to ignore the worsening plight
of Afro-Americans in the absence of such a situation.
Policy makers are constrained in any anticipatory or re-
sponse strategies by state fiscal problems, brought on by
an inflationary and slow-growing economy. If anything,
this constraint increases the possibility of repression
as the major policy for dealing with any upheavals.
Policy makers are equipped for this option, having sup-
plied urban police departments with a wide range of
278
hardware in the wake of 1960s turmoil (primarily through
the Law Enforcement Assistance Agency). Thus if urban
ghettoes move into another cycle of relatively unorganized
upheaval, the state may either actively repress disorder
?lthi„ ghettoes or allow disorder to run its course within
orders heavily defended by police and militia. I see
this as a probable, not simply possible, situation within
the short-term future, though not one which precludes
other possible developments.
Budgetary limitations do not completely preclude
symbolic and tactical commitments in state racial policy
designed to ward off or minimize disturbances. Summer
jobs programs aimed at Afro-American youth, the tinder and
spark of I960 's urban upheavals, are currently being ex-
panded, and may possibly be good for both public relations
and preventive purposes. Other programs that would make a
significant symbolic impact without much expenditure of
funds might include "sweat equity" rehabilitation of urban
tenements in a highly visible but not widespread program.
Various other self-help programs might be launched with a
maximum of fanfare and minimum of funding. Any of these,
though, run the risk of raising and then dashing expecta-
tions
.
Policy makers must take domestic racial politics
into account when considering future resource conflicts in
the third world. Has the Afro-American community been a
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constraint upon intervention in southern Africa, in addi-
tion to acknowledged Vietnam-related constraints in public
opinion? Did Angola policy in 1975-76 in fact take this
into account? How does racial strife within the military,
a problem of major proportions, affect both preparedness
’
and the prospects of intervention in African politics? Is
the disproportionate representation of Afro-Americans in
the military a constraint upon such interventions? Is
this a consideration in current design and introduction of
the military draft? Will resource conflicts within the
third world rekindle virulent white nationalism in the
U.S.? Will they push or encourage the state to trade upon
racism in increasingly troubled economic times? All of
these are serious and imminent questions.
These questions, and domestic race policy generally,
would be affected by the re-emergence of a movement for
racial equality or of a left-wing movement which seriously
promoted such a goal. Either development, or both, would
move the state away from the "low level" policy of neglect
and repression outlined above—away either to the right or
to the left. It is not impossible that sustained, organ-
ized pressure on the state could wrest significant racial
reforms. The price of such reforms to the state would be
major legitimacy problems among many white citizens and a
weakening of capital
' s position vis-a-vis the working
class, the second perhaps intensifying long-term economic
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problems. The difficulty of mounting such an organized
drive for reform would be the need to deal openly among
potential white support with the taboo element of race
Without such a campaign, organized racial reform
will encounter the same popular resistance that it did in
the 1960's. However, while such politics now show scat-
signs of emerging, they are not an immediate prospect.
This prospect is conditioned, both in left theory and
practice, by the intertwined and yet "independent” nature
of racial issues with respect to sexual and class considera-
tions. If my analysis is correct, then racial issues are
at once more independent and yet more deeply intertwined
with class and sexual liberation than is usually argued by
various theories of inequality. It suggests that, as Allen
and others have argued, 35 movements for racial justice must
have an independent status within left politics and yet be
an integral part of left strategy. (Feminists make a simi-
lar case for independent organizations.) This independent
basis is the requirement for constraining the ever-present
tendency of white reformers to subordinate racial reform
to other considerations, to see racial reform as the inevi-
table outcome of their own agenda, to see race relations
as a derivative phenomenon. I of course in a sense have
derived race relations from a confluence of patriarchy
and capitalism, but the conclusion of this derivation is
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the relatively independent status of race relations as
quasi-nationalist politics.
Thus a final and related possibility is the re-
ergence of militant and/or revolutionary black national-
ism as a widespread, organized force in Afro-American
communities. Depending on the strategies such a movement
employed, I would expect the state to respond with a com-
bination of repression and concessions. And, state re-
sponse could foreseeably be tipped toward substantive,
even structural, reform, if such movements were accompanied
by a strong left-wing presence in general. To restate,
however, while such politics show scattered signs of
emerging, they are not an immediate prospect.
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CHAPTER V I
COMPETING THEORIES OF LEGITIMACY:
review and conclusions
I ntroduction
In this dissertation I have appraised liberal,
Marxist, and hermeneutic theories of legitimacy, and have
drawn their insights into my own account of one major
legitimation dynamic, the connections between sexual racism
and state legitimacy. In counterposing these theories I
have focused on their concepts of social structure and
ideology, which offer some of the sharpest possible compari-
sons between them. And, I have tried to clarify the social-
epistemological commitments behind these differing
treatments of social structure and ideology.
From these points of view, Marxist and hermeneutic
theories of legitimacy improve in two ways on mainstream
liberal analyses. First, in different ways each alternative
brings to legitimation theory an appreciation of the inter-
woven and mutually constraining nature of social institu-
tions. They provide us, in a way the abstracting tendency
of liberal analysis does not, with insights into the struc-
tural interaction between economy, state, and culture which
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shapes the American state's legitimation problems. Second,
in its analysis of constitutive ideology, hermeneutic theory
Boes beyond mainstream liberal and Marxist epistemology by
perceiving the essentially normative and rule-governed
nature of social activity. In dolng so lt contributes to
legitimation theory vital connections between knowing the
social world, authority in the broadest sense, and social
identity. This epistemological potential brings out the
crucial expressive dimension of legitimacy, helping estab-
lish links between the erosion of cultural traditions so
prominent in capitalist development, and the questioning of
social authority, including that of the state. On the basis
of these contributions, James O'Connor's and Jurgen
Habermas' theories stand as successively more capable than
the liberal perspective they challenge.
This chapter will review the successive capabilities
of liberal, Marxist, and hermeneutic theories on these
terms, as well as the themes which I particularly bring to
this appraisal. These include first of all an explicit
conception of class structure, including the role of a
professional-managerial class (PMC). I find this structure,
and especially its PMC aspect, crucial for clarifying main-
stream political science's treatment of legitimacy and the
displacement of crisis tendencies into the state which
0 Connor and Habermas argue. Second, I rely on an explicit
account of gender socialization and patriarchy to fill out
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rny views on culture, social identity, and the structural
pressures to which the state is subject, I apply both of
these amendments, finally, along with the contributions of
the other theories I counterpose, to connections between
race and legitimacy which remain undeveloped in these
theories. I argue that by examining the sexual aspect of
race, we can perceive deep connections between the struc-
tures of capitalism and patriarchy, constitutive belief
systems and social identity, and the legitimacy of the New
Deal state.
Review of Themes
Chapter One. In chapter one, I traced the history of
legitimation analyses by the liberal mainstream of politi-
cal science. Liberal theories, going back to Hobbes, have
often embraced some form of scientific, or more broadly
positivist, epistemology. Yet up to about 1900, the main-
stream of liberal thought considered this commitment to
science consistent with addressing the normative questions
so central historically to social theory. John Stuart
Mill, for example, developed a theory of the state which
explicitly linked questions of human nature and individual
development to the analysis of political institutions and
political obligation. In this country, early political
scientists like Woodrow Wilson applied similar commitments
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to normative questions to their concrete studies of American
government After about 1900, though, the study of politics
began to move away from these questions and toward a view
which denied the meaningfulness of normative debate. I
argue that if we are to fully grasp the discipline’s current
toward legitimation, we must understand the social
meaning of the historical shift to scientism.
Liberal thought originally emerged in a context of
social revolution, a revolution propelled in part by changes
in social class relations which allowed and fostered new
productive techniques. In appraising the development of
these technologies, men like Francis Bacon became philoso-
phers of the new science they found in craftsmen's empirical
experimental tinkering. The empirical, mathematical, and
mechanical sensibilities of these new men of science influ-
enced liberal thought in profound ways. They helped infuse
the intellectual climate with a standard to be applied in
knowing not only nature, but also society, and a standard
by which we could not only know society, but also improve
it through the material progress it would inform. That is,
they helped shape a major claim of liberal thought, that
science might ameliorate or solve age-old social problems,
especially those rooted in material scarcity.
This claim of liberal ideology emerged in somewhat
altered form, and with renewed force, by the end of the 19th
century. As it had been originally, it was shaped in
289
complex ways by the develops of social class relations
and technology. In a series of struggles over roughly a
forty-year period (1880-1920), capital broke the craft
organization of production remaining inside many industries.
By seizing control over production itself, capital "freed"
the mental aspect of production, and science itself, as
forces in both the abstraction and degradation of labor and
in the expansion of production. This degradation and
abstraction of labor exacerbated the social problems of
poverty and unemployment endemic to capitalism, at the same
time that it helped to undermine the craft organization of
many working class communities.
In the context of this turmoil, occupations evolved
or emerged in the social division of labor concerned pri-
marily with planning and social control in production (i.e.,
engineers), and social control and reform outside produc-
tion (i.e., social workers, cultural workers, positions
related to advertising, lawyers). These occupations
developed largely under the pressure of capital's need to
intervene directly and continuously in the work process,
and increasingly in the everyday life of the working class
--raising the rate of exploitation, fostering attitudes
amenable to capitalist work requirements, socializing
immigrant labor, dealing with social disorder. The dominant
self-images of this emerging class, and the activities they
informed, were both accepting and critical of capitalism
—
290
in part because of pressure from the left, and in part
because of genuine revulsion from what appeared as the
"excesses” of capitalism. These self-images included the
task of bringing order and rationality to social life,
reforming capitalism and mediating the disputes between
capital and labor, and the application of scientific/
technical expertise to the surrounding world. These self-
images express the mediate position of these occupations
in the class structure, and are in effect modern statements
of the liberal vision I summarized above. This vision is
of a society improved and run by men of science and knowl-
edge, overcoming material scarcity and its attendant social
conflicts. Any account of the new science of politics
gestating in this period, or of its subsequent development
and content, would be radically incomplete without an
account of these visions, and without an account of the
roots of these scientific aspirations in the struggles of
the era.
Successive waves of the aspiring political science
profession articulated its claims to realism, precision,
and neutrality against traditional liberal (and radical)
theories of politics. But it was not until the late 1940's,
when corporate foundations funded the behavioral science
movement, that political scientists could successfully
dominate the study of politics. These foundations were
open to the professional claims of behavioralists in large
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part because of the success of applied science's social
control and productive roles in the work process. The
foundations had, for instance, already created and funded
new universities such as Rensselaer, and funded existing
universities, to supply the required basic
engineering manpower; they had also funded
research and
the development
of industrial sociology and various other managerially-
oriented sciences. The funding of behavioral political
studies in the late 1940's was a logical extension of these
management concerns to broader social and political issues,
especially in the context of Depression-era disorder and
the attractions of left-wing movements.
What the new profession of political science produced,
within the pressures of corporate funding, was a body of
political knowledge bearing the imprint of both corporate
concerns and the technocratic/managerial ideology so consti-
tutive of the PMC life-world. These imprints bear in turn,
though in a manner epistemologically unconscious of the
relation itself, corporate and PMC concerns with the ability
of subordinate populations to disrupt the social agenda of
elite groups. Peter Bachrach has aptly described these con-
cerns as a "revolt from the masses." The revised theory of
democracy produced by this revolt held, for instance, that
elites were the guardians of democratic values, that apathy
is functional for democracy, and so on.
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In order to reach such conclusions, the new science
of politics had first to do away with inherently normative
and politically suggestive terms such as class and state,
and then to reduce absolutely necessary concepts like power
and interest to highly behavioral/operational definitions.
These definitions created, in the revised theory of democ-
racy, a startling likeness to the social relations in pro-
duction resulting from capital’s seizure of the work process.
The great mass of people could only engage in the opera-
tional equivalent of democracy--pulling the voting lever-
while elites themselves possessed the values, ideas, and
technical expertise to manage the democratic state.
By assuming this behavioral stance, political science
could ratify a system which discarded older aspirations for
participation in decision making, or for an active citizen-
ry, as unsuited to industrial society—much as their
engineering counterparts like F. W. Taylor did with social
relationships in production. Yet, this was no conspiracy
on the part of political scientists. Rather, it was the
result of internally-woven class and epistemological pres-
sures to abstract the social world into routine and creative
labor, and as mental labor, to regard the body politic
objectively, much as an engineer regards a machine--or a
worker
.
Since roughly 1950, the dominant attitude in political
studies toward legitimacy (whether behavioral, or more
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generally positivist) has embodied these concerns. The
collective effort of this mainstream, represented by the
work of Almond and Verba, Lipset
,
and others, formulated a
major contradiction of the capitalist state: the need to
maintain its legit imac^hrough democratic forms whii P
i nsulating itself from actua l democratic pressure from
Yet the studies of value consen-
sus and electoral opinion which produced this equation of
legitimacy with social stability did not predict, despite
their scientific aspirations, the legitimation problems that
would confront the state after the mid-1960's. Why?
Self-identified as elites, having painted a picture of
the just and stable society, and epistemologically
unequipped to deal with either the logic of moral issues or
the interconnected structures of the political economy, the
mainstream was ill-positioned to anticipate and conceptual-
ize the growing problems of the welfare state. It suffered,
as John Schaar put it from a perspective somewhat different
from mine, from the blindness of the eye perceiving itself.
Treating legitimacy as a matter of mere belief about
authority, this mainstream could record but not clearly con-
ceptualize the expressive depth of a crisis in socially
constituted standards of right
. And by embracing welfare
state capitalism as tacit background, this mainstream could
not be fully aware of developing structural pressures
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either on the state, or on the cultural beliefewhich help
ground political authority.
As Marx said, when the wagon of history turns a
corner, the ideologists fall off. When the current period
of economic and legitimation crises emerged, political sci-
ence found that the "behavioral laws" it had been after had
somehow changed. Since the late 1960 's, opinion in the
discipline has increasingly characterized the limited demo-
cratic forms of welfare state pluralism, with their tacit
Keynesian background, as hindrances to effective social and
economic policy. Effective policy, especially effective
economic policy, is clearly a requirement for legitimation.
Yet, as is often grudgingly perceived, democratic forms
also seem crucial to legitimating state power. But faced
with a perceived trade-off between democracy and effective
policy
,
most political scientists not surprisingly give
greater weight to effectiveness. Much of the current debate
within the discipline over meeting the crisis through insti-
tutional change and innovation assumes this common ground.
There are two crucial points to be made about such
debates. First is that proponents of market techniques,
of investment coordination through a Reconstruction Finance
Corporation, of various Constitutional changes, all see
their solutions as simply a matter of will within prevail-
ing economic relations. They do not grasp how the truly
constrained and contradictory nature of our political
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economy will limit the effectiveness of these changes. The
second point is that rhetoric increasingly used by politi-
cians and academicians to justify calls for "reindustriali-
zat ion" carries with it strong proto-nationalist tones—
appeals to a threatened civilization of production, economi-
cally and militarily challenged in an unstable world in
which we must "modernize" to survive. These proto-
nationalist appeals seek to legitimate the re-grouping of
corporate power in a time of economic crisis, and in the
context of a retreat on the crucial legitimating processes
of democracy.
Chapter Two. James O'Connor's account of state fiscal
crisis moves significantly beyond liberal legitimation
theories by clarifying the extent to which the state is
structurally captive of capital's accumulation needs.
Properly amended, his analysis pushes us to realize the
constraints on new" market —incentive policies, and on in-
stitutional change confined to the state, in resolving the
state's legitimacy problems.
As O'Connor argues, the increasingly interwoven and
interdependent nature of our capitalist economy has required
the state to finance an array of capital's collective pro-
ductive and social control needs. That is, to a considerable
degree, the parameters of state spending are not simply a
matter of political choice, but rather of necessity—
a
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necessity beyond the conventional appreciation of the level
and categories of spending mandated by public law. No con-
stitutional amendment or "sunset" clause in any legislation
could appreciably offset this trend.
But as O'Connor points out, in responding to these
pressures to aid private accumulation the state must pre-
sent its actions as those of an independent
, public institu-
tion operating for the general welfare. This it can
generally do as long as the economy performs well. However,
in expanding, the economy requires increasing state spending
(reflecting growing interdependence) to support collective
productive needs and to control the surplus populations shed
by capitalist development. And, the increase in this spend-
ing has been exacerbated by an entrenched network of particu-
laristic corporate interests and by the decentralized,
overlapping, and uncoordinated branches and levels of the
U.S. state. One major result, as predicted by O'Connor, has
been the politicization of the budget around tax revolts and
around elite attacks on the state's "social wage." O'Connor
sees the unplanned nature of this accumulating spending as
a major cause of the stagflation which plagues the economy,
a situation threatening the state's legitimacy in two ways:
by undermining its claim to economic management
,
and by
contributing to a general fiscal politicization which
menaces the state's appearance as an independent, public
institution
.
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Yet amendments to 0’ Connor’s account are crucial. He
actually understates, in my opinion, the constraints on the
state as an economic manager. This shortcoming is related
to his perhaps unwitting embrace of what I call the liberal
Problematic of public power, a problematic which both ex-
presses and shapes his inadequate account of the class
structure. By assuming and even embroidering this perspec-
tive, he glosses over the crucial question of whether a
crisis of the state, even as he explains it, will necessarily
be a crisis of capitalist relations. Finally, he underesti-
mates other cultural constraints on the state through an
external view of ideology similar to that which handicaps
behavioral theories in explaining crises of belief. He thus
suffers nearly the mirror image of their problem: unable to
grasp the experience people have of structural change,
behavioral theories failed to predict the legitimation
crisis, while O'Connor encounters crucial problems explain-
ing the persistence of the social order in the face of the
crisis
.
O'Connor too readily accepts the Keynesian view that
the state can act as economic manager. He does this by
slighting the role of private financial centers in economic
management, and by overstating the positive impact and
capability of state economic policy. State spending, he
argues, is the prime determinant of investment and consump-
tion patterns in the economy, and the driving force behind
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capital's post-war expansion. In contrast, I would argue
that the growth of social spending in a capitalist economy
represents a bigger contradiction than O'Connor recognizes.
In the first place, the spending categories he outlines are
neither clearly productive or unproductive from the point
of view of capital; their essential ambiguity from this
point of view is itself a problem for understanding and con
trolling their impact. Moreover, while certain forms of
state spending may be necessary to production, their ambigu
ous status means that they are essentially a drain on the
total system's capital available for directly profitable
investment. Second, state spending is a risk because the
state policy is relatively vulnerable to pressures from
subordinate populations; these pressures do not have to
respect the dictates of profitable investment. In short,
I would bring out even more strongly than O'Connor does
the contradiction between the growing need for economic
planning and social spending, and the constraints on such
activity in a capitalist economy.
State policy options are also constrained by the
international political economy. I would argue even more
strongly than O'Connor does that the structural position
of the U.S. in this framework had a tremendous influence on
the economic surplus which the state could draw on. Policy
makers had options, which they do not now have given shifts
this framework, for directing spending at subordinatein
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populations in order to forestall or stabilize social dis-
order, and for pork-barrel type raiding of the state budget.
Appreciating this point would help make O'Connor more
sensitive to the potential contribution of nationalist
politics to the "solution" of economic and legitimation
crises, a potential overshadowed in his theory by the
state’s predicted economic managerial role in fostering a
social-industrial complex."
O’Connor's flawed view of the state's economic mana-
gerial role reflects his embrace of what I call the liberal
problematic of public power. This problematic cannot be
understood outside of the developing class relations which
have shaped it, class relations which O’Connor partially
obscures by dividing the economy into sectors. Even though
he goes further than liberal theories in clarifying the
structural economic constraints on state policy, if his
view entered widely into public debate it would insuffi-
ciently challenge a widespread public resignation about
private power relations, would in fact encourage more
blame of the state than is warranted, and would suggest
incorrectly
,
that reform of the state is the primary way of
solving the current crisis.
Liberalism's focus on public power, as well as the
very institutional distinction between state and production,
bear the imprint of early bourgeois struggles against the
entrenched aristocracy of feudal and mercantile states.
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With this institutional distinction, state power becomes
relatively more visible than class power in production in
large part because the taxes which the state levies are so
transparently enacted and enforced, and appear to be matters
of convention. In contrast, the economic surplus is no
longer extracted as transparently as it was under feudal
social relations. Exploitation is mystified through the
labor market's ideology of equal exchange, and class rela-
tions appear not as conventional or political in comparison
to the state, but as natural. O’Connor cannot make this
point, not simply because he has no labor theory of value,
but also because he does not focus on productive relations
per se. The tax revolts he so correctly predicted, as well
as their political limitations, are in part conditioned by
this relative visibility.
A complete account of the American form of this
liberal problematic would have to address the real and
ideological impact of the vast proprietary class of the
early 19th century. In this dissertation, I have focused
on the relation of the PMC to this ideology. Since the
1930' s, ideologies of the managerial revolution have vastly
inflated the power and latitude of PMC occupations. This
inflation, generalized by media and educational systems,
has fed into a real and complex set of PMC—working class
relations, relations suffused with a "mixture of deference
and hostility on the part of the working class, and
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contempt and paternalism on the part of the PMC." 1 The
managerial activities of this class in production may gen-
erate resentments on the part of workers, but such resent-
ments do not often issue in a political challenge to these
productive relations themselves. Rather, they spill over
into public politics—much more clearly the arena of con-
vention, will, responsibility, and blame. These relations
and images of the PMC influence dominant public images of
the welfare state— as agent of social justice, as economic
manager, as unwelcome meddler.
In particular, PMC actors (through foundations and
interest groups) visibly influence the definition of politi-
cal issues which, when embodied in state policy, often
impinge directly and disproportionately on working class
life. Middle class activists have tended to define pollu-
tion at the work place out of public debate; and, they have
until recently neglected to consult, or to propose protec-
tion for, workers who would be dislocated by effective
environmental regulation. Or, as far back as the mid-
1960' s, early New Right ideologists pointed out the class
hostilities wrapped up in working class resistance to
integration: resentments of "limousine liberals" and
"pointy-headed bureaucrats" who supported integration, but
who could personally opt out of it.
Thus, both the visibility of and frustration with
the growth of the state are generally compounded by the
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reformist /managerial claims of PMC ideology and activity.
In particular, the managerial stance not only informed
state economic policy, but invited blame on the state for
the failure of this "management"
--ideologically over-
determining the legitimation problems rooted in the struc-
tural constraints on capitalist economic planning. In the
problematic of public power, PMC occupations play an essen-
tial role in reproducing the social order through the con-
venient lightning rod they make for the ruling class itself.
They facilitate, through political activity and self-image,
the displacement into the state of conflicts deeply indebted
to class relations in production. But like their position
in the class structure, they play a highly ambivalent role
in this process: helping create political problems (resent-
ment toward the state) even as they deflect from the deeper
property relations which shape them.
Chapter Three
. Within a Marxist framework, we can go this
far in grasping the rootedness of legitimating ideology in
social (class) relations. But there is still some distance
to go in understanding the belief-suffused experience we all
have of social relations, and in applying this understanding
both to internal connections between authority and social
identity and to the tenacity and vulnerability of various
beliefs which affect state legitimation. In the Marxist
tradition, recent works developing Gramsci's notion of
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hegemony have started to address these issues; Raymond
Williams, in fact, has quite eloquently and fruitfully
explored them. But it was the hermeneutic tradition in
Philosophy which in earliest, clearest, and most explicit
fashion laid out what was at stake in the internal link of
beliefs to activity.
I have argued that it is the task of social study, and
not only art or literature, to convey the expressive dimen-
sion of human experience. To assume, on the contrary, a
stance which necessarily or overwhelmingly objectifies
social relations, however well intended, is to participate
in the dynamic which divests the modern social world of
meaning. For, the scientific world view has not confined
itself to the debunking of mystical purposes in the cosmos.
Rather, shaped by and influencing the power relations in
which they are situated, applied natural and social science
have helped divest many social activities of purposes
internal to themselves—especially for subordinate popula-
tions. That is, science as a facet of domination has helped
destroy the expressive meanings embodied in everyday life
by degrading the human relations which foster the creation
of this meaning—reducing the number of those who can
cooperate in shaping their own activity, as well as the
opportunities to do so.
The obvious example of this is contemporary work
life. With the dichotomizat ion of mental and manual labor
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and the commodification of science, the vast majority of
people must (today) engage in abstracted, repetitive, and
intense work processes beyond their control. Robbed of the
opportunity to shape their labor and products according to
their own purposes, robbed even of the opportunities to
interact in a human way at work, they give meaning to and
legitimate this bondage through external reasoning; work
has little if any meaning on its own. Instead, most work
in order to live a human life outside of work: they work
to sacri f ice for families and children, and project a
better future through such sacrifice in part because work
and its wages cannot justify the present.
Hermeneutics can clarify the place of such experience
in legitimation dynamics through a normative "logic" not
available to most liberal and Marxist theories. In the
first place, it reveals how depth grammar of our language
establishes a pr ima facie connection between human wants
and purposes and the normative appraisal of "good." Be-
cause human activity is in part constituted by rules which
embody purposes and wants, our social relationships are
essentially normative and expressive
. Rules are also gen-
erally normative in that they establish correct and incor-
rect ways of acting; they are social authority.
Because of these qualities of rule-informed activity,
there are important internal connections between how we
know at a practical level to engage in the institutions of
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our culture, our exeressj^exEerience and social identity
within the institutions of that culture, and the authority
which that culture has over us. To cast doubt upon, or to
render increasingly difficult, contradictory, or utopian
the range of purposes that form the expressive dimension of
these institutions would be to undermine their authority.
That is, a crisis of authority, whether political or
more broadly social, can be at one level an expressive
crisis of social identity. Thus social change which renders
a set of practices untenable— the impact of capitalist
development on English hand weavers, as E. P. Thompson
describes—can be experienced as a qualitative loss of
self, even if material gain accompanies the change. Or,
a process which led one to reject or re-evaluate the aspi-
ration, say, of social mobility—because it undermines the
solidarity of community or family life, as some interviewees
in The Hidden Injuries of Class came to believe—would be
at some level a rejection or re-evaluation of the self.
One would rightly expect such loss, questioning, or rejec-
tion to be a painful, troubling experience, and perhaps for
many, a source of resistance to social change (or social
critics) as such.
Hermeneutics helps us appreciate the internal web of
purposes, wants, meanings in a culture, and so can go some
distance in clarifying the chain of displacement or effect
when an area of social life undergoes this divestiture of
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meaning. For instance, with capital’s
process and the virtual disappearance
seizure of the work
of the left between
1920 and 1932, the range of eulturally-available motiva-
tions to sustain blue-collar work became qualitatively more
privatized. The possibility of individual mobility for
one's children could appeal to a range of families where
class mobility was no longer on the agenda, where craft
work was no longer a major force in working class communi-
ties, and where the expansion of professional occupations
based on the expropriation of working class skills provided
a real but limited outlet. For some, a consumerist frame -
——
might make sense of a society in which working class
families and communities— in part through demands on time,
destruction of skills, competition from capital—were in-
creasingly less able to organize the production of basic
foodstuffs, community services, and culture. This frame-
work could also claim to "solve" problems associated with
the degradation of work-life and community: products to
sustain youth in a culture where speed-ups at work and in
the family required vitality, products which offered an
outlet for the mechanical skills increasingly degraded in
production, or a sense of individual power to compete with
the periodic appeals of cooperative power (the auto);
products like radio, movies and the auto which offered the
possibility of escape.
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Here, though, hermeneutics necessarily draws upon
(often) tacit notions of power relations and structural
change to situate the shift in purposes and meanings. For
instance, the instrumental and structural causes of the
destruction of mass transport are an essential part of the
privatization of purposes around the auto. Thus a theory
of legitimation requires not only a sensitive grasp of
culture, but also of the pressures upon cultural meanings,
pressures originating in relations of domination, and in
the array of impinging yet distinct and unevenly developing
institutions of American society. O'Connor's account of
tax revolts, for instance, could be deepened by relating
increased taxes (and their relative visibility) to pres-
sures upon the aspirations and motivations of everyday life.
Jurgen Habermas' Legitimation Crisis is a step for-
ward in grasping these systemic changes. He traces a dis-
ruption of the traditional meanings essential for
constituting capitalist institutions to increasing, eco-
nomically originated pressures upon the state. In late
capitalism, he argues, the general replacement of market
mechanisms with attempts at corporate planning have en-
tailed increasing state intervention in the socializing
institutions of society (family, educational system). This
intervention proceeds through a form of technical ration-
ality, bureaucracy, which is disruptive of and incommen-
surate with the essentially moral rationality of cultural
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institutions. Writing in 1973, he also argues a continuing
erosion of pre-bourgeois world-views-religions-that have
tacitly strengthened capitalism by addressing the crucial
existential questions bourgeois individualism cannot even
ask: death, guilt, sickness; reconciliation with nature;
relations of solidarity; collective needs and interests.
According to Habermas, this ’’tale of two reasons” has
politicized unreflectively embraced practices in education
and family life, leading different groups to question the
authority relations embedded in these practices (gender
relations, parental authority, the education profession),
and impinging on these practices (the state’s bureaucratic
interference). But this politicization will not neces-
sarily result in new cultural patterns supportive of late
capitalism, he argues. For normative argument, once begun,
follows a process di st inc
t
from the instrumental ration-
ality embedded in state and economic institutions; more-
over, normative argument per se presupposes that we could,
through the giving of reasons, reach consensus on a pro-
posed norm. Habermas sees this presumption of normative
argument as an epistemic pressure operating in periods of
legitimation crisis; it is a presumption based on an ideal
of undominated discourse, an ideal "freed” in times of
structural crisis to exert a forward-looking, developmental
force. The ideal itself amounts to a procedure for arriv-
ing at an uncoerced consensus (on social purposes, norms,
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authority), equivalent for all practical purposes with
moral truth itself
--an ideal of participatory, democratic
discourse and the social relations which would sustain that
discourse. Largely for this reason, he argues, the erosion
of tradition is a one-way process. Once the traditional
meanings which enter into and legitimate capitalist social
relations have entere.d the realm of consciousness and de-
bate, they cannot be reconstituted in their old patterns.
Habermas argues, therefore, for a particular version of
historical teleology (of social systems) based largely on
his analysis of teleological meaning (human purposes) at
the level of everyday life.
Habermas’ treatment of constitutive ideology and
social identity helps us deepen our understanding of public
disaffection from the state, which is widely seen as a
meddling, bureaucratic threat to private life. He paints
a persuasive picture of a state undermining the very basis
of its own authority
—
generalized acquiescence in a context
of economic expansion—simply by pursuing its general mis-
sion of rationalizing the social and economic conditions of
accumulation. Its expanded activities, indeed, call for
increased legitimation at a time when those activities
help undermine legitimation processes themselves. That is,
Habermas goes beyond other theories of legitimation I have
examined by linking experiential crises of social identity
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to the expanding and uncoordinated domination of political-
economic structures.
However, since Habermas imports O'Connor wholesale
into his theory, he is subject to the same criticisms I
made against O’Connor with regard to class structure, state-
managed capitalism, and the international political economy.
Like O'Connor, Habermas' problems in these areas may reveal
a debt to the liberal problematic of public power. It par-
ticularly affects his argument that the state will be a
target of dissatisfaction over its attempts to "plan" cul-
ture for the benefit of accumulation.
According to Habermas, the state falls prey to this
blame because its cultural intervention, as a clear exercise
of power, must be legitimated. This need for legitimation
disrupts the pattern of civil privatism, or generalized
acquiescence to state activity. Yet capitalist investment
decisions and consumption management contribute heavily,
though less "visibly," to cultural change; in fact they
contribute heavily to frustrations which are then aimed at
the state
. Thus not just structural constraints upon the
state to try to "manage" capitalism, but also the relative
visibility of state compared to private power, play a cru-
cial role in the displacement of crisis into the state
which O'Connor and Habermas argue. This visibility, ideo-
logically conditioned, is something they both partly assume
and find no need to explain. Whatever the source of
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cultural disruption, Habermas is correct that it could lead
not only to a state crisis but also to a crisis of capital-
ist relations. But if Habermas clarified the direct role
of corporate power in this disruption, and his theory
entered widely into public discourse, it would challenge
the ideological detours which limit the questioning of
class relations.
The teleological thrust of his argument also raises
problems. I would concede the epistemic pressure toward
equality which he describes, but temper it with an account
of identity-based resistance to criticism and change. For
this reason, social practices and their internal relations
of domination may change in form but not necessarily evolve
;
elites and reactionary movements can appeal to the emotional
roots of such practices. This possibility, in part, is
essential to the potential for the reactionary nationalisms
which, though he is clearly sensitive to them, Habermas
largely ignores in his crisis analysis.
The tenacious quality of social identity can be seen
m the gender roles and patriarchal relations which Habermas
does not detail in his account of culture. As a system of
gender inequality, patriarchy has its roots in complexly
interwoven sexual property relations and social identity.
Though it varies significantly by class and ethnic group
in our country, patriarchal relations in general embody a
distinction between public and private worlds in which
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women prlmary roles are defined ±n^ Qf the
world of family, kinship, and mothering. Men, on the other
hand, participate in both spheres of social life with recog-
nized prerogatives in each sphere. As children, as em-
bodied beings, are socialized into gender roles, they enter
a social system of capitalist patriarchy in which sensual
repression for both men and women serves the needs of in-
tense production, and in which relatively greater sensual
repression for women helps to define and reproduce patri-
archy. This inequality relates not only to a double
standard for sexual activity, but also to male and community
rights" in women’s activity that women do not have equally
in themselves or in men.
This system of property rests in large part on the
fact that mothering in our society is primarily a female
responsibility—not simply bearing, but raising children.
This equation of gender and mothering is an essential
moment in the reproduction of patriarchy, as I have argued
with Chodorow and Rubin, for it means that girl and boy
children through asymmetrical processes in learning their
heterosexuality, and that women as mothers are symbolic
objects of exchange— "cultural property"—during the learn-
ing of heterosexuality. The asymmetries and power rela-
tions of the current gender system foster important
vulnerabilities for many people around heterosexual sensual
and sexual relations. Men and women tend to develop
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differing, gender related combinations of affective and
erotic capacities and expectations, deeply complicating,
even frustrating, intimate relations. Evolving ideals of
virile men and sensuous women, indebted to patriarchy, may
add burdens of ’’performance" to the sensitive process of
developing and sustaining intimacy. These and other areas
of vulnerability are
.compounded, manipulated, by the deploy-
ment of sexuality in consumer ideology. They are also sus-
tained, perhaps intensified, by taboos which may hinder or
prohibit the discussion necessary for reducing this
vulnerability; these taboos affect both men and women, and
especially in Anglo cultures discourage male openness about
emot ions
.
Introducing such considerations will deepen but
necessarily complicate the perception of social identity
which hermeneutics and Habermas provide. Moreover, in
accepting the idea of a sex/gender system, as well as an
account of inequality in that system, we are under real
pressure to rethink the constraints under which economic
and political elites operate. Personally implicated, so to
speak, in that system, they are susceptible to politics of
family life and sexuality that speak both to the eroding
power of capitalist development and to the tenacity of
tradition
.
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Chapters Four and_Five, In reaching this conclusion, my
dissertation moves from an appraisal of competing legitima-
tion theories to a more concrete application of the perspec-
tive I have worked out through this appraisal. I argue that
American race relations are an area in which we can perceive
deep connections between social identity, the structures of
capitalism and patriarchy, and the political system of the
New Deal state. These are connections which are largely
unavailable to us through received liberal, Marxist, and
hermeneutic theories—though each of the theories I have
examined makes contributions to my analysis.
My basic argument is that in the dominant culture,
interwoven dynamics deeply indebted to patriarchal and
capitalist relations foster a projection of sensuality onto
non-white peoples, interpret this projection as a threat to
white family life, and encourage a sense of vulnerability
to this threat. These projections are a central element in
such important cultural themes as the contrast between
civilization and barbarism, and the beast or animal element
in human nature. The essential capitalist sources of these
projections have been the historical need, varying in char-
acter by class position, to channel human nature in the
service of disciplined, intense production, and the pro-
gressive degradation of manual labor (that is, of physical
qualities) in the context of its abstraction from mental
labor. The patriarchal context of emerging capitalism
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helped answer for our culture the "question" of what facet
of social life to channel in the pursuit of methodical pro-
duction: the sensual, physical qualities most completely
identified with women. These capitalist and patriarchal
factors, in a sense, rest upon a "base level" of sexual
repression involved in the establishment of heterosexual
norms, incest taboos,, and other rules restricting sexual
partners. In sum
,
capitalist patriarchy either establishes
or intensifies important physical/sexual connections between
the domination of inner and outer nature, and fosters the
projection of this sensuality onto Afro-Americans.
These projections establish asymmetrical sexual-racial
taboos which speak to white ambivalence about "undisci-
plined” lifestyles and those who seem to embody them; black
"sexuality" is not only an object of fear, but an object of
fantasy and attraction for men and women. These taboos are
asymmetrical by virtue of the sexual property relations
which patriarchal gender socialization helps establish at
the level of the personality. Thus black people appear not
only as threats because of the generalized sexuality they
represent; black males in particular appear as superior
sexual competitors and threats to white males. Yet sexual-
racial taboos are not mere reflexes of patriarchal and
capitalist structures. They enter into and help constitute
the social distance and hierarchy of racial segregation and
subordination, establishing boundaries that have repeatedly
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been tested by an interracial sexuality fraught with con-
flict and exploitation.
In short, pressures toward racism are inherent at
the deepest level of the social identities which individuals
form in capitalist patriarchy. In the history of our race
relations, they ground consistent ideologies of and fasci-
nations with supposedly degraded black family life, with
miscegenation and interracial sexuality, and with supposed
black sexual cr iminality--prost itut ion and rape. Sexual
projections, and especially patriarchal mores, have grounded
the reproduction "within" the working class itself of racial
ideologies and practices. Historically, for instance, the
refusal of craft unions to admit black men to full member-
ship must be seen in this light. These unions often played
a large role in organizing the social life of their commu-
nities, and guarded access to economic skills in the con-
text of fraternal rituals emphasizing equality. The denial
of black male membership, save in segregated locals, not
only preserved economic privilege, but also denied a fra-
ternal equality that would tacitly sanction interracial
sexuality
.
Sexual projection, and the patriarchal mores widely
but varyingly shared across class, have also grounded the
frequent and often successful appeals to racial solidarity
made across the class structure. I have argued that this
was true in the proto-racial Nativist movement of the
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period 1835-1855, where sexual themes provided a common
ground between native workers in economic competition with
immigrants, and middle class reformers with no direct
interest in cheap labor who saw Catholic immigrants as an
undisciplined, licentious group. Sexual projection, and
especially the threat of black male sexuality, symbolized
both in post-bellum Southern communities and later in
Northern urban centers the encroachment of the entire black
community upon the position of the white community. In
situations where appeal to these projections was clearly
manipulatory justifications for lynching, Northern news-
paper stories fanning working class racism against newly-
arrived black workers— it is significant, I think, that
the appeals were made on the basis of beliefs shared across
the class structure. These appeals are a distinguishing
mark of the racial nationalisms which especially mark our
domestic history, nationalisms internally related to the
international rivalries which have so often restrained
class politics in modern European societies.
Nationalism generally must be understood as a con-
stellation of myths and traditions akin to nostalgic
populism, in which members of various social classes ally,
making claims upon each other that emphasize their cultural
solidarity in the face of competing cultures. This popu-
lism is grounded in a world structure of combined and
uneven economic development, and serves to mobilize support
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for politics! economic development in the face of competi-
tion or domination in this structure. Widely but not
completely shared across class, sexual practices and patri-
archal arrangements also seem to ground the cultural claims
made across the class structure that stems from production.
This source seems crucial to the racial definitions of
threat or competition so common to nationalist conscious-
ness, definitions unusually prevalent in domestic U.S.
history
.
Sexual projections and mores also play a clear role
m struggles over housing integration in both working and
middle class communities, though by virtue of most Afro-
Americans' class, these struggles (and the school integra-
tion struggles they help inform) have been concentrated in
working class neighborhoods. Housing conflict is an impor-
tant area to consider because of the focus it provides for
the economic, sexual, and ideational aspects of legitima-
tion. In the first place, good housing in capitalism is
scarce: building housing requires significant capital, and
housing production—especially low income housing— is gen-
erally a less profitable investment than others for those
who have the capital—banks and builders. This scarcity
underwrites a struggle for good housing in the working
class, and racial/ethnic animosities definitely have this
material component. Yet homes in our culture also provide
a locus of sexuality, socialization, and patriarchal
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property relations, as well as an important symbol of major
cultural themes: the cult of domesticity, and the family
as refuge. In helping to constitute housing segregation,
sexual-racial taboos keep at a distance those who seemingly
negate or threaten that which is gathered in the meaning of
the "home .
"
These interwoven economic, sexual, and cultural
motives for segregation have historically been traded upon
by the constellation of interests which dominate urban hous-
ing production and rentals: banks, builders, real estate
agents, and landlords. These interests helped to develop,
and heavily profited from, the post-1900 residential segre-
gation which whites were culturally inclined to, even as
the housing production these interests underfunded created
the material conditions for shelter competition within the
working class. When the housing market collapsed in the
Great Depression, the state helped underwrite mortgaging
and low-income housing in order to forestall class conflict
around this basic material need. In doing so, state policy
sanctioned and promoted segregation as a condition of its
legitimacy, both to the white public and to the housing
interests which found state funding and segregation so
profitable. In this policy, I would argue, as well as in
the effects of its later symbolic reversal, we can see an
intimate connection between legitimation and social iden-
tity. And in this policy, I would argue, the state
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responded to and represented an aggregation of popular and
elite interests best conceptualized as white nationalism.
Yet these housing policies emerged at the beginning
of a change in state racial policy and in the white nation-
alism it responded to, especially at the national level.
These changes were possible in a period of highly contra-
dictory legitimation requirements with respect to race,
contradictions literally embodied in the Roosevelt electoral
coalition oi white native and ethnic workers, PMC reformers,
the "solid South," and Afro-Americans. The sources of this
change were complex, long term, and cannot be adequately
represented in this dissertation. They include, however,
the demographic and subsequent electoral pressure of black
urban migration after 1900, itself encouraged by war jobs,
Southern repression, and the increasing capitalization of
Southern agriculture. They also include a set of threats
from the left which helped force corporate liberal planners,
politicians, and PMC reformers to embrace, and attempt to
channel, black struggles. Among these were Depression-era
labor and black community organizing by black and white
leftists, the left and nationalist tendencies within the
black movement which helped "moderate" groups look respect-
able, and the range of inspiration which post-WW II colo-
nial liberation movements provided for black struggles in
this country. And finally, the sources of change include
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an evolving climate of racial consciousness indebted to the
paternalistic, social-welfare consciousness of PMC reformers
This PMC racial consciousness, emerging after roughly
1900, challenged the extreme biological racism popularized
by opponents of Reconstruction and by defenders of lynching.
It initially viewed Afro-Americans as child-like, amiable,
and genetically inferior yet capable of cultural improve-
ment. In accord with the PMC Weltanschauung
, it offered a
future of inegalitarian harmony and cooperation—of the
races. This consciousness informed such reform groups as
the white founded and financed NAACP
,
the Campaign for
Inter-Racial Co-operation and Harmony, and the Southern
Women's Campaign Against Lynching. Initially favoring
black "improvement" within segregated institutions, this
opinion gradually shifted under black and left pressure to
one which could regard segregation as an unjust convention
,
and one which could therefore conceive of actual integra-
tion. The history of racial caste theory, I would argue,
expresses just such a development.
As these factors opened wedges in the historical
alliance of white nationalism, the state was forced in-
creasingly into contradictory positions: between, at
least initially, Southern and Northern power blocs, between
national and state levels of government, and between the
need on the one hand to calm the disorder of non-electoral
struggles through concessions, and on the other the need
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to respect still-powerful white nationalist forces. The
re-appearance of black nationalism, after roughly I960,
played a key role in shaping these tensions.
In classic nationalist fashion, black power advocates
sought to mobilize a people short on other economic and
political resources around a kind of romantic populism:
black history and traditions, blackness as an aesthetic
standard, and so on. While the articulation of black pride
came to suffuse the entire spectrum of black struggle, it
informed separatist politics in particular. Through the
media, many whit es--including those previously sympathetic
to civil rights—experienced this explicit black nationalism
as a nightmare threat, and in one sense directly intended
by advocates, as a materialization of black manhood. The
white backlash fed in part on the dread of black male power
immanent in the sexual aspect of race itself.
The moderate reforms which militant black power advo-
cates help make necessary, I would argue, helped satisfy
the reformist consciousness of white liberals, undercutting
key support for further progress. And since 1970, the im-
pact of some reforms—especially affirmative action and
school integration—seems to have significantly eroded
abstract white middle class support for integration, thus
to have helped restore a certain amount of white, cross-
class unity against integration, and therefore to have made
it possible or necessary, in the absence of black social
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disorder, for the state to retreat on racial issues. In
this retreat, the state has shored up one of the few areas
of its legitimation problems that is reasonably within
political cont rol--unlike
,
for instance, economic planning.
This retreat, I think, cannot be fully understood without
analyzing the sexual sources of deep, intense, and wide-
spread white resistance to integration.
Conclusions
My conclusions stand in five areas. The first con-
cerns the relative merit, on their own terms, of liberal,
Marxist, and hermeneutic theories of legitimacy. The second
covers the need for a concept of a PMC in American politi-
cal analysis. The third concerns the problematic of public
power. The fourth embraces some of the implications of my
work on sexual racism. And the fifth covers more general,
but quite important, thoughts about the political trends
which my analysis clarifies.
One. Liberal analyses of legitimacy, O'Connor's theory, and
Habermas' theory are successively more capable accounts of
legitimation. Mainstream political science's analysis is
limited by epistemological and social commitments which
shape its status as a legitimating ideology for the social
order. Shaped by positivist understandings, the mainstream
understands only tacitly the essentially rule-governed and
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expressive nature of human act ivity--features which inter-
nally link human beliefs and purposes, social identity, and
the authority of social institutions and practices. Shaped
by bourgeois understandings, the mainstream cannot ade-
quately formulate or understand the economic pressures under
which the state operates. O'Connor improves our grasp of
these pressures, but cannot adequately illuminate the
experiential crisis of belief inherent in legitimation
problems. Habermas, though, employs sophisticated notions
of both structural pressures and constitutive belief systems
to describe the crisis of the state. If we regard these
three theories on their own terms, they stand in this order
of capability. But their particular contributions can also
be improved by an external critique summarized by my con-
clusions in the next four areas.
Two. Contemporary American social theory, including the
topic of legitimation, requires some concept of a
professional-managerial middle class. While the dimensions
of this concept are debatable, the need for it is clear.
This concept adds needed subtlety to a class analysis of
politics, a subtlety not available when we apply an ab-
stract, two-class model of capitalist development to recent
historical situations. Such a concept only makes explicit
the sociological reality which many Marxist analyses con-
sistently but tacitly draw upon.
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In this dissertation, the PMC concept first of all
helps clarity the managerial and scientific commitments of
the dominant paradigms in post-WW II political science,
xhese legitimating ideologies themselves express, secondly,
the broader mediation of capitalist domination through
political and ideological institutions in which a profes-
sional elite plays a subordinate but active role. Thirdly,
the PMC concept also sheds light on the displacement of
crisis tendencies into the state posited by O'Connor and
Habermas. It helps us understand the relative visibility
and vulnerability of public power by clarifying the social
relations which ground reformist and managerial political
aspirations, and by clarifying a visible and mediate source
of capital and state's impact on culture. And finally,
connections between race and legitimation clearly show the
effect of the PMC presence: this class was important in
the breakdown and recent reconstruction of the class alli-
ance of white nationalism. The state disregarded the pur-
poses of this alliance at the cost of considerable
legitimation problems among the white public.
Three . Generalized in our culture, the liberal problematic
which focuses on the exercise of public power enters and
disables O'Connor's, and to a lesser extent Habermas',
theories of legitimation. Increasingly involved in
underwriting the economic, social, and political needs of
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corporate capital, the welfare state has been surrounded by
an ideology informing its attempts at economic and social
management, and overstating its managerial capacities by
mystifying its structural dependence on the corporate
economy. O'Connor and Habermas go an appreciable yet in-
sufficient distance in clarifying this structural depend-
ence, still accepting an overstated version of state-managed
capitalism. O'Connor sees the state budget as the primary
spur of capitalist accumulation, and primary cause and
remedy of accumulation crises; Habermas argues a politici-
zation of the state over its interference in cultural
practices. Both seriously underplay the role of class
dynamics outside the state in affecting the areas they
examine: investment and economic growth, and cultural
degradation. With their primary focus on the state, both
assume what they must in fact explain: how a questioning
of state power, over economic growth or cultural crisis,
will necessarily be connected by participants to a ques-
tioning of capitalist social relations. That is, the dis-
placement of crisis into the state posited by both
theorists reflects, what I might without too much crudity
describe as, true and ideological judgments about the
state's role in late capitalism.
Four
. The place of race relations in recent legitimacy
problems cannot be fully understood without an analysis of
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its sexual aspects. These aspects reveal deep connections
between the structures of capitalism and patriarchy, con-
stitutive belief systems and social identity, and the
political system of the New Deal state. These connections
show that race has played a more independent and more
widely implicated role in recent legitimation problems than
that attributed to it by liberal, Marxist, and hermeneutic
theories of legitimacy—though indeed each of these per-
spectives contributes something to our understanding of
these connections.
My work provides new support to the analysis of
American race relations as a quasi-nationalist form of
social relations—that it is a "precipitate" of capitalism
and patriarchy not reducible to either. Others, like
Robert Allen, have adopted the (semi) nationalist position
not only out of the persuasiveness of the "internal colo-
nies" argument, but also out of deep frustration with
white reformers. It is argued that Afro-American politics
must have an independent organizational basis, in part, to
counteract the ever-present tendency of white reformers to
subordinate racial reform to other considerations, to see
racial justice as the inevitable outcome of their own
agenda, and generally to reproduce the racism of the cul-
ture in their organizations. But the contribution of
sexual racism, and of racial-sexual interaction generally,
to these problems remains a public secret and an explosive
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source of discord in racial coalitions on the left. The
historical neglect of sexual inequality per se by a male-
dominated left is clearly a source of these racial divi-
sions. Moreover, I suspect that my analysis will scarcely
provide comfort to advocates of black nationalism, com-
plexly tied as black nationalism is to assertions of black
manhood assertions often blatantly misogynist. Yet a
public recognition of sexual racism by all parties is essen-
tial to transcending the destructive barriers it expresses,
not only for non-whites, but for the entire spectrum of
left interests.
In fact, race, sex, and class may be so deeply inter-
twined in the American situation that no progress beyond a
certain point is possible on any of them without progress
on all of them. For instance, if my arguments about the
debt of racial nationalisms to sexuality are correct, then
they have significant implications for an account of work-
ing class formation in the U.S. I would be prepared to
argue that the relative failure of working class politics
in this country has had a great deal to do with the common
cultural-sexual ground that could be articulated across the
white class structure, especially with respect to race.
The failure to apprehend and struggle around this source of
underdevelopment rests not only on a male-identified left's
neglect of sexual politics, but also on a rigidly
reductionists, antipsychological stance towards culture
prevalent on the left.
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In virtually the only place where Marx discussed
class as a sociological concept, he spoke of class as a
potential to which shared community and culture were essen-
tial. The most perceptive of contemporary Marxist histori-
ans, Raymond Williams and E. P. Thompson among others, have
convincingly illustrated this in a way quite congenial to
the hermeneutic principles I have employed. But in compari-
son to Western European counterparts, the U.S. working class
has not as fully developed this distinct culture.
The racial source of this "cultural underdevelopment ,
"
I think, is immanent in the gender relations and alienated
sensuality of any capitalist patriarchy. But U.S. demog-
raphy has always been distinguished from that of European
countries by the physical presence of significant numbers
of non-Europeans—a situation reflective of our colonial
origins. This "material" difference, in Aristotle's sense,
allowed the racial potential in American capitalist patri-
archy to flourish, a potential realized in successful claims
to racial solidarity across the white class structure.
Captured in the opposition between civilized and barbarian
peoples, such solidarity is an alternate form of community
to that of class. While class identification has existed
and does exist among the U.S. working class, racial divi -
sions have consistently hindered its struggles, and a sense
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of fundamental class opposition has always been surrounded
and often stunted by the cultural envelope of racial commu-
nity with other classes.
l±y.e • The analysis developed in this dissertation goes some
distance in clarifying contemporary political developments.
In the first place, the past ten years or so have witnessed
a vast direct politicization of family and sexual issues.
Middle class white women confronted their own subordinate
status in male-dominated civil rights and anti-war move-
ments, arriving at liberal and radical feminist critiques of
society. Their challenge to sex roles tapped into widely
felt experience of oppression among women, yet neglected
crucial class and racial differences in this experience.
They have also shared with later left feminists the fright-
ening image—sometimes deserved, often the result of a
neglect which allowed this caricature—of being anti-family.
New Right men and women have rushed into this partial
vaccum around the family, expressing and trading on the
aspirations and worst fears of those who find kinship a
source of identity and of comfort in a troubled world, of
those who find this anchor of personal life threatened by
an array of forces. The New Right has tellingly used,
partly through default on the left
,
a perceived threat to
the family as a major focus of social analysis--of crime,
pornography, violence against women, schools which are
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troubled and failing and teaching the wrong values. Blind
or cynical about the capitalist and patriarchal sources of
these problems, New Right leadership mobilizes a fearful
public against what it and its cadres are inclined to see
as the major sources of pressure against the family—the
government and the liberal left. Thus New Right propaganda
stresses liberal and feminist "plans" for a federal Depart-
ment of Family Affairs to coordinate the state’s challenge
to parental authority.
The overt politicization of family and sexual life
has clearly been fed by the less-explicit ly acknowledged
sexual politics of integration. When the right speaks of
troubled schools, sexually-based fears of integration are
high on its list; in this it addresses a potentially vast
audience. The left has not yet focused on or sought to
defuse this source of support for the right. Not that it
would be easy; but surely things would be worse left unsaid.
My analysis also helps us see how racism and a resur-
gence of racist violence, even when not directly manipulated
by political-economic elites, are an all-too-obvious outlet
for the fears wrapped up in a crisis of, or challenge to,
capitalism and patriarchy. Race unites the mores of these
modes of domination; always perceived as threats, blacks
serve once again in a time of crisis as mirrors for the
development of capitalist patriarchy's culture.
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The continuing process of cultural erosion which
Habermas focuses on feeds the potential for nationalist
politics, it provides the very material required for
nationalism's nostalgic appeals. Thus both racism and
threatened machismo are essential to the rhetoric and con-
victions of the right's international stance. Descriptions
of third world challenges to U.S. hegemony as barbaric and
uncivilized clearly call on and reinforce domestic racist
sentiments. There is a strong streak of plantation men-
tality visible in the right's attitude toward the third
world: the only tolerable third world nations are those
led by pliant and civilized "house servants"
j indigenous
challenges to their rule are interpreted here in the
metropolis as both imported (trouble-makers in the ghetto)
and as a threat to American manhood (the pitiful giant
syndrome)
.
With the virtual abandonment of integration, and the
continued ghettoized confinement of non-whites, this colo-
nial attitude is now being blatantly re-introduced to
domestic U.S. race relations. Plans for urban "free enter-
prise" zones resemble nothing so much as the U.S. client
states in which American capital exploits the local popula-
tion free of state restraints (recognized unions, minimum
wage laws, health and safety measures), and with the aid
of violent repression. This proposal has substantial sup-
port not just on the right, but potentially among white
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politicians who are abandoning or moderating their support
for welfare liberalism.
The left cannot successfully meet these challenges
without an understanding of their roots. Nor can it meet
them without addressing the related racial and sexual divi-
sions which dilute its own strength. My analysis, I think,
contributes a beginning to this sorely-needed clarification.
It also gives additional reasons, if any more are needed,
why plausible visions of an alternative society are essen-
tial to the left's success: visions of a non-repressive
work life, of a diversity of roles open to men and to
women, of a society which prizes human interaction and
culture as objects in themselves, and of a society which
respects ethnic diversity without erecting ethnic barriers.
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